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Abstract 
This thesis explores the role and effectiveness of police authorities in 
connecting policing and the citizen and in increasing the citizen's involvement 
in the delivery of their policing service. The thesis examines: police authorities 
in the context of citizenship and in relation to accountability; and whether the 
operational function of law enforcement, the original charge of Keeping the 
Kings Peace and policing by consent - can work homogenously within a 
system characterised by both active and passive citizenry. 
Individual chapters discuss whether police authorities have sufficient 
power, whether the home secretary and chief constable have too much 
power, and the propensity of police authorities to demand answers and call 
the police service to account. 
As history shows, it is possible to have a police service carrying out 
policing functions in the absence of a police authority performing a scrutiny 
function; but it would be impossible to have a police authority without a police 
service. Therefore, the thesis argues that the added value, the relevance and 
the effectiveness of police authorities needs to be unambiguous. 
Key words: 
police authority, chief constable, home secretary, tripartite, consultation, 
obligation, participation, decision, power, watch committees, institution, 
accountability, Scarman, bequeath, passive, active, social contract, 
falsification, rectification, 
CHAPTER1 
OVERVIEW OF THESIS pp. 1-4 
CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction p., 5-6 
My methodological approach pp. 6-8 
Choice of method; a quantitative or qualitative approach pp. 8- 11 
Implications of a quantitative approach: pp. 11-14 
Implications of a qualitative approach pp. 14-17 
The impact of bias, concepts & definitions within social research pp-17-19 
Concepts pp. 19-22 
The importance of generalisation for quantitative research pp. 22-24 
Grounded Theory pp. 24-26 
Interviews and questionnaires pp. 26-31 
Using case studies pp. 31-34 
Single or multiple studies and the problem of generalisability pp. 34-36 
Conclusion pp. 36-38 
ii 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EVOLUTION FROM THE WATCH COMMITTEE 
TO THE MODERN POLICE AUTHORITY 
Introduction p. 42-48 
The birth of a police service p. 48 
Keeping the King's Peace pp. 48-49 
Statute of Winchester pp. 49-51 
The duties of a constable pp. 51-53 
Police reform: contributors and legislation pp. 53-59 
The early Watch Committee and police authority P. 59 
Watch Committees pp. 59-65 
Justices of the peace pp. 65-66 
Inspection and the County and Borough Police Act 1856 pp. 66-68 
The Police Act 1964 pp. 68-74 
The core functions of the police authority pp. 73-77 
Conclusion pp. 77-78 
iii 
CHAPTER 4 
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 
Introduction pp. 80-84 
The contentious issue of citizenship pp. 85-94 
Alienation pp. 94-101 
Perspectives on Citizenship pp. 99-10/ 
Active Citizenship pp. 102-102 
Passive Citizenship pp. 102-105 
Marshall on citizenship pp. 105-110 
Political context of citizenship pp. 110-113 
Sense of belonging pp. 113-117 
Emerging forms of citizenship pp. 117-122 
The Social Contract pp, 122-124 
Dependency and manipulation pp. 133-1xx 
Accountability through consultation and participation pp. 133-11 
Comparative representation and diversity in our institutions pp. 138-141 
Tables: 
Employment & ethnic Communities p. 139 
Ethnic minority representation p. 141 
Ethnic minorities' representation on public bodies' p. 143 
Obligation and consent pp. 146-153 
Conclusion - pp. 153-156 
iv 
CHAPTER 5 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Introduction p. 157 
The stakeholders pp. 159 
Association of Police Authorities (APA) pp. 160 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
and the Audit Commission pp. 160-161 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) pp. 161-162 
Police Federation p. 162-163 
Accountability Defined pp. 163-165 
Accountability Described pp. 163-174 
Accountability through financial Allocation pp. 174-176 
Accountability, trust and the police authority under fire pp. 177-178 
The Humberside Police Authority pp. 178-179 
Nottingham Police Authority pp. 179-180 
The structure of police authority accountability pp. 181-183 
Accountability through regulatory bodies pp. 183-184 
Corrective action and accountability through policing plans pp. 184-189 
Accountability through monitoring and efficiency targets pp. 189-191 
Accountability through best value reviews pp. 191-194 
Accountability through financial resources pp. 194-201 
Accountability through representation pp. 201-205 
Accountability through mergers pp. 205-207 
V 
Police authority members and committees 
Appointment 
Payment for members' 
Tables 
5: 1 Basic and special responsibility allowances 
5: 2 Basic and Special Responsibility Allowances 
Conclusion 
pp. 207-208 
pp. 208-209 
pp. 209-211 
p. 210 
p. 211 
pp. 215-221 
CHAPTER 6 
DEMYSTIFYING THE POLICE AUTHORITY: INTERVIEW 
AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
interview and Questionnaire results pp. 222-224 
Ultimate Responsibility pp. 224-229 
Operational and strategic responsibility pp. 229-232 
Training pp. 232-233 
The Tripartite system pp. 233-244 
Consultation and participation pp. 244-247 
Measuring the impact of the police authority pp. 247-249 
Enhancing accountability pp. 249-257 
Policing Plans pp. 257-259 
vi 
CHAPTER 7 
THE POLICE AUTHORITY DEMYSTIFIED: 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
Consultation participation and obligation pp. 260-270 
Awareness of police authorities pp. 270-274 
Measuring the impact of police authorities pp. 274-278 
The Tripartite System pp. 278-282 
Accountability pp. 282-284 
Accountability through performance pp. 284-290 
Structures and supervision pp. 290-289 
Policy and processes pp. 289-290 
Training and resources pp. 290-291 
System failure and conflicts pp. 291-293 
The budgetary powers of the police authority pp. 293-295 
Implications for policy and practice pp. 295-298 
Accountability pp. 298-300 
Competing Agendas pp. 300-302 
Appointed or elected officials pp. 302-305 
Rebalancing the Relationship pp. 305-312 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
pp. 313-328 
vii 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Structured questionnaire pp. 329-233 
Semi-structured interview schedule pp. 233-338 
Appendix 2 
List of interviewee's pp. 338-339 
Appendix 3 
Chronology of Acts pp. 339-347 
ABBREVIATIONS p. 348 
FIGURES 
Table 4: 1 Employment rates of communities (2005) p. 139 
Table 4: 2 Entry to Higher Education 
Table 4: 3 Ethnic minority representation (2004) p. 141 
Table 4: 4 Numbers of Ethnic Minority members in police authorities p-142 
Table 5: 1 Basic and special responsibility allowances p. 209 
Table 5: 2 Basic and Special Responsibility Allowances p. 210 
Figure. 6: 1 Who is ultimately responsible for policing? p. 224 
Figure. 6: 2 In disputes who has the final decision? p. 226 
Figure. 6: 3 Where does the balance of power reside? p. 227 
Figure. 6: 4 Do you (police authority members) have regular training and 
briefing days? p. 232 
Figure. 6: 5 Is this training sufficient? p. 233 
viii 
Figure. 6: 6 Is the tripartite system relevant? p. 233 
Figure. 6: 7 The position of the police authority within the tripartite structure is? 
p. 235 
Figure. 6: 8 Within the tripartite system is the police authority proactive or 
reactive? p. 237 
Figure. 6: 9 Who is responsible for investigating complaints against senior 
police officers? p. 238 
Figure. 6: 1 0 Is this responsibility compatible with the strategic role of the police 
authority? p. 238 
Figure. 6: 1 1 Who do members represent? p. 240 
Figure. 6: 112 Are members doing enough to represent those identified in p. 242 
Figure. 6: 13 Is the police authority doing enough to represent its constituents? 
p. 242 
Figure-6: 14 Are people likely to participate if they feel represented? p. 244 
Figure. 6: 115 How effective are Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCG) 
p. 245 
Figure. 6: 16 Do they attract a representative audience? p. 246 
Figure. 6: 17 Does the police service respond differently as a result of the 
involvement of the police authority? p. 247 
Figure. 6: 18 Can accountability be strengthened by electing police authority 
chairs and members? p. 249 
Figure. 6: 119 Would electing members be more democratic than appointments? 
p. 252 
ix 
Figure. 6: 20 Would elected chief constables improve accountability and give the 
local community a greater say? p. 253 
Figure. 6: 23 Do you think the citizen knows about police authorities? p. 255 
Figure. 6: 24 Do you think citizens are aware of the distinction between the 
police service and the police authority p. 256 
Figure. 6: 25 Do national policing plans contradict local priorities? p. 257 
Figure-7: 11 Is the citizen obliged to participate? p. 260 
Figure. 7: 2 Is the ability to impose punitive measures important for 
accountability? p. 278 
Figure. 7: 3 Do you see a distinction between accountability and transparency? 
p. 281 
x 
CHAPTER1 
OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
My interest in this area of criminology developed after I was 
approached by the Metropolitan Police Authority to be an adviser on new 
Home Office guidelines on Independent Custody Visiting - formerly known 
as Lay Visiting. My experience at the Metropolitan Police Authority raised 
my awareness of this very important organisation which very few people - 
myself included - had ever heard of. I was also intrigued about how police 
authorities operated and how - if at all - they engaged with local people. 
Most research, discussion and debate on policing has historically 
been about the role and the functions of the police service. In particular, the 
focus has predominantly been around how the police service balances the 
sometimes conflicting requirement of enforcing the law and policing by 
consent (Scarman: 1981). Police authorities occupy a pivotal position in that 
they have a legal duty to scrutinise the police service and to ensure that 
there is an effective and efficient police service for each area. Despite this, 
very little research has been done on police authorities. 
In this thesis I seek to do three things; firstly, to look at the role of 
police authorities within the tripartite system of the chief constable, the 
police authority and the Home Secretary. Secondly, I explore the extent to 
which police authorities enable citizens to feel a sense of involvement in the 
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delivery of their policing service and thirdly, I explore whether police 
authorities are able to adequately bring the police service to account. As 
expressed by Bayley (1991), law enforcement is the most visibly coercive 
tool of government and as citizens we give our authority and consent in the 
hope that our way of life and our assets are protected. 
This research seeks to build on the existing body of work on policing 
and is intended to stimulate further thought and debate around; 
a) The relevancy of police authorities, their potential and their 
actual impact, 
b) The role of police authorities in relation to the citizen, the 
police service and accountability. 
C) The views of police authority members on how they 
perceive their role and the role of the police authority. 
In chapter two I present my methodological approach and explore a 
number of important themes including quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to research and their application within this study. Drawing on 
Becker (1972), Weber (1949), Denscombe (2002), Ainsworth (1962), 
Bulmer, (1982), Popper (1959) and others, I explore the role of bias, 
concepts, definition, replication and falsification within social research. 
In chapter three, I provide an historical account of the development of 
policing and the emergence of watch committees which developed into the 
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police authorities that we know today. I also discuss the anomalies and the 
oversights of the Police Act 1964 which even today still impacts on police 
authorities. Finally, I explore the difficult juxtaposition between policing 
policy at the strategic and national level, its representation in local policing 
plans and the process of implementation at the local level. 
In chapter four I present my theoretical approach which looks at 
citizenship and policing in the context of the state's primary function which is 
to provide the conditions conducive to a harmonious and secure life 
(Bentham, 1960; Held, 1999). In this chapter I explore the relationship 
between the citizen and their institutions and I discuss how these various 
relationships impact on the collective sense of belonging (Parekh: 2000). 
Passive and active citizenry are significant features in this chapter and I 
return to the proposition that whether or not we actively participate with our 
institutions, the plethora of institutions and bodies that have sprung up to 
represent us are indicative of the expectation on the part of policy makers 
that the citizen will be engaged and that the state will be increasingly 
accountable even if that accountability is at arms length through 
representative bodies, regulators or Quasi Non-Govern mental Organisations 
(QANGOs). 
The crosscutting theme throughout this thesis is the social contract 
and how police authorities contribute to upholding and rejuvenating the 
contract between the state and the citizen. The perception that citizens are 
increasingly alienated from the decision making process is a cause for 
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concern and I cite the report of the Sheehey Committee (1993), the 
government White Paper on police reform which led in 1994 to the Police 
and Magistrates Courts Act, the Scarman report (1981) and the McPherson 
report (1999) as examples of attempts to ensure that the citizen has access, 
can increasingly be involved and can demand more accountability. 
Chapter five focuses on accountability and explores the many ways 
that police authorities can ensure that the police service is accountable. 
Through the works of Day and Klein (1987), Mulgan (2003) Pyper (1996), 
Howard (2005), Loveday and Reid (2003) and others I discuss democracy, 
accountability, engagement and obligation. In this chapter, I ask whether 
increased accountability can lead to increased participation and I add that in 
order for there to be increased participation, trust is the uncompromising 
special ingredient that the citizen must have in the institutions representing 
them. 
In chapter six I present the findings from my interviews and 
questionnaires and in chapter seven, I draw conclusions and discuss 
Possible implications for policy and practice. I conclude by discussing 
whether accountability is as much about knowing what questions to ask as it 
is about ensuring that there is sufficient information, checks and balances 
and clarity about the mechanisms for bringing about that accountability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
My aim during this chapter is to present and discuss the research 
methodology that I have applied to this study and to explain my choice. On 
the following pages I explore the advantages and the disadvantages of 
primary and secondary data. Whilst I have applied a qualitative approach to 
this research I have discussed the implications of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies on social research more generally and on my research in 
particular. I reference the works of Black (1999) and Hirschman's (1993) 
research on the imbalance between the use of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies; Layder (1993) and his conclusion of there being a lack of 
clarity between qualitative and quantitative approaches; Atkinson and 
Hammersley (1995) and the need for fidelity in research and Eisner and 
Peshkin's (1990) four schools of thought to methodological approaches. 
During this chapter I present a detailed discussion about the role and impact 
of concepts, bias, replication and definition as discussed by Weber (1949), 
Bulmer (1970), Denscombe (2002), Ainsworth (1962), Becker (1972), Bulmer, 
(1982) and Blalock (1970). 
Questionnaires and interviews play an important role within grounded 
theory and I evaluate some of the potential difficulties presented by using 
questionnaires and interviews including Webb and Webb's (1932) insistence 
that oral accounts are notoriously unreliable, Popper's (1959) theory of 
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falsification and Wallace's balanced appraisal of the merits and pitfalls of 
questionnaires and interviews. Finally, I explore the various considerations 
around undertaking case studies and appraise the merits of conducting single 
or multiple case studies and the resource implications for undertaking 
sequential or simultaneous studies. Finally, I discuss the challenge and the 
importance of ensuring that any study is sufficiently robust and capable of 
comparative analysis. 
Whilst outlining my methodological approach, this chapter also 
performs the dual function of a defence of my chosen methodology. According 
to Denscombe (2002), when it comes to the choice of strategy, methods or 
analysis, social research is rarely a matter of right or wrong. The decision is 
therefore about choice and whether the choices made are reasonable. 
'... there is a need for social researchers to provide justification for their 
research methodology ... What the researcher must do is show that the 
adopted approach is fit for purpose, logically organised, better than 
alternative approaches rather than arguing that one is right whilst the 
other is wrong or unethical' (Denscombe, 2002: 124). 
My methodological approach 
It is important that I state from the outset that this was a very small 
research sample and there are limitations to the extent that the results from 
this research can be extrapolated and applied more widely. 
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I have designed and sent questionnaires to all forty two police 
authorities and I have carried out a series of in-depth interviews. There is a 
degree of caution necessary when using oral evidence: according to Webb 
and Webb (1932: 142) '... of all recognised sources of information, oral 
evidence has proved to be the least profitable'. I am therefore not using 
questionnaires and interviews in order to unequivocally substantiate a position 
but that, through a process of triangulation (Mathison, 1988) 1 can assert that 
a position or a stance is relevant now at this time and place (Popper, 1959). 
I have designed a concise questionnaire survey that has been emailed 
to all police authorities (see appendix 1). Some police authorities have generic 
email addresses where all correspondence is filtered to the police authority 
member by Member Services. However where direct contact details have 
been available I have emailed the questionnaire directly to individual police 
authority members. Some police authorities such as Hertfordshire Police 
Authority have a designated member to respond on behalf of the police 
authority. 
There are approximately 760 police authority members in the 42 police 
authorities in England and Wales. In November and December 2007 1 sent 
questionnaire surveys to all police authority members and initially had 81 
returned and completed. In January 2008 1 resent a further 200 
questionnaires to police authority members and received a further 27 
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completed questionnaires. In total I received 1081 completed questionnaires. 
New empirical ground has been covered by this research as nothing in 
literature suggests that any other researcher has had such a high level of 
contact with police authorities. For example, I have received questionnaire 
responses from 14% of police authority members. I conducted 25 in-depth 
interviews (see appendix 2) with specific individuals, police authority 
members, significant gatekeepers between the community, the police service 
and the police authority. My interviewees included police authority members, 
the former Home Secretary - the Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP-, the Chairman of 
the Association of Police Authorities, the Executive Director of the Association 
of Police Authorities, the Policy Officer of the Association of Police Authorities, 
the Clerk to the Metropolitan Police Authority, a former chief constable and a 
very senior grade 5 civil servant. There are a number of interviewees whose 
identity has been kept secret due to the sensitivity of the comments they have 
made. 
Choice of method: a quantitative or qualitative approach 
After selecting the subject matter to research, the next and probably 
the most important question the researcher is confronted with is the decision 
of which is the most appropriate methodological approach to apply to tackling 
the research question. Eisner and Peshkin identify four schools of thought to 
methodological approaches. The first identifies 'those who regard positivist 
and qualitative approaches as complementary, each having its own strength 
1 See Appendix 1 
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and place in social research' (Eisner and Peshkin, 1990: 11). From this 
perspective it is the question that should drive the method, not the method 
driving the question. The second school of thought identified by Eisner and 
Peshkin (1990) emanates from those who maintain that whilst qualitative 
research might be good for exploratory work it is generally a soft and less 
trustworthy research methodology. 
Eisner and Peshkin's third school believes positivist and scientific 
methods are suspect because they are based on a deterministic causal model 
which does not fit the social arena in which human action takes place. In his 
analysis Hammersley (1995: 1) goes a little further stating that 'most of the 
references to positivism are negative and are disparaging if not dismissive. ' 
Positivism for Hammersley is rejected not only on intellectual grounds but 
morally and politically because it involves the disguising of value biases as 
objective knowledge and implies support for the socio-political status quo. 
Hammersley argues that in disguising bias and by accepting that this enables 
or creates objective knowledge, positivism is rendered morally and socially 
bankrupt. The fourth school of thought identified by Eisner and Peshkin 
denies that there are any significant differences between qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies and maintains that the differences that are 
highlighted are grossly exaggerated. 
My methodological inclination is towards Eisner and Peshkin's first 
school of thought which sees qualitative and quantitative approaches as 
complementary: this is because I believe that it is the question that should 
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drive the method not the method driving the question. I also accept that whilst 
there are differences between qualitative and quantitative methodologies, 
these differences may at times be exaggerated. For example, if during my 
research I pose the question, how many police authorities have conducted 
improvement plans? Answering this question lends itself to a quantitative 
approach requiring the gathering of empirical statistical data. Conversely, if I 
ask about the quality of those plans? Answering this question would primarily 
require a qualitative approach where the definition of quality and an 
understanding of social concepts and biases would be required. Here both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches diverge and converge and rather than 
rendering their individual use incompatible, their differences ensures their 
compatibility and complementarity. 
When accepting or rejecting methodological approaches the primary 
consideration ought to be whether the research question can be sufficiently 
understood and logically argued through a qualitative and/or quantitative 
approach. Majchrzak (1984) and Majone (1980) were clear about the benefits 
of qualitative approaches and they argued that as far as policy research was 
concerned, technical analysis involved far more than the simple collection and 
analysis of quantitative data. Majchrzak (1984) saw that discourse and the 
rational scrutiny of information were important elements in the technical 
analysis of social problems. This is further supported by Alvesson and 
Sk6ldberg (2000) who maintain that empirical data is not always a 
prerequisite for the development of a theory and that primary reliance on 
empirical data runs the risk of the research being deficient on the first 
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occasion the data encounters unexpected circumstances. For this reason, 
Alvesson and Sk6ldberg believe that empirical approaches need to be 
interspersed with action research or qualitative approaches. 
Implications of a quantitative approach and the use of empirical data 
According to Bulmer (1982: 31): 
'... the propositions of social sciences must be tested against 
observational data to survive as tenable generalisations ... where the 
production of accurate, meticulous and precise data constitutes an end 
in and of itself. 
In order to effectively research this thesis it is unavoidable that I will 
need to use empirical data: the question is therefore whether I can reasonably 
rely on existing data (published or unpublished) or whether primary data 
needs to be collected. 
The quantitative approach was developed by scientists studying the 
physical world and was labelled positivism in the early 20th century by 
Whitehead and Russell (1962) in Pfincipia Mathematica. As an approach, 
positivism measures the mathematical relationships between sets of variables 
and as a methodological approach it reaffirms the importance of imitating the 
natural sciences. Logical quantitative research begins with a statement of 
II 
hypotheses and through a process of deduction ends with an evaluation of the 
hypotheses (Bryman, 2001). 
'... the positivist approach is preceded by the selection and generation 
of hypotheses and often followed by an attempted generalisation to a 
wider situation, it is accordingly not dissimilar to qualitative approaches' 
(Bryman, 2001: 12). 
Bryman advises that caution should be taken to ensure that we do not: 
'... treat positivism as synonymous with science and the scientific... 
[because] ... when writers complain about the limitations of positivism it 
is not entirely clear whether they mean the philosophical term or a 
scientific approach more generally' (Bryman, 2001: 12). 
For Gephart (1988), because of its reliance on empirical data, the 
central core of the quantitative approach is positivist. Bryman (2001) 
questions whether the social world can and should be studied according to 
the same principles, procedures and ethos as natural science which sees 
setting up formal experiments as the only way of establishing causal links 
(Light, Singer and Willett, 1990). Maxwell (2004) also agrees with the 
positivist approach that the social world can be studied according to the same 
principles, procedures and ethos as natural science. 
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I ... when compared with 
descriptive, relational, and experimental 
approaches only experimental inquiries enable the researcher to 
determine whether a treatment causes an outcome to change' 
(Maxwell, 2004: 243). 
Hirschman (1993) found that there was a great imbalance between 
quantitative and qualitative publications and that between the 1980's and the 
early 1990s, the use of quantitative models to test consumer behaviour 
theories was most prominent. Hirschman proposed that this drive towards 
quantification had decontextualised entities and constructed artificial linkages 
on the basis of worth and utility. Wallendorf and Bucks (1993) and Gould 
(1995) felt there was room for researcher introspection as a method of 
focusing awareness along with extrospection -a focus on the external world. 
Black (1999) sees everyday observations as haphazard, careless and 
unsystematic, whereas the observations carried out by scientists encleavour 
to be specific, objective, well focused, systematic and most importantly, 
capable of being replicated. 'The difference between commonsense 
explanations and scientific ones lie in the way the two originate' (Black, 1999: 
2). 
I have seen no guarantees or evidence to support the assertion that 
studies which are systematic and organised in this way are anymore likely to 
produce valid explanations than other approaches. Bryman explains that: 
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'The doctrine of positivism is difficult to pin down and to outline but for 
some writers it is a descriptive category that describes a philosophical position 
that can be discerned in research; for others it is a pejorative term used to 
describe crude and often superficial data collection' (Bryman, 2001: 11-12). 
For Layder (1993: 110) the status of the '-distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative is ambiguous ... no longer useful or simply 
false'. 
Strauss (1987: 278) warns that researchers must stop themselves from 
thinking in quantitative terms; for example 'what percentage of x will do Y, with 
what probability', as this is unhelpful. 
Implications of a qualitative approach 
While the positivist approach is dominant in the physical and natural 
sciences, the qualitative approach is more frequently applied in the social 
sciences. In contrast to quantitative approaches where variables are tightly 
defined, have limited overlap and can readily be measured, qualitative 
approaches embrace concepts which are more ambiguous or for which there 
exists a range of interpretations (Bryman, 2001). The qualitative approaches 
reject the practices and norms of natural sciences and see social reality as 
constantly shifting (Bryman, 2001: 20). The reliance of quantitative research 
on quantification, verification and duplication in the collection and analysis of 
its data results in social reality being viewed as an external objective reality 
(Gephart, 1988). In contrast, Morse (1994) explains that qualitative research 
relies on inference, insight, logic, luck, words and social interpretation and 
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rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data, it emphasises 
an inductive rather than a deductive approach with the emphasis placed on 
generating theories as opposed to being concerned with the testing of 
theories as in quantitative approaches (Goulding, 2002; Morse, 1994; 
Bryman, 2001). 
Qualitative approaches also have difficulty with replication; 'If a second 
researcher were to study the same group or society the experiences and 
findings would differ, it is therefore difficult to measure real changes' (Blalock, 
1970: 45). This knowledge does not however render Blalock unsympathetic to 
the plight of social science and he writes: 
g ... certain methodological difficulties make it difficult to provide 
definitive answers to many questions that might be asked of the social 
scientists, some of these difficulties are shared by all the sciences 
physical as well as social and stem from limitations inherent to the 
scientific model' (Blalock, 1970: 9). 
According to Kvale (1983: 74), the purpose of qualitative research is 
... gathering descriptions of the life and world with respect to the 
interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomenon. 
Bryman (1984) offers a compromise and suggests that linking 
qualitative and quantitative approaches offers a more sophisticated way of 
treating the comparability of the different methods of investigation. Anderson 
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(1986: 159) identifies that 'methods do not uniquely pick out particular 
theories and that scientific goals may be achieved via alternative methods'. 
For example, the analytical tool employed by qualitative researchers is words 
as opposed to numbers and statistics. Qualitative researchers employ 
linguistics, social and psychological skills to interpret and analyse situations. 
There are, however, exceptions to this such as content analysis which 
according to Berelson (1952: 18) and Holsti (1969: 14) is essentially a 
systematic and objective quantitative technique. Morse (1994) has explained 
that as a technique, content analysis is also widely used by qualitative 
researchers and involves the search for patterns through the analysis of the 
content. 
Whilst it is a useful methodological approach, I believe that adopting a 
content analysis approach would alter the essential fabric of the subject 
matter of this thesis, resulting in the research becoming preoccupied with the 
process of content analysis to the detriment of the broader aims of the thesis. 
Atkinson and Hammersley (1995) allude to this and cautioned that rather than 
being preoccupied with methodology the social scientist ought to be 
preoccupied with fidelity to the phenomenon under study. Bryman (2001) 
supports this and asserts that the qualitative researcher is on a journey of 
discovery rather than one of verification. I also agree with Bulmer (1982: 166) 
when he states that: 
'Social science is likely to contribute most by blending its theoretical 
insights with empirical inquiry by cultivating the interpretation and 
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understanding of the world through a judicious mixture of the concrete 
and the abstract'. 
The impact of bias, concepts and definitions within social research 
Within any research the potential of bias and its impact requires careful 
consideration. Becker (1972) noted that when studying social phenomena 
social scientists are caught in a crossfire between those who urge them to be 
neutral and value free and those who maintain that '... if the scientist does not 
express deep commitment to a position then their work is shallow and 
useless' (Becker, 1967: 239). Becker maintains that this is a false dilemma as 
one would have to accept that it is possible to do research that is 
uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies. For Becker, personal 
and political sympathies are inevitable and so the question is not whether the 
researcher should take sides but on whose side they are on. Becker explains 
that we naturally and unintentionally fall into sympathies with people or the 
subject matter that we are researching and focus too much on leading 
questions which leads respondent to provide specific answers. In his analogy 
of the deviant he explains that '... we fail to ask those questions which can 
lead us to conclude that the deviant has indeed done something wrong' 
(Becker, 1967: 240) and as a result our overall assessment of the situation 
becomes one-sided. 
Becker identifies three types of bias: Subordinate bias, 'N political bias 
and political bias. Becker describes a hierarchy of credibility which impacts on 
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bias; Firstly there is Subordinate bias; '... in any system of ranked groups we 
take it for granted that members at the highest level have the right to define 
the way things really are' (Becker, 1967: 241). Secondly, there is 'A' political 
bias. According to Becker officials lie because things are not always as they 
would like them to be and things do not perform as society would like them to: 
for example, hospitals do not cure people, prisons do not rehabilitate and 
schools do not educate and MP's salaries do not match their expectations. 
For Becker (1967), the view of an institution from the perspective of the 
subordinate therefore casts doubt on the official line. This is what Becker calls 
'A' political bias and he argues that more research is biased in favour of 
institutions than the citizen. 
The other bias which the researcher can be accused of is political bias. 
Any research that may have political ramifications potentially places the 
researcher in double jeopardy as spokespersons on competing sides of an 
argument may be sensitive to the work and its conclusions. Indeed, the very 
statement of the question and the way it is phrased may be problematic. 
I ... research can provide evidence which will enable those pursuing 
particular policies to give them scientific respectability; research 
becomes ammunition for the side that finds the researcher's 
conclusions most congenial and supportive' (Bulmer, 1982: 156). 
Implicit to discussions on bias is the assumption that the researcher is 
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either swayed between left or right or that they are opposed to or accepting of 
an argument or position. In reality, however, this is rarely the case and there 
is no carte blanche position on bias as researchers may hold sympathies for 
more than one side of a debate which may vary and fluctuate resulting in a 
myriad of sensitivities and biases being reflected throughout the work. As 
Hammersley (1995: 188) notes '... research is political in some respects and 
not in others and it is relative to how one defines the terms involved, 
especially the word 'political' itself. 
Whichever side we are on, Becker argues that we must work in such a 
way that '... a belief to which we are especially sympathetic could be proved 
untrue' (Becker, 1967: 246) for Becker this is the ultimate neutralising effect of 
owning one's bias. 
Concepts 
The ambiguity of concepts, definitions and the ability to replicate sit at 
the very heart of this debate about methodology and has always been the 
central cause of controversy between those social scientists who adhere to a 
qualitative approach and those who are more aligned to the processes and 
procedures of the natural sciences. Blalock (1970) explains that this debate is 
not exclusive to social sciences but is also prevalent in physical sciences. In 
order to deal with the inherent ambiguity of concepts Blumer (1970) 
encouraged the use of sensitising concepts rather than definitive definitions. 
For Blumer, terms like institutions, citizenship, race, ethnicity, attitudes, social 
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class, social process and discrimination are vague because they allow rough 
identification without permitting a determination of what is or is not covered by 
the concept. Blumer, however, does not think there ought to be definitive 
concepts and argues that whilst sensitising concepts are limited - because 
they lack specific attributes or bench marks - we ought to continue to develop 
them as they provide the user with a general sense of reference and guidance 
in approaching empirical instances. 
Weber (1949: 92-93) identified a difficulty which was that the language 
used by social sciences is '... ambiguous constructs created to meet the 
unconsciously conceived need for adequate expression, and whose meaning 
is definitely felt, but not clearly thought out'. For Weber the ideal type is 
created not as a definitive description of a definite aspect of reality, nor is it a 
hypothesis but it can aid description and explanation. Hence, whilst 'this 
mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere, in reality' (Weber, 
1949: 90), it provides a useful tool with which to aid our understanding and 
explanation of our world. One of the inherent difficulties of attempting to define 
concepts explicitly is that with each definition the reality of the lived 
experience is changed or altered through the eyes of the definer. Because it 
defines the experience, like Brewer (2000) and Hammersley (1995), 1 believe 
that the lived experience is valid and significant enough to be relevant and 
included in the research. 
Blumer's contribution to solving the problem of concepts is to develop 
precise and fixed procedures that will yield a stable and definitive empirical 
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content whose success depends on imaginative life studies that are slow, 
tedious but have the virtue of remaining close to their natural world. 
Bulmer (1982: 53) observes that different disciplines define concepts in 
different ways and the implication for social policy is that researchers - in the 
same way that they ought to justify their methodology (Denscombe: 2002) - 
must define their terms and justify the definition that has been selected. The 
definitional crisis deepens for Bulmer when one considers that concepts are 
not used consistently even within a single framework. A good example of this 
is Ainsworth's (1962) concern with the consequences of a lack of love. 
Ainsworth looks at the term maternal deprivation and how it is used to 
describe rejection, hostility, cruelty, over-indulgence, repressive control and 
lack of affection. Rutter (1972: 128) also adds to the discussion by explaining 
that '... experiences included under the term maternal deprivation are too 
heterogeneous and the effects too varied for it to continue to have any 
usefulness... '. 
It is argued, however, that if a variable can be precisely defined and 
distinguished it can be measured and if its occurrence is frequent enough it 
can be usefully studied using quantitative methods (Black, 1999; Denscombe, 
2002; Bulmer, 1982; Goulding, 2002; Bryman, 1984,2001; Blalock, 1970). 
From this position sensitising concepts can positively aid the replicability and 
generalisability of social constructs. 
Due to the possibility that quantitative methodology provides a higher 
possibility of controlling internal and external variables, quantitative 
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approaches are preoccupied with measuring. The genesis of this 
preoccupation is that positivists see the possibility of exact replication aided 
and guided by mathematical and scientific measurability as the defining and 
central characteristic that enables the same conclusions to be drawn time and 
time again. Qualitative research is however more concerned with identifying 
and distinguishing concepts, rather than measuring them because, as Blalock 
(1970) says, replication in social sciences has been rare due to practical 
considerations encapsulated in the need for the researcher to demonstrate 
originality, the need to publish, the importance of literary style and novelty. 
Finally, for Blalock (1970: 44-45), due to there being fewer social scientists 
than the myriad of subjects to study, the researcher spreads to new areas of 
study rather than provide a '... thorough, systematic, and tedious examination 
of the old'. 
The importance of generalisation for quantitative research 
For Donmoyer (1990) the criterion for scientific rigour in quantitative 
research is its capacity to make genera lisations. Whilst the ability to make 
generalisations may be problematic for qualitative studies, Donmoyer 
suggests that this difficulty can be addressed through the use of an alternative 
language for the criteria. I have already discussed some good examples: 
constructing ideal types (Weber: 1949), developing sensitising concepts 
(Blumer: 1970), effectively using our biases (Becker: 1972), or dismantling the 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches (Layder: 1993). 
Donmoyer sights schema theory and its concepts of assimilation, 
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accommodation, integration and differentiation to characterise how 
generalisation occurs in experiential learning and believes that applying this 
language to qualitative research gives it '... far more utility for applied fields 
than was traditionally believed' (1990: 198). 
For the quantitative researcher, generalisation is achieved through 
various channels including ensuring that the size of the sample is sufficiently 
wide to allow the researchers to sample cases that may be typical of the 
subject or the question being researched. If the sample is correctly drawn 
then the results are deemed to be applicable to those in the actual sample 
group and it is also generalisable to a specified population: this is what Yin 
(1994) calls statistical generalisation. 
For Gomm (2000) it is a mistake to base the robustness of research on 
this approach first because there will never be enough cases. Secondly, 
although it is possible to observe and measure human behaviour at the 
individual level without involving the subjects of the research and even to 
formulate law-like generalisations about the behaviour of individuals en 
masse, the value of observational measurement becomes more problematic 
as the scale of observed behaviour grows. Thirdly, behavioural patterns may 
be established which provide a prima facie case for generalisation; however 
without knowing the intensions of those involved, prediction is fragile and as 
Brewer states (2000: 50), '[as] ... the observer's experience is an important 
and legitimate source of data [it is equally important for us to understand the 
meaning and intentions behind the action]. Jorgensen' (1989) agrees that the 
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observer uses his/her initial observations from which to formulate single or 
multiple hypotheses which are then discarded or refined in the research. I am 
therefore inclined to support the view that whilst a compendium of research 
tools from qualitative and quantitative approaches can be employed in most 
research, social science does require a different and distinct research 
approach from the traditional sciences which may be narrative, 
phenomenological, or ethnographic. 
Grounded theory 
In contrast to ethnography, grounded theory has its origins in symbolic 
interactionism and according to Glaser and Strauss (1968: 3) 'The ultimate 
goal of the grounded theory researcher is to develop theory that goes beyond 
thick description. The researcher is expected to interpret actions and develop 
a theory which incorporates concepts of 'self, language, social setting and 
social object' (Schwandt, 1994: 124). Using the principles of grounded theory 
the researcher primarily collects interview data, makes multiple visits to the 
field, develops and intertwines categories of information, writes theoretical 
propositions or hypotheses or presents a visual picture of the theory. Using 
the principles of symbolic interactionism, Glaser and Strauss first articulated 
grounded theory research in their book The Discovery of Grounded Theory 
(1967). They maintained that theories should be grounded in data from the 
field especially in actions, interactions and the social processes of people. 
Glaser argued that the theory should only explain the phenomenon under 
study whilst Strauss insisted on the use of coding matrixes to conceptualise 
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beyond the immediate field of study. Despite the difference between Strauss 
and Glaser'the approach has maintained credibility and is a commonly used 
research methodology' (Goulding, 2002: 45). For Lincoln and Guba (1985: 
300) the central criterion of grounded theory is '... it's credibility, its ability of 
transferability, its dependability and confirmability'. For Hill and McGowan 
(1999), the approach provides reciprocation between data collection, analysis 
and theory and allows frameworks, criteria and observations to emerge and 
evolve throughout the study. 
At the very heart of grounded research is the desire to broaden its 
explanation of a process, an interaction or an action amongst individuals. In 
its attempts to achieve this the approach not only relies on existing theories 
but because it accepts that theory evolves during research and that inquiry is 
context bound, grounded theory generates its own themes and categories 
(Goulding, 2002). For example, during the course of this research a number of 
questions have arisen which have enabled the development of new theories 
around the role of police authorities. Firstly, it is clearly laid out in the Police 
Act 1964 that all police authorities are under a duty to secure the maintenance 
of an 'adequate and efficient' force for their area (Police Act 1964: Section 
4.1). Over recent years, due to the increased attention from the media and 
politicians the role and responsibility of police authorities has risen in 
prominence. One of the thought provoking questions is whether the catalyst 
for this increased prominence has been as a response to the terrorist threat 
and the role of the police (and by extension the expectation and responsibility 
of police authorities) or whether the police authority's role has actually 
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expanded, or whether the long running debate about devolving responsibility 
from the centre of government down to the local level has had an influence on 
the role and workings of police authorities and other similar public bodies. 
What is provided by employing a grounded approach is the possibility to delve 
into the detail and the lived experiences of the participants and the institution. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 12-13) explain that in grounded theory '... the 
researcher does not begin with a theory then proves it, but starts with an area 
of study and what is relevant in that area of study is allowed to emerge'. 
The grounding of theory in data, the process of research inquiry, 
making comparisons and asking theoretical questions ensures that the 
development of theory is possible. For Glaser and Strauss (1967), adding the 
respondent's data ensures that the theory is fully grounded. Grounded theory 
according to Bryman (2001: 397) '... represents the most influential strategy 
for conducting qualitative data analyses'. Goulding (2002) notes that the 
grounded approach is flexible enough to allow n ew theories to be generated. 
For these reasons, the grounded theory approach is aptly suited to my 
research. 
Interviews and questionnaires 
One of the primary sources of information for grounded theorists is the 
interview. Interviewing is a very flexible technique suited to a wide range of 
research purposes. 
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'At one extreme the interviewer may simply read out a list of questions 
and alternative responses ... At the other extreme the interviewer 
adopts a 'non-directive' almost conversational style, allowing the 
interviewee to determine the course of the discussion' (Drever, 1995: 
1). 
For Wallace (1954) the disadvantages of using questionnaires include 
the potential high non-return and low response rate. In order to prevent a low 
response rate, intensive follow up work is needed via, telephone calls, letters, 
personal interviews, etc. For Wallace there is also the likelihood that those 
who return and answer the questionnaire may collectively hold differing 
opinions than non-respondents, leaving the non-respondents as a collection 
of individuals for whom nothing is known. The advantages for Wallace of 
using questionnaires included that questionnaires permit wide coverage for 
the minimum expenditure of effort and money, enabling wider geographic 
coverage and yielding greater validity through larger and more representative 
samples. Questionnaires permit more considered answers and they are more 
effective in situations where group consultations may influence the responses. 
On the issue of generalisability, a questionnaire provides greater uniformity in 
the way questions are posed and gives respondents anonymity and privacy. 
All interviewees in this research were advised that if they wished to 
remain anonymous or if they wanted to speak off the record they were free to 
do so. Anonymous interviews enable the researcher to draw out important 
issues to the phenomenon being studied by allowing participants to describe 
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in detail their experiences. Those interviewed are more likely to provide useful 
contributions to the research, expounding on existing theories and being 
potential catalysts for new theories and ideas. 
Unstructured, semi-structured, face to face, open-ended or 
ethnographic interviews are generally favoured in qualitative approaches and 
grounded theory (Goulding, 2002). Interviews are particularly favoured 
because they are deemed to be flexible enough to enable the research to 
enter areas previously not considered. However this flexibility comes with 
potential difficulties. Fontana and Frey (1994) outline those as difficulties in 
gaining entry, understanding the language, understanding the culture 2 
gaining trust and establishing a rapport with the interviewee. 
As noted by Blumer (1970), interviews involve an element of 
anthropology which requires the researcher to learn new languages and to 
understand the subtle cues and nuances of communication. This for Blumer 
(1970) highlights the need to arrive at commonly accepted definitions through 
sensitising concepts. Realistically, however, the researcher cannot reasonably 
be expected to understand the plethora of cues and nuances of those being 
researched which in-turn increases the likelihood of errors, misjudgement or 
misunderstandings in interpretation. Some attempt can be made to limit the 
incidents of error by comparing interview findings with other data obtained 
through triangulation. 
A theme I return to in chapter 5 
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Mathison (1988: 15) states: 'Extending this metaphor [triangulation] to 
social phenomena, the researcher (navigator or military strategist) can use 
several kinds of information to determine the truth (location) about some 
social phenomenon (an island or the enemy)'. 
As noted by Bryman (2001: 303) problems are also found in other 
approaches such as statistical sampling. 
I ... statistical sampling is a redundant exercise because committing to 
interviewing x percent of an organisation's membership may mean you 
end Up wasting time and resources because you could have confirmed 
the significance of a concept or its connections with other concepts by 
using a much smaller sample. 
There are other problems associated with interviews (particularly face- 
to-face interviews) including the possibility of leading questions, discomfort 
due to the sensitive or personal nature of the subject matter, perceived 
breaches in societal codes of politeness, cultural variances in interaction 
between the sexes, ages and religions or confidentiality concerns. 
Another issue that may affect the data gathering process is that the 
interviewer may have insufficient depth or understanding of the subject matter 
to inquire and draw out pertinent issues resulting in the interviewee 
inadvertently or by design being less than open in revealing information and 
the interviewer being unaware that omissions are being made (Goulding, 
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2002; Haslam, 1999; Bulmer, 1982; Fontana and Frey, 1994). Attempts can 
be made to address some of these concerns through re-interviewing. 
However, the unintended consequence of re-interviewing may be that it 
heightens the attention of the interviewee to particular issues resulting in a 
change of mind or stance. Kvale (1983: 76) argues that we must guard 
against this and '... there must be a low degree of structure imposed by the 
interviewer, a preponderance of open questions and a focus on specific 
situations rather than on abstract and general opinions'. 
For this reason verification through triangulation is important. I 
subscribe to the realist epistemological position that the interviewee's account 
provides an important insight into real life outside of the interview situation 
and as such, every attempt ought to be made by the researcher to ensure the 
accuracy of each and every account. Although in practice, triangulation 
cannot occur on every issue, it is a valued baseline particularly if like Kvale 
(1983: 76) the researcher sees the goal of any qualitative research as being 
to '... research the topic from the perspective of the interviewee'. For Kvale 
(1983: 74), the purpose of qualitative research is to gather 'descriptions of the 
life and world of the interviewee with respect to the interpretation of the 
meaning of the described phenomenon. 
The phenomenologist Cassell places an emphasis on bracketing where 
the researcher '... consciously sets aside their own presuppositions about the 
phenomenon being researched' (Cassell, 2004: 12). This of course means 
that the researcher must reflect on the assumptions that he or she holds and 
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remain alert as to how this may colour every stage of the research process. 
Conversely, Schwandt (2000) posits that intuition, interpretation and 
the need to understand the relationship between the researcher, the subject 
matter of research and the reader are important. Schwandt (2000: 194) 
argues that '... understanding requires the engagement of one's biases ... 
reaching an understanding is not a matter of setting aside, escaping, 
managing or tracking one's standpoint, prejudgements biases or prejudices'. I 
also accept the view of Schwandt regarding the importance of human opinion, 
thought and bias. 
Using case studies 
Social scientists place a high premium on standardisation and are 
concerned firstly, to collect data in such a way that all respondents are 
confronted with identical questions. Secondly, they work to ensure the 
generalisability of the results (Weber, 1949; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Lewis, 
1998; Blaylock, 1970). Thirdly, they are concerned with 'specifying standard 
criteria for data analysis procedures so that different analysts will reach similar 
conclusions when confronted with the same data' (Blaylock, 1970: 46). Case 
studies are increasingly being used and valued (Guba and Lincoln, 1992; 
Kvale, 1996; Stake, 1995; Walsham, 1995; Yin, 1994; Robson, 2002), but in 
addition to the points mentioned above there are additional considerations of 
which researchers need to be mindful. These include the use of empirical data 
(Bulmer: 1982), the value of primary and secondary research (Bulmer, 1982; 
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Bryman, 2001; Gephart, 1988), the merits of qualitative, quantitative 
approaches and the impact of bias, (Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; 
Hammersley, 1995; Layder, 1993; Black, 1999; Hirschman 1993) and finally, 
the cost and time implications. 
Using examples from organisational writings on technology transfer, 
strategic change and the management of new structures, Eisenhardt in 
'Building Theodes from Case Study Research' (1989) describes the potential 
of case studies for developing theory and argues like Bennett and George 
(1995) that case studies produce knowledge of high quality. For Eisenhardt 
the induction of theory from case studies is an iterative process and is like the 
continual comparative method in grounded theory He writes: 
'The case study approach is tightly linked to data generation based on 
a number of steps involving the definition of the research question, 
selecting the cases, crafting instruments and protocols, fieldwork, 
analysing data, shaping hypotheses, enfolding literature and closure' 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 533). 
The case study approach to qualitative enquiry is focused on an in- 
depth description of a process, a programme, an event or activity. There are 
researchers (Stake: 1995), who consider the case study an object of study 
and others like Merriman (1988) who consider it a methodology. For Hartley 
(2000: 323) '... it is not a method but a research strategy'. Whichever 
description is most applicable, it is of peripheral value to this research. Suffice 
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to say, the positive arguments for employing a case study approach include 
that it has some unique and specific contributions to make to social research 
due to its ability to enable the viewing and identification of behaviours and 
nuances not previously envisaged as relating to the research question. The 
methodology also accommodates more in-depth analysis of statistical data 
and finally, it permits a better understanding and assessment of the situation 
by examining the behaviour in context (Rist, 1982). 
As discussed by Rist (1982), Whilst most case studies are qualitative 
they are also capable of being used in a quantitative way as observations can 
be undertaken which quantify the numbers of different types of activities or 
behaviours. Majchrzak (1984: 63) identifies 3 different types of case study. 
The first type is 'where the case study is of specific interest and has merit in 
and of itself... ' Majchrzak calls this an intrinsic study. Secondly, Majchrzak 
identifies the instrumental case which is where the focus of a qualitative study 
is on a specific issue with a case study used to illustrate the point. The third 
case study type identified by Majchrzak is collective in nature and includes 
multiple cases where studies are compared and contrasted and the 
researcher is required to make generalisations. 
A decision to undertake primary case studies would necessitate a high 
degree of clarity about the purpose and the role of the study and would 
require that I had fully explored the limitations of conducting single or multiple 
studies. In addition to that, I would need to clarify the degree to which I can 
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reasonably compare and contrast my study/studies in order to arrive at 
relevant and representative conclusions at the end of this thesis. 
Single or multiple studies and the problem of generalisability 
On the question of whether I should undertake single or multiple 
studies, Lewis (1998) explained that conducting a single case study provides 
little foundation for comparisons and poses difficulties if the researcher 
intends to extrapolate and make generalisation from the findings. Lewis 
concludes that any claims or conclusions can only be said to work or apply if 
they do apply in those situations and in those situations alone: I concur with 
this conclusion. I also agree with Stake (1995) that the purpose of the case 
study is not to represent the world but to represent the case in question. 
Notwithstanding, there does need to be scope and an understanding that 
generalisations may need to be drawn. Like Lewis (1998), Blaylock (1970: 46) 
concedes that: 
,... one of the problems raised by small-scale research is that of the 
generalisability of one's findings. This problem asserts itself from 
flexibilities in the way questions are asked, subtle differences in the 
working hypotheses and interpreting of the data'. 
The view of Bryman (2002: 303) on statistical sampling adds weight to 
this point. 'By doing two or three studies you do not alter the findings i. e. you 
could arrive at the same conclusion by doing one study or analysing another 
study'. 
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In addition to the problem of generalisation, working with a single or a 
limited number of case studies presents the additional problems of the 
fieldwork becoming too detailed or - if restricted to a single case study - the 
research may be too perfunctory and not provide enough data to illuminate 
and explore issues that may arise within the thesis. 
Goetz and LeCompte (1984: 228) argued that qualitative research 
acquired its own potential for generalisability by providing 'comparability and 
translatability' which involves the possibility of description and definition 
enabling other researchers to use the results of the study as a basis for 
comparison. Lincoln and Guba (1985: 217) suggest that transferability 
corresponds to generalisability arguing that '... transferability must be 
reassessed in each and every case in which transfer is proposed ... the final 
judgment on that matter is vested in the person seeking to make the transfer'. 
Lincoln and Guba see the degree of transferability as being the similarity 
between two contexts - what they call 'fittingness. 'Fittingness is defined as 
the degree of congruence between two contexts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 
124)'. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) asserti that transferability and generalisability 
requires reassessment on every occasion that it is used raises the question of 
falsification. Popper (1959) argued that appeals to the evidence can never 
actually guarantee that a theory is right, only that the theory is right so far. 
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This is because it is always possible that new evidence may be found that 
contradicts the theory (Popper, 1959). 
Falsification not only embodies the principle that theories are always 
open to being refuted but also carries with it the idea that researchers should 
seek to test theories in circumstances where they are most likely to be 
refuted. 
'An advance in science is not a matter of scientists making a discovery 
and then proving it to be right. It is a matter of scientists making a 
guess and then finding themselves unable to prove the guess wrong 
despite strenuous efforts to do so (Crotty, 1998; 31). 
For Anderson (1986: 159) '-falsification is not a workable 
methodology for the social sciences'. For my thesis, however, falsification is a 
workable methodology, as I am not seeking to identify issues that will remain 
constant for all times but to identify issues of interest at a single point in time 
which through rigorous testing could be proved wrong. 
Conclusion 
Like Hirschman (1985) 1 have given careful consideration to the fit 
between the research question and the methodology and I have decided to 
follow a qualitative grounded theory approach. Moreover, I agree with Hill and 
McGowan (1999) that the qualitative approach provides reciprocation 
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between data collection, analysis and theory and allows frameworks, criteria 
and observations to emerge and evolve in a fluid manner throughout the 
study. One of the gratifying aspects of the qualitative approach in contrast to 
quantitative methods is that it enables the researcher to reappraise and refine 
questions, facilitating an in-depth pursuit of emerging avenues of inquiry. 
Similar to Pope (2000), 1 think it would be unfeasible and unwieldy for 
me to conduct simultaneous case studies as there would be significant 
challenges in relation to time, financial resources and difficulties with gaining 
access. According to Pope '... even if it is possible to conduct simultaneous 
case studies they are not as useful as sequential development' (Pope, 2000: 
114). 
An important aspect of my methodology has been the use of 
questionnaires and interviews which have enabled me to gain further insight 
into the way police authorities operate. The advantages identified by Wallace 
(1954) - with which I also concur - is that questionnaires permit wide 
coverage for the minimum expenditure of effort and money and enable wider 
geographic coverage and are therefore likely to increase and yield greater 
validity through larger and more representative samples. Questionnaires do 
permit more considered answers and are more effective in situations where 
group consultations may influence the responses. On the subject of 
generalisability, questionnaires provide greater uniformity in the way 
questions are posed and can provide respondents with a higher level of 
anonymity and privacy. 
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Interviewing respondents enabled me to draw out pertinent issues and 
provided me with the opportunity to explore particular issues in greater detail; 
for example, local accountability and the desirability of elected and appointed 
officials. Interviews are also more likely to provide useful contributions to 
research. For example, I had a number of 'off the record' statements from 
police authority members and from senior civil servants which directly led me 
to look into the apparently lack lustre response from the Metropolitan Police 
Authority into the unflattering Audit Commission report (2008) on Data 
Recording in the Metropolitan Police Service. 
Whilst it would be useful to use both primary and secondary research, 
due to financial constraints I have decided to use existing case studies rather 
than conducting primary research. Through triangulation, via documentary 
research, literature reviews organisational reviews conducted by police 
authorities, by analysing information gleaned from public meetings, one-to- 
one interviews and questionnaires, I will test and assess the role and 
effectiveness of police authorities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EVOLUTION FROM THE WATCH COMMITTEE 
TO THE MODERN POLICE AUTHORITY 
Introduction 
The genesis and subsequent creation of the police service in England is 
inextricably linked to the development of police authorities because without a 
police force there would be no conceivable purpose for police authorities to exist. 
It is also apparent from studying the literature that that there was no grand design 
for the development of policing in the UK because the development of the police 
service did not occur in a logical or systematic way but was moulded by the 
needs and fears of society which evolved over time as those needs and fears 
fluctuated and changed (Critchley, 1978). Reiner (1992) also saw the 
establishment of the police as an unnecessarily protracted and painful process 
and Critchley (1978) described the Wapping murders in 1811 and the Gordon 
riots of 1780 as crucial turning points which significantly hastened attempts to 
develop a systematic policing system. In his essay on social structure and 
anomie Merton (1949) maintained that deviant or nonconformist behaviour was a 
feature of a society over-emphasising and stressing the importance of achieving 
goals and aspirations. The difficulty which arose was that there was no 
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corresponding emphasis on the institutional procedures required to obtain those 
goals. As there is no 'Route to progress" there exists the potential for a state of 
constant 'warre' and anomie. In order to stave this off, a force or system was 
required to force men to cooperate (Hobbes, 1980: 43) - or as Rousseau says 
ultimately men most be forced to be free (Rousseau, 1987: 60). 
As citizens we may accept the legitimacy of our institutions and accept the 
level of security, order and to some degree cohesion and coercion they bring to 
our lives. As outlined in chapter 3 this acceptance is apparent despite or in spite 
of the many imperfections and failings of these institutions which may result in a 
deep seated erosion of trust and confidence (Berkeley, 2003; Locke, 1978; 
Blunkett, 2002; Marsh, 1977; Hart, 1978). As identified by Barker (1960, xii). The 
idea of a social contract which binds society together has two elements; firstly, 
there is the contract of government, between the ruler and subjects and 
secondly, there is the contract of society. According to Barker there cannot be a 
contract of government without the prior condition of there being a contract of 
society. As citizens we accept and endorse a multitude of social contracts. For 
Barker (1960) the state - in the sense of a political community and as an 
organised society - is based on a multitude of social contracts which permit and 
allows us all to conduct our lives relatively free from the fear of harm or overt 
exploitation. Within these parameters where the individual fails to comply and 
threatens to resist their obligations they will be faced with the threat or actual 
imposition of negative sanctions (Held, 1990). 
' See Appendix 1 
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There is a multi-layer of social contracts represented through the creation 
of regulatory and scrutiny bodies which provides important checks and balances 
in order to protect the citizen. Protection and simultaneous endorsement is 
achieved by creating an umbilical link between the individual, the state, the 
institution - and for the optimistic - it can be seen as an attempt to embed 
democracy, egalitarianism and fair play. However, for others, the functions qf our 
institutions and their processes particularly with regard to police authorities are 
confusing, in fact, according to Jones (1994) the structure and workings of police 
authorities is intentionally confusing. There are those who do not recognise the 
description of intentionally confusing institutions but they see that the multiplicity 
of processes and procedures of institutions as further emboldening and 
supporting an elitist agenda. For elite theorists, the potential of mass involvement 
would be destabilising and they conclude that all institutions are pathological in 
that they all succumb - as a consequence of the social contract - to the iron law 
of oligarchy which is the inevitable and irreversible domination of the majority by 
an elite (Pareto, 1939; Mosca, 1935; Michels, 1958; Jones, 1994: 43). 
Whilst human beings are obsessively self-interested, Hobbes (1980: 43) 
maintains that we are reasonable and have the capacity to pursue our desires as 
efficiently as possible. From this, Hobbes constructs a cogent argument as to 
why we ought to be willing to submit ourselves to a higher authority and he sees 
the justification for our obligation as being the knowledge that even though we 
are naturally self-i nte rested, we are extremely rational. Hobbes goes on to argue 
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that in the absence of any force to coerce men to cooperate, life would be 
unbearably brutal; therefore we will rationally and instinctively choose to submit 
to the authority of a sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil and civilised 
society (Hobbes, 1980: 43). Given that most people want to avoid their own 
deaths, Hobbes concludes that the state of nature is the worst possible situation 
in which men can find themselves as it is the state of perpetual and unavoidable 
Warre' (Hobbes, 1980,186-188) which can only be resolved by the reasonable 
and rational nature of man and his desire to pursue peace through a 'social 
contract' (Hobbes, 1980: 183). 
The social contract described by Hobbes has two distinguishable 
elements. Firstly, individuals need to agree to establish society by collectively 
renouncing the rights they have against one another as in the state of nature. 
Secondly, one person or assembly of persons must be imbued with the authority 
and power to enforce the initial and subsequent contracts. If these provisos are 
accepted, a social contract is born and mutual benefit is realised and 
conventional society becomes possible. Once this is established the states three 
powers - the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary - become organised and 
the central components of the social contract finds its being as the state realises 
its autonomy and legitimacy (Kant, 1785; Clarke, 1994: 106). 
It is therefore interesting to note that one of the most important aspects of 
any social contract is pursuing peace through the development of a police 
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service. As noted by Reiner (1992: 20), the 'cop-sided' view of history asserted 
that the primary beneficiaries of the newly established police service were the 
working class and the poor, it was surprising that there was such resistance to 
setting up a professional police service. Critchley (1978: 28) also found in his 
earlier work that the poor were worst off without a police service and as such 
they managed as best as they could until the reform of the rural police. 
Locke (1974) saw human nature as less pessimistic than Hobbes and 
argued that the state of nature denoted a non-political period which was not 
amoral as implied by Hobbes. Nevertheless, in a society epitomised by self 
interest and ownership it soon becomes clear - despite the opposition during the 
Pitt years - that a system of policing is required to ensure the security of 
ourselves and our belongings if we are to sustain a peaceful society (Reith, 1938: 
221; Critchley, 1967). 
Those who had property became aware that it was in their interest to 
create a government or system to protect their assets and property from those 
who did not. On this basis Rousseau (1987) saw the invention of private property 
as the defining element of a modern society and it constituted a pivotal moment 
in our evolution out of a simple state into one characterised by greed, competition 
and inequality. He argued that governments were established, purporting to 
guarantee equality and protection for all, even though in a Machiavellian sense 
the government, by its very existence was seeking to fossilise the very 
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inequalities that private property had produced (Machiavelli, 2003). In fact, even 
though the poor had initially benefited from the setting up of a police service, the 
bourgeoisie benefited most from the establishment of the new system of policing 
because their property and security were safeguarded and the social structure on 
which their power was based was stabilised (Bunyan, 1977: 63-64; Brogden, 
1982: 71). 
As discussed later in this chapter the Gordon riots, the chartist movement, 
the Wapping murders and a number of other incidents demonstrated the need for 
the fragile social contract to be strengthened and further supported. The various 
legislative Acts from Pitt's abortive Bill of 1785 to the Police Act 1964 served to 
emphasise the importance and the need not only to stave off the ravishes of the 
unbridled nature of man through a plethora of social contracts, but for other 
contracts to be developed and underpinned by the initial social contract being 
rooted and relevant to the exigencies of the time. The original social contract 
would have been insufficient to deal with modern issues of conflict between 
individuals, between individuals and institutions or between one institution's 
systems and processes and another's. Indeed, the old systems of control could 
not cope with the issues affecting modern policing (Reiner, 1992). For Reiner 
(1992: 13) and Critchley (1978: 21) the twin pressures of urban and industrial 
revolution were the primary causes that triggered the need for police reform. 
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The birth of a police service 
Keeping the Kings Peace 
Policing in England cannot be fully understood if viewed from the centre or 
in relation to a system of centralised command and control (Lee, 1901). Policing - 
or Keeping the King's Peace as it was originally known - had always been a local 
responsibility. Six parliamentary committees (1812,1816, two in 1817,1818 and 
1822) concluded that the development and organisation of a police system was 
at odds with the British system of freedom. The committees concluded that the 
curtailment of liberty would be too great a sacrifice for the proposed 
improvements in policing (Reith, 1938: 221). The then Home Secretary Robert 
Peel chaired the 1822 committee which acknowledged that the then system of 
policing was inadequate but far from supporting a new system of policing it 
recommended the strengthening of the traditional model already in place 
(Critchley, 1978). 
From the reign of King Alfred A. D. 849 to A. D. 887 the responsibility for 
keeping the King's peace rested with each locality and was based on the 
principles of collective security and social obligation. During this time, unless you 
were exempt - through high social position or property - every male was enrolled 
to undertake policing responsibilities in groups of ten families called a 'tything' 
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headed by a 'tythingman'. This system relied on all members accepting an 
obligation for the good behaviour of each other (Lee, 1901). 
The Assize of Clarendon (See Appendix 3 for a chronology of significant 
Acts of parliament) which was issued in 1166 described how felons were to be 
presented to the courts of justices or to the sheriffs. The Assize required that 
town's people report to the sheriff any suspicions they had about one another or 
any issues that could adversely affect the running of the district. Reports or 
presentments would be made by the tything man to a jury of twelve men of the 
hundred who would then forward the accusations to the sheriff. There was also 
The Assize of Northampton issued in 1776 which prescribed harsher punishment 
and put a system in place of registering outlaws and reduced the power of the 
sheriff. Here we saw the beginnings of the role of constable and the early use of 
the jury system. 
Statute of Winchester 
In 1285, during the reign of King Edward I the earliest road legislation - the 
Statute of Winchester - was put in place. This statute was largely a consolidation 
of features from earlier systems but primarily its main objective was to 'abate the 
power of felons' (Critchley, 1967: 7). 
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There were three distinct aspects of the statute that was relevant to the 
early watch committees and later to the police authority. Firstly, the statute 
revived the system of watch and ward where watchmen provided support to the 
constables in securing the town or village. This system saw the development of 
the first substantive distinction between policing in towns and rural areas. For 
example, rural regions were not necessarily walled as large towns were and the 
geographic areas tended to be more remote. Town areas by contrast, required 
more men and there would need to be an appreciation of the commercial aspect 
and transitory nature of movement within and between towns. 
The second measure which the statute revived was the Saxon practice of 
hue and cry which was a means of dealing with strangers who resisted arrest by 
the watchman. When the hue and cry went up it signalled that the whole 
population was required to join in the pursuit, those who did not were seen as 
siding with the fugitive/s. 
The third aspect of the statute that was relevant to the early watch 
committees and later to the police authority was that the responsibility of local 
policing was in the local district and the constable still retained the responsibility 
of presenting the offender to the court. What the statute succeeded in doing was 
that it reinforced the preventative aspect of policing provided by the watch at 
night and the ward during the day, it reinforced an element of repression through 
the hue and cry and it was punitive by presentment (Critchley, 1967: 7). 
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The duties of a constable 
The duties of a constable were varied and diverse and involved setting the 
nightly watch and incarcerating and delivering criminals to the Justice. The 
constable also had the responsibility of managing staff, initiating the hue and cry, 
or requesting a hue and cry (warrant) from the Justice. Additional responsibilities 
included making presentments and bringing reports on infringements of the law. 
Four times during his year of office the constable would be required to attend the 
quarter session and produce upwards of a hundred separate pieces of paper on 
which he had written the affairs of the parish. The principle obligation in the 
Assize of Clarendon placed a direct responsibility on the parish and therefore the 
constable to bring to account every breach of the law. Failure to do so left the 
whole parish liable to a fine from the Crown and the injured party. There was also 
a second sanction which could be levelled at the constable, that of negligence 
which further added to the reluctance of men to participate if they were able to 
avoid becoming a constable by paying their way out. 
The other way of avoiding this responsibility was through possession of a 
'Tyburn Ticket' where a person who prosecuted a felon to conviction would be 
exempt for life from all parish offices. These certificates were widely sort after 
and purchased at high cost. The ability to buy oneself out of this further 
exacerbated the degradation of the role of constable; as a result many of those 
who served as constables were those least able to secure employment in other 
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ways and tended to be illiterate and at worst as corrupt as the criminal classes 
(Critchley, 1967). This old system of policing was also depended on part-time 
constables and watchmen and was inadequate (Elmsley, 1996). Elmsley notes 
that the fact that some were willing to take on the job did not mean that they were 
any good at it; in fact the opposite was usually the case (Elmsley, 1996: 216 & 
218). 
The Statute of Winchester (1285) and the Justices of the Peace Act 1361 
was a transition from the frankpledge 2 to a system based on a working 
partnership of the constable and justice. The advent of the justice of the peace 
had a serious impact on the post of constable. If a man had a trade, anytime 
spent as a constable could ruin his business (Emsley, 1996: 217) so as 
merchants, tradesmen and farmers became increasingly unwilling to undertake 
this unpaid and onerous roll those who could afford it would pay deputies to fulfil 
their obligations, the deputies themselves often then paid other deputies to fulfil 
the role they were paid to undertake. Thus as Ascoli (1979: 18) explained, the 
office of constable was never'in theory or practice a privileged position'. 
The office of constable had two distinctive characteristics: as the annually 
elected representative of the parish he 3 was its executive agent which entailed 
making the necessary presentments at the court, Secondly, he was responsible 
2 Trankpledge' which was a pre-emptive compulsory fixed bail set on individuals as a safeguard In anticipation of arrest. 
31 have used the word 'he' because constables at this time were exclusively men. 
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for keeping the King's peace and with royal approval this office was distinct from 
all other local offices. Policing at this time was distinctive from today for a number 
of obvious reasons including that there was no regulation or control over the 
police because there could be no higher authority or seal of approval than that of 
the Royal House. Even though the position of constable was not privileged, the 
role was unmonitored and those who were fortunate or unfortunate enough to be 
obliged to do it had very few checks and balances to their activities. 
It was widely accepted however that the system of the parish constable 
was ineffective and until Robert Peel most discussions, debates, changes and 
attempted changes in legislation was borne out of experience of crime in London. 
This focus on London had the consequence that the provinces followed divergent 
paths in the development of their police forces. Some rural areas remained 
unchanged and for a longer period of time they remained under the system of 
frankpledge. As I have discussed earlier, this delay had a devastating impact on 
the poor and the working class (Critchley, 1978,28; Reiner, 1992; 20). 
Police reform: contributors and legislation 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century with the exception of 
London there was little in the way of a recognised local government structure. 
The urban sprawls that developed in the wake of the industrial revolution relied 
on archaic institutions and customs such as parish vestries, manor privileges and 
53 
common law which soon became outdated and irrelevant. The reality as 
chronicled by Critchley (1967) was that after a hard day's work in the fields, the 
factories and the mines the working classes did not feel any sense of obligation 
nor indeed saw it as a priority to undertake unpaid work. The lack of voluntary 
input led to a systematic breakdown of law and order and although there was a 
general framework in place, the principles and the real life experiences that were 
required to embrace, give body and momentum to this system - ultimately 
leading to a stable society - broke down leaving the streets unsafe, untended, 
unlit and filthy. Lee (1901) recounted that during a parliamentary election one 
party secured the services of professional boxers as bodyguards to protect its 
candidate from the physical attacks of political opponents. 
During the second half of the eighteenth century the Improvement Act 
(1762) significantly impacted on law and order by making provision for each town 
to levy a fee for local watching, lighting, paving and street cleaning. Through the 
Improvement Act 1762 more towns employed paid watchmen and through this, 
the lineage of the municipal police forces set up under the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1835 can be traced. 
The impact of the Fielding Brothers, William Pitt's abortive Bill in 1785, the 
Home Secretary Robert Peel, the River police, the Bow Street Runners, the 
Wapping murders, the Gordon riots, Metropolitan Police Act 1839, the County 
Police Bill the Birmingham Police Bill and indirectly the impact of the Municipal 
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Corporations Act 1835 all made valuable and indelible contributions to the 
system of policing we have today. 
For example, Henry fielding (Chief Magistrate of Bow Street) made a 
landmark contribution to policing through the production of a series of pamphlets 
on penal policy and criminology. Through his journal he educated the public on 
penal issues and provided descriptions of criminals through the Covent Garden 
Journal. His other contribution was that he formed a body of thief-takers in 1750 
and recruited seven people to brake up gangs. This was set up as a commercial 
interest which years later evolved into the Bow Street Runners. After his death 
his brother John Fielding took over and elaborated on thief-takers requesting that 
households formed groups that would supply Bow Street with information on 
criminals. 
The Gordon riots and Pitt's Bill were important catalysts in the evolution of 
the police service. In 1778 parliament passed the Relief Act repealing 
seventeenth century anti-catholic legislation. In June 1780 violent anti-catholic 
riots broke out in London as protestors marched on parliament to present a 
petition requesting the repeal of the Relief Act and a return to Catholic 
repression. During the rioting, chapels, catholic homes, prisons; public buildings 
and individuals in the street were attacked. It took the government and London 
authorities ten days to restore order by which time, 12,000 troops had been 
deployed and over 700 people had been killed. 
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As a result of the disturbances it was acknowledged that something ought 
to be done about policing (primarily in London). Until this time it was believed that 
the authority to control the police was the justices. Pitt's government however 
presented a Bill in 1785 to sever this link in favour of a strong police force across 
the metropolitan area. The Bill proposed that there were to be three salaried 
commissioners of police who would also serve as justices of the peace. The 
existing constables and watchmen would be maintained and subsumed into the 
regular police. The existing metropolitan justices would be stripped of their 
executive police functions and be concerned only with their judicial role. Due to 
opposition primarily from the city the Bill was withdrawn and became know as 
Pitt's abortive Bill. Not-with-standing this the Bill provided us with an early insight 
into the modern structure of policing. 
The Wapping murders also marked an important period in policing. As a 
result of two families being murdered in the east end of London in 1811, the then 
Home Secretary Richard Ryder, set up a committee to look at the nightly watch 
and the effectiveness of various local Acts. Between 1812 and 1822 six 
committees concluded that the idea of organised policing was incompatible with 
British liberty (Reith, 1938; Critchley, 1967). The 1822 committee was set up and 
chaired by the Home Secretary Robert Peel and reported that it was difficult to 
reconcile policing with freedom of action and from interference. After his 1828 
inquiry on crime in London and Middlesex, Robert Peel concluded that the 
system of policing was defective and that it was not in anyone's interest that a 
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grocer, shopkeeper or any other business person should have the unpaid added 
responsibility of managing and taking an active part in policing. His new Bill of 
April 1829 established a new police office at Westminster and two justices who 
were responsible for control over the new force and answerable to the Home 
Secretary. The act made the Home Secretary responsible for approving the size 
of the forces and gave him the power to command the two justices (later 
Commissioners). Although it did not happen immediately the Bill was applied 
across the country - except for the City of London. 
The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 was an important piece of legislation 
under which police forces were required to be established in England and Wales. 
There was however a lack of uniformity in the establishment of the forces and 
each area adopted a different arrangement for governance with some boroughs - 
because they had the power to determine whether or not to establish a force - 
ignoring the act altogether (Reiner, 2000: 41). The essence of the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1835 was that it was a tool for rearranging the administration 
and management of councils with the requirement to establish a police force 
being only one aspect of it. The act initially only applied to the 178 boroughs in 
England and Wales that had been granted charters of self-government - 
Birmingham was not one of those towns. 
The significance of Birmingham's exclusion from self-government was 
highlighted during the disturbances of the Chartist movement in 1839. 
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Although attempts at policing the streets of Birmingham had been made in 
the past, due to a lack of funds it had largely been unsuccessful. The chartist 
disturbances however forced local magistrates to request officers from the 
Metropolitan Police force to assist in bringing the 1839 Chartist riots under 
control. Chartists campaigned for what was at the time, radical parliamentary 
reform; they demanded votes for all men, equal electoral districts, the abolition of 
the requirement that members of parliament be property owners, payment for 
members of parliament, annual general elections, secret ballots, trade union and 
factory reform, and they were vehemently against the Poor Law (Ashton, 1999: 
34,35). The Birmingham police were unable to quell the disturbances and 
obtained reinforcement from the Metropolitan police. The impact of the Chartist 
riots underscored the need for the city of Birmingham to create an effective police 
force. The Birmingham Police Act 1839 was passed and resulted in the control of 
the police being taken away from the council4 and the Home office being 
authorised to establish a force of around 250 constables and 50 officers to begin 
policing the streets with a commissioner to manage the force who was 
answerable to the Home office (Critchley, 1976: 80-84). 
Until 1842 when the council took back control of the police 
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The early watch committee and police authority 
With the growth of provincial police forces two systems of local 
accountability developed; one through the watch committee and the other 
through the power of justices of the peace to appoint a chief officer. 
i) Watch Committoos 
Elected town councils appointed committees and were required to appoint 
no more than one third of its members to form the watch committee. These 
committees possessed the power to appoint and dismiss police 
office rs/constables and establish regulations for the running of town forces 
(Critchley, 1967: 63). The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 removed the 
responsibility of police as Improvement commissioners under the Improvement 
Act 1762 and broke the link where police were secured under the Lighting and 
Watching Act 1833. This meant that the rolo of the police came under an Act of 
Parliament designed specifically for that purpose. 
Whilst there were some similarities between the Municipal Corporations 
Act 1835 and the later Metropolitan Police Act 1839 there were more significant 
differences: for example Metropolitan police officers received regular pay. which 
was not standard practice outside the Metropolitan police area: also In London. 
all former watchmen and constables were dismissed and new people were 
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employed whilst in other areas the same people were seen as a source of cheap 
labour and were kept on. The impact of these differences was that the boroughs 
appeared to be less efficient and smooth running than the metropolitan police 
area and they fell behind in their methods of recruitment and training. 
The question of police control and accountability was a controversial one 
even in the 19th Century. The Metropolitan Police Act 1839 established 
unequivocally that the force was under the control of the Home Secretary. There 
were no guidelines or chains of authority for policing outside the Metropolitan 
police area and the only guidance issued was that watch committees would 
produce quarterly reports for the Home Secretary. There was also no mention of 
a chief constable or any other rank to take charge of officers. What resulted from 
this was a disorganised band of watchmen unclear whether within the right of the 
watch to hire and fire constables it also had the right to give orders to the police. 
These uncertainties continued for a number of years with notable 
disagreements arising between watch committees and chief constables with 
some chief constables being subservient to their watch committees whilst others 
acted independently and at times confrontationally (Brogden, 1982; Spencer, 
1985). The two most notable cases which demonstrated these disagreements 
were in Birmingham 1880 and Nottingham 1956. The disagreement in 
Birmingham centred on the change in decision by the chief constable to arrest 
people found drunk. For many years the Birmingham police had adopted a policy 
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of not arresting individuals unless they were disorderly or posed a threat to 
themselves or others. The chief constable decided to alter this without 
consultation with the watch committee and proceeded to arrest anyone found 
drunk. There was widespread criticism of this change and the chief constable 
was summoned before the watch committee and advised that he had a 
responsibility to consult the committee regarding changes in operational activities 
especially as it was likely to directly affect and impact on taxpayers. The chief 
constable refused to accept this or back down. The Home Secretary at the time 
drew attention to the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 which empowered the 
watch committee to take preventative action to halt misuse, or abuse of the 
system coupled with the responsibility of it to discharge any constable it felt 
jeopardised the office. The watch committee emphasised that it was inconsistent 
for the chief constable not to be subordinate to it or in harmony to the watch 
committee and advised that there would possibly be need for the chief to resign. 
It was only at this stage that the chief constable gave way and agreed to the 
request of the committee (Critchley, 1967: 131). 
A similar dispute occurred in Nottingham in 1956 when the chief constable 
asserted that the duty of enforcing the criminal law belonged to him and not the 
committee. The chief constable of Nottingham suspected that members of the 
city council had acted corruptly and after his consultation with the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) he was advised to undertake further enquiries. After 
the Metropolitan Police's investigation, the DPP took no further Action. 
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Subsequently, the watch committee requested that the chief constable report 
details of the inquiry to them which he refused to do. The watch committee 
suspended the chief constable. However, the Home Secretary at the time 
concluded that the actions of the committee amounted to a deliberate 
interference with law enforcement and ruled in favour of the chief constable 
(Critchley, 1967: 270-2). 
The legal case that most clearly established the model of constabulary 
independence was that of Fisher v. Oldham Corporation (1930). Fisher brought 
an action against the Oldham Corporation and the watch committee after being 
imprisoned wrongfully in connection with obtaining money by false pretences. Mr 
Justice McCardie ruled against Fisher on the grounds that the police officer/s had 
not acted as servants of the borough but were exercising an original authority 
conferred directly on them and exercised by virtue of their office which could not 
be exercised through the responsibility of anyone else but the police officer 
themselves (Marshall, 1967: 16,33-36). Jones et. al (1994,13) believes this 
decision was wrong and argued that 'power is conferred directly on many other 
officials without the same conclusions being drawn'. 
The two most recent examples of overt disagreement arose as a result of 
the Bichard inquiry and the proposed merger of police forces in England and 
Wales in 2005 and 2006. In 2004 the Bichard inquiry report criticised the 
Humberside Police and its Chief Constable Mr David Westwood for significant 
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failings in the handling of intelligence on Ian Huntley (the Soham murderer). The 
then Home Secretary David Blunkett MP lodged legal papers with the High Court 
in June 2004 in an attempt to force the suspension of the chief constable of 
Humberside, David Westwood. Despite the Home Office receiving 
correspondence from the Humberside Police Authority - the direct employers of 
the Chief Constable David Westwood - arguing that the chief constable should 
remain in his post, the Home Secretary used his powers under the Police Reform 
Act 2002 to direct the police authority to suspend Mr Westwood in order to 
maintain the public confidence in the force. 
The other more recent occasion occurred in relation to the proposed 
merger of police forces. In 2005/06 following Her Majesty's Inspectors of 
Constabulary's (HMIC) report 'Closing the Gap'; the then Home Secretary 
Charles Clarke MP asked police authorities and forces to develop proposals for 
merging the 43 police forces in England and Wales. Police authorities across 
England and Wales rejected the Home Secretary's request to commit to 
voluntary mergers and by the deadline of 23rd December 2005 no police authority 
had submitted proposals despite the substantial financial incentives on offer to 
those who agreed to the mergers. The Association of Police Authorities reiterated 
its demands for assurances from the government on key issues such as funding, 
local accountability and timescales before it would advise police authorities to 
consider voluntary mergers. Bob Jones, chairman of the Association of Police 
Authorities (APA) issued a press release saying; 
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'Police authorities have unanimously rejected the Home Secretary's plans 
to force these proposals through [and] there are also credible alternative 
options which should be considered very seriously. ' 
Source: APA press release 22/12/2005; Times Online and PA News: 22/12/2005 
Depending on ones point of view, the aforementioned disagreements may 
support the position that police authorities have been and are still being 
undermined, the examples may also support the view that police authorities are 
unable or unwilling to challenge - or challenge successfully - the prevailing police 
or Home Office position. Even with Elock's (1991) directional accountability there 
is, according to Jones et al (1994) an inability of police authorities to be effective 
instruments of accountability. This inability is caused because police authorities 
are tied to the explanatory and cooperative forms of accountability. Jones et al 
also alleges that police authorities have a propensity to bury their heads in the 
sand being studious civil servants; however, on the subtle and controversial 
issues they fall very short of the mark. The other view point is that these events 
demonstrate that there are countervailing interests vying for position within a 
pluralist system. The Association of Police Authorities (APA) sited the refusal of 
police authorities to present proposals to the Home Secretary on suggestions for 
merging police forces in England and Wales as a good example of police 
authorities asserting themselves (APA: 2005). Silverman (2005) however, 
believed that this was public evidence that they were under greater political 
pressure than ever before. 
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ii) Justices of the Peace 
The second system of local accountability that developed was the power 
of justices of the peace to appoint a chief officer. 
Following the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, the County Police Act 
1839 gave justices of the peace the power to appoint a chief officer of police who 
would hold statutory office and only be dismissed at quarter or general sessions. 
The act also made all county forces subject to the rules concerning government 
pay, clothing and accoutrements of constables (Lustergarten, 1986: 42). Justices 
were empowered but not required to establish a force and there was no 
centralisation of police powers. The standing of the county chief constable was 
much greater than that of the borough chief and under this arrangement the chief 
constable was to an even higher degree under the authority of the Home office. 
Once in post, the only power the justices had was that they could dismiss the 
chief constable. The chief constable had the power to appoint constables, 
promote, demote, fine, suspend or dismiss constables at will. It was very 
apparent at this time that the chief constable performed many of the functions 
similar to the watch committee. 
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Inspection and the County and Borough Police Act 1856 
It was not until the County and Borough Police Act 1856 that it became 
compulsory for all counties to establish a rural police force. The act also 
reinforced the power of the watch committee and the justices and introduced a 
provision for the central inspection of police forces, enabling the crown to appoint 
three inspectors of constabulary to assess the efficiency of all forces (Jones et. 
el: 1994). Under the County and Borough Police Act 1856 a grant was made 
available to forces that served a population of over five thousand and was seen 
by many as an incentive for smaller areas to merge forming larger forces. The 
act also contained clauses which prevented the agreement from being broken 
once it was entered into without the Home Secretary's consent and an order 
could be placed in council to impose an agreement on any reluctant council. 
These were the new police authorities and they were required to submit statistics 
to the Home Secretary of crime in their area. Here we see the beginnings of a 
top down approach with an element of local management. 
Until 1874 the Home Secretary's only real power over these police 
authorities was that of withholding a certificate of efficiency (Jones & Newburn, 
1997). Under the County and Borough Police Act 1856 boroughs with 
populations of less than five thousand were not entitled to grants but in 1874 in 
order to adequately cover pay and clothing the exchequer increased the funds to 
all police forces from a quarter to one half of their total budget. According to 
66 
Critchley (1967) this move inevitably led to an increase in the Home Secretary's 
control over county forces. The first inspections by Her Majesties inspectorate of 
constabulary (HMIC) highlighted that there was no test of efficiency that could be 
applied or used to assess police forces and the service they provided, as a result 
the possibility of standardising police practice was not possible (Jones et, al: 
1997). With the proposed increase in grants the inspectorate made a number of 
recommendations: a) that the appointment and disposal of chief constables 
ought to be done with the express approval of the Home Secretary; b) that the 
grant should not be given to any borough with a population of less than 10,000 
and c) that a system of pay and pension should be set up otherwise it would be 
impossible to keep a stable police force. A select committee on police 
superannuation was set up in 1875 and in 1877 the Municipal Corporations Act 
imposed the first compulsory check on the formation of new police forces by 
stipulating that a separate police force could not be established unless the 
population exceeded 20,000 (Critchley, 1967: 130). 
On the question of who should control the police there were two camps or 
schools of thought, one believed control of the police was a judicial matter and 
the other an administrative one. Through the Local Government Act 1888 the 
government sought a compromise between the two positions with the 
development and management of the force being in the hands of a joint 
committee of the council and quarter sessions5. The Local Government Act 1888 
5 The Courts of Quarter sessions date back to 1363 when Keepers of the Peace were formally called Justices and 
empowered to meet four times a year. The four sessions were held at Epiphany, (Easter or Lent, Midsummer, and 
67 
established the administrative pattern for policing, establishing county councils 
and under their aegis, standing joint committees consisting of two thirds elected 
councilors and one third local magistrates to be the police authority for county 
forces. 
What however led to the creation of the police authority as we know it was 
the Royal Commission established in 1960 whose report in 1962 led to the Police 
Act 1964. The establishing of the Royal Commission had been as a direct 
response to concern about police wrong doing; in particular regarding the use of 
force by the police, about police accountability and the degree to which it was 
possible to seek redress against individual officers. There was also a variety of 
other issues including concerns about increasing crime rates, the effectiveness of 
the police and their ability to address rising crime and new kinds of crime (Jones 
and Newburn, 1994). 
The Police Act 1964 
The Police Act 1964 replaced the old system of watch committees and 
joint standing committees with a single system of police authorities. Watch 
committees had previously been composed entirely of councillors, whilst half of 
the members of the joint standing committees were magistrates. The new 
authorities consisted of two-thirds councillors and one-third magistrates and as 
Michaelmas. The court dealt with both criminal and administrative matters though many of Its administrative functions 
ceased in 1888 when county councils were introduced. 
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discussed above there were three basic forms of authority; the single, the 
combined and the joint police authority. 
The ineffectiveness and limitations of the Police Act 1964 becomes 
apparent as one analyses practical implementation issues against the legal 
objectives of the act. For example, the way the act defined the role of police 
authorities, their relationship to chief constables and the Home Secretary was 
limited in four ways. 
Firstly, the only statutory duty that the act placed on chief constables in 
relation to police authorities was the requirement to submit an annual report. The 
Police Act 1964 permitted the police authority to request that a written report be 
provided to it on any matter related to policing within its area. For Marshall 
(1978), this explanatory type of accountability, where after the event the police 
explain the policies they have followed or actions they had taken, was 
insufficient. It can therefore be legitimately argued that this provision in the 1964 
act provided little actual leverage for police authorities because in reality a chief 
constable could refuse to make a report if s/he believed it would contain 
information that ought not to be disclosed, or if it was deemed to be too sensitive 
to operational issues (Reiner, 2000: 188). Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) had 
previously come to this conclusion and argued that section 12.3 of the Police Act 
1964 which provided chief constables with this important opt out demonstrated 
that not only did the Home Secretary have power over the police authority but 
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that he could wield that power of influence and control within the tripartite 
structure. This was evidence for Baldwin and Kinsey (1982: 106) that 'police 
authorities were the weak successors to the watch committee and with this 
weakening, chief constables have become stronger' which is evidenced through 
the growing strength of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
becoming an effective pressure group. 
The second area where discrepancies arose between the Police Act 1964 
and its implementation was that the act gave police authorities no powers to 
instruct chief constables to change any policies set out in the reports provided to 
them. Lustgarten (1986) saw this position as unsatisfactory arguing that the 
dependence of police authorities on their chief constables/commissioners for 
information was likely to stymie their ability to offer effective objective oversight 
and criticism. 
The third discrepancy is in relation to the Home Secretary as ultimate 
arbiter; because it serves to emphasise the power and preeminence of the 
government in policing matters. Lustgarten (1992) and Reiner (1992) claim that 
the centralisation of policy-making power, coupled with the increase in influence 
of central institutions has been at the expense of local accountability and that by 
the end of the 1980s, most important decisions about policing were taken by 
central bodies, in particular the Home office. In cases of real conflict between a 
chief and his police authority, not only would the chief constable always prevail 
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but the police authority would defer to the expertise of the chief (Reiner, 1992; 
2000,189; Brogden, 1977). Reiner (2000: 188) saw that the act was 
contradictory and vague, particularly with regard to the police authority's power 
to instruct chief constables on general rules concerning law enforcement. 
The fourth discrepancy was identified by Boateng (1985: 238) who noted 
that the Police Act 1964 had the effect outside London of institutionalising the 
growing authority of the chief constable, giving him sole responsibility for the 
operational direction and control of the force. Through the Police 1964 Act 
(section 4.1) the police authority's role was defined as the general duty'to secure 
the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the area'. This 
separation and distinction between operational and strategic roles has according 
to Boateng 'bedeviled the relationship ever since' (Boateng, 1985: 238). 
Lustergarten (1986) saw the distinction as untenable and Reiner (2000: 189) saw 
it as a 'tendentious classification, without a basis in the act itself. 
Although the 1964 Police Act set up the tripartite system giving equal 
powers to each of the three partners, in practice, according to Loveday (2005), 
power was weighted against police authorities in favour of chief constables. 
Loveday also observed that constabulary independence further eroded the ability 
of police authorities to influence policing. 
71 
In relation to London, Loveday argued that police authorities were 
emasculated by the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1985. The Police 
and Magistrates Court Act 1994 and the Police Act 1996 were important 
landmarks in the relations between the members of the tripartite because these 
Acts cut the size of police authorities from 35 members to 17, and transferred 
control over police budgets from the police authority to chief constables 
(Loveday, 2006: 12). 
There are two primary views about this. Firstly, that there is an overt 
intension to cloud the decision-making process which is served by ensuring that 
roles and responsibilities are unclear (Jones et al, 1994: 27); and secondly, that 
there has been a perceptible shift of power to chief constables and the Home 
office to the detriment of police authorities (Reiner, 1993). Support for this 
perceptible shift was evidenced when the former chief constable of Manchester - 
Sir John Anderton - stated that 'the policeman is nobody's servant and the police 
authority has no authority or right to give the chief constable orders about the 
disposition of the force because the full authority and responsibility of the force, 
its deployment and its resources is the sole responsibility of the chief constable' 
(Times, 18 March 1982). 
Disagreements between police authorities, home secretaries and chief 
constables served to highlight that the Police Act 1964 provided little statutory 
power to police authorities. Jones and Newburn (1997) also saw that police 
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authorities had a lack of influence which they argued was not simply due to the 
lack of statutory powers afforded under the Police Act 1964 but was due to 
police authorities narrowly interpreting their role and failing to use the powers 
they had. Jones et al. (1994: 62) saw 'police authorities as self-limiting and the 
architects of their own decline'. In addition, their lack of influence was due to 
their cumbersome size, a lack of expertise by police authority members, a lack of 
understanding by members of the scale and operation of police authorities, some 
chief constables accepted the important role of police authorities whilst others 
viewed police authorities as an annoyance. 
The core functions of the police authority 
Police authorities are independent bodies and there is a police authority 
for each of the 43 police forces in England and Wales with the only national 
police authority being the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA). The duty of 
the police authority is to set the strategic direction for the local police force whilst 
holding the chief constable to account on behalf of the local community for the 
policing service delivered. 
Prior to the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 there were - in 
England and Wales - three structural types of police authorities, the combined, 
the joint and the single authority (Hart, 1951). 
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Combined authorities were independent of the constituent local councils 
and because they were unattached to and arguably unaware of some of the local 
constraints - particularly budgetary ones - within local areas they were deemed to 
be less accountable than single county police authorities. Combined authorities 
only existed outside of metropolitan areas such as Avon & Somerset, Thames 
Valley, and Sussex. 
Joint authorities consisted of members nominated by constituent 
metropolitan district councils and magistrates from the different areas. These 
types of authorities only existed in metropolitan areas and came into being when 
the metropolitan counties were abolished in 1985. Examples of joint authorities 
include Greater Manchester, London and West Yorkshire. Single authorities 
tended to function as a committee of the county council, e. g. Lancashire or 
Surrey. 
There were also two national service authorities that performed a similar 
function to police authorities; the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service. These have now been merged into the Serious and 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). These authorities were set up by the Police 
Act 1997 and came into being on 1st April 1998. 
With the passing of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 significant 
changes to both the composition and powers of police authorities came into force 
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in England and Wales. The act made police authorities independent of local 
government and because combined, joint and single police authority structures 
were local government arrangements these structures became obsolete. The act 
also substantially reduced the size of police authorities and the numbers of 
elected councillors on them and independent members were introduced to police 
authorities. As a result of the act, police authority membership consisted of 9 
local councillors, 5 independent or appointed members and 3 magistrate 
members totalling 17 members. Some larger authorities had slightly more 
members; for example the Metropolitan Police Authority had 23 members which 
enabled it to more adequately represent London's size and make up. 
According to the Policy Studies Institute (1997), despite initial criticisms 
that the Police and Magistrate Court Act 1994 represented an attack on 
democratic accountability, there was evidence that local police authorities were 
actually re-invigorated as a result of it. The Policy Studies Institute (1997) also 
found that the most criticised aspects of the act - the reduction in police authority 
size and the introduction of appointed independent members - made police 
authorities more active and influential and rather than increasing central control, 
many forces and police authorities had used local policing plans to introduce a 
range of local police objectives, including crime prevention and quality of life 
issues such as traffic calming measures and road safety. Notwithstanding this, 
however, police authorities were effectively less democratic and their local plans 
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had to take account of national issues which at times were at odds with local 
concerns. 
Baldwin and Kinsey, (1982: 108) and Jones et al (1994: 27) agreed with 
Jack Straw MP in a memorandum on his Police Authorities Bill 1979; Jack Straw 
explained that the role and power of police authorities had been defined in terms 
of increased powers for the police which was not the intended purpose. The 
democratic scrutiny of the police had - in his opinion - been reduced to an 
unacceptable level. Mr. Straw MP introduced a private members Bill that would 
have given police authorities powers to determine general policing policies, bind 
chief constables to act in accordance to them, and police authorities would have 
the powers to appoint senior officers down to superintendents. Mr. Straw also 
proposed - as did Loveday and Reid (2003) - that magistrate members be 
removed from police authorities -a move that is now being implemented. The 
proposals also included a number of checks on police authorities; for example, 
the home Secretary would adjudicate on disputes between the police authority 
and the chief constable. The Bill did not become law and amongst those who 
were most vociferous against it was the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) who saw the Bill as allowing political interference into the operations of 
the police. What ACPO failed to grasp however was that the involvement of the 
home Secretary in appointing senior officers, the home Secretary's power to veto 
requests by police authorities for reports from their chief constables and the 
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increased funding from the Home Office to police authorities had already 
introduced political influence/interference at the highest level. 
Conclusion 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there was no grand design 
for policing in the United Kingdom, its development was never logical or 
systematic but was moulded by the needs and fears of society and then evolved 
over time as those needs and fears fluctuated and changed (Critchley, 1978). 
Reiner (1992) however does not accept this analysis. Critchley (1978) described 
the Wapping murders in London in 1811, and the Gordon riots of 1780 as crucial 
turning points that hastened attempts to develop a systematic policing system. 
Despite the conclusions of the three committees set up in 1816,1818 and 1822 
that it was incompatible to retain a police service, the need for such a service 
was over time proved to be necessary. The work of the Fielding brothers, the 
impact of the Gordon riots and the Wapping murders all served to demonstrate 
the need for a systematic system of policing. 
The transition from watch committees, the role of the justices and their 
powers to appoint chief officers along with the significant impact of the various 
Acts of parliament all set the scene for our current structure of policing and police 
authorities. Today, there is a fine balancing point to be found between policing 
policy on a macro level, its representation in local policing plans and its 
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implementation on the micro level. This potential tension between the macro, 
micro, the national and the local, presents a conundrum over whom or what 
policing is serving; is it a political structure that has security functions or is it a 
security structure with political functions? The juxtaposition of a sense of liberty 
and freedom whilst maintaining law and order is politically and morally sensitive. 
The obvious fear is that strong policing can lead to tyranny whilst a laissez fair 
approach may - in extreme cases - result in anarchy (Mills, 1906: 8). 
Police authorities stand in a pivotal position to affect and improve upon our 
collective experience of policing. In the following chapters I will be considering 
the role of police authorities in the context of citizenship, their effectiveness and 
their relevance to affect change, engage stakeholders and provide increased 
accountability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 
Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to cradle the discussion of police authorities in 
the wider context of the rights and responsibilities of the citizen and the state. I 
will be discussing these issues in the context of what it means to be a citizen, 
what is expected and how as an institution police authorities fulfil their primary 
role of ensuring the maintenance of an efficient police service and how they 
consult, engage scrutinise, bring to account and ensure added value to the 
citizen and the system of policing. 
As a means of enhancing, legitimising and perpetuating the agreed 
norms and protocols of society and its institutions, it is essential that the 
citizen is able to participate economically, socially and politically. At its most 
basic level citizen involvement and participation reflects the citizen's trust and 
acceptance of society's norms and values (Blunkett, 2001; Clarke, 1994; 
Locke, 1978; National Consumer Council, 2002; MORI, 2003; Audit 
Commission, 2002; Coleman, 2005; Alibhai-Brown, 1999; Hewitt, 1996). If 
there is to be a smooth and effective exchange of rights, responsibilities and 
obligations, the relationship between the citizen and the state requires 
reciprocity of action not just theoretically but practically. The bequeathing by 
the citizen of responsibilities and powers to the state is just the beginning of 
the relationship. 
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The state's primary role is to provide subsistence, produce abundance, 
favour equality and maintain security (Bentham, 1960; Held, 1999). The 
Burkean view sees the individual citizen as directly empowered whilst 
Rousseau's model of democracy in The Social Contract (1762) is closer to our 
current system where the individual invests power in professional politicians 
and institutions. Our investing of power is channelled through bureaucrats, 
civil servants and politicians who then operate through various government 
departments and institutions. Through the Department of Health we are 
provided with a health service, our welfare state is supported through the 
Department of Work and Pensions, the Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills ensures that we have education and skills provision and enables 
business and industry to operate within set parameters and conditions. The 
Department for Environment Food and Rural affairs (DEFRA) overseas food, 
environmental and agricultural affairs, the Ministry of Justice oversees our 
judicial system, through the Ministry of Defence our armed forces secure our 
borders, the tripartite system of the Bank of England, the Financial Services 
Authority and the Chancellor sets the financial climate for economic activity 
and there are many more national agencies and bodies. This model of 
government and governing is further complicated - and to some extent 
duplicated - at the regional level through devolved authorities which includes 
Regional Development agencies, local Government Offices and at the local 
level through local councils, Local Strategic Partnerships, Primary Care Trusts 
(PCT) and Local Area Agreements (LAA)l to name a few. Regulatory bodies 
I Local Area Agreements (LAAS) are made between central and local government in a local area. Their aim Is to achieve local solutions that meet local 
needs, while also contributing to national priorities and the achievement of standards set by central government. 
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like the Strategic Rail Authority, the British Medical Association (BMA), the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), Trading Standards, police authorities and 
many others have the power to call various bodies to account on our behalf, 
ensuring transparency and fairness in the operation of the sectors and 
industries they monitor, scrutinise and oversee. 
If the state is to function effectively it needs to secure and maintain 
legitimacy by gaining consent which ultimately could lead to increased 
involvement and participation (Blunkett, 2001; Clarke, 1994; Locke, 1978; 
National Consumer Council, 2002; MORI, 2003; Audit Commission, 2002; 
Coleman, 2005; Alibhai-Brown, 1999; Hewitt, 1996). Whilst tacit consent as 
postulated by Locke (1978) plays an important part within the armoury of an 
effective administration, what is really required, is the active participation of 
the citizen because active participation reflects a higher level of importance in 
the mind of the citizen and underpins and provides direct buoyancy to the 
legitimacy of our institutions and its processes (Blunkeft, 2001; Clarke, 1994). 
Whilst all citizens are afforded the same rights and the same 
responsibilities, in practice citizens are not treated equally; for example ethnic 
minorities and people with disabilities face discrimination, unequal access to 
opportunity and are poorly represented in public and political life. This is highly 
Local Area Agreements seek to: 
provide Intelligent and mature discussion between local and central government, based on a clear framework and shared understanding 
of national and local priorities 
Improve local performance, by allowing a more flexibie use of resources, to achieve better outcomes and devolve responsibility 
enhance efficiency by rationatising non-mainstrearn funding and reduce bureaucracy to help local partners to join up and enhance 
community leadership. 
The first round of 20 LAAs was announced on the 22 March 2005, the second round of 66 LAAs was announced on the 22 June 2005 (improvement Bt 
Development Agency: 2006). 
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relevant because the citizen, having bequeathed responsibilities and powers 
to the state to aide the smooth and effective exchange of rights, 
responsibilities and obligations, expects that there is reciprocity and equity not 
only in theory but in practice. There is therefore an obligation on the citizen 
but also an obligation on the state. 
According to Boaden (1982), reciprocity between the state and the 
citizen ensures that all have equal access to become involved and to interact 
with society's institutions - whether they wish to challenge or accept them. If 
the expected reciprocity is not maintained and there is evidence of 
discrimination and marginalisation, the question which then arises is whether 
those who are marginalised and discriminated against are under the same 
obligation as other non marginalised citizens to participate. In this chapter I 
develop this argument and in chapter five I develop the theme that even 
where there is discrimination and marginalisation, our institutions are more 
accountable 2 today than they have ever been and that this level of 
accountability reflects an attempt to reduce marginalisation and discrimination. 
However, there is no evidence to support the argument that increasing 
accountability will result in increased participation (Scarman, 1986). To some 
extent Ignatief (1995) concurs with this and argues that the more a citizen 
receives from the state the more they are obliged and have an increased 
sense of responsibility to it. Throughout this chapter I will be looking at the 
2 Scrutiny occurs through direct election of officials; nationally, regionally and locally. Scrutiny also occurs 
legislatively; through bills and acts of Parliament; through select committees and appointed members. Scrutiny 
also occurs through the civil service, through Independent auditing agencies and bodies, through the media, think 
tanks and the plethora of universities and research Institutes. 
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implications of this for the citizen, the state and the ability of police authorities 
to engage the citizen and how this may affect the operational role of the police 
service. 
What I hope to identify is the role police authorities can and have 
played in directing and focusing this sense of obligation into active 
participation. Unlike Ignatief, however, I do not see the defining aspect of 
one's responsibility or propensity to participate as being measured by the level 
of what one receives from the state. Why? Because the citizen is the recipient 
of a vast array of public services that have to be provided for everyone if they 
are to be provided for anyone (Titmuss, 1988: 123). It is highly probable 
however that the catalyst for increased participation is inextricably linked to 
having a plethora of meaningful opportunities for increased representation 
and involvement. Hoban (2004) explains that participation and involvement is 
apparent and/or evidenced through the degree to which the citizen is able to 
affectchange. 
I do not intend to provide a detailed critical appraisal or analysis of 
citizenship in relation to geographic, economic or socio-political boundaries of 
a country and the communities within it. What I seek to do here is to discuss 
the relevance of citizenship in relation to our institutions and to discuss how 
the work of police authorities can and has impacted on local participation. 
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The contentious issue of rights and citizenship 
Embodied within the concept of the rights of the citizen is the notion 
that we all have the right to be free from offence and violence and we also 
have the responsibility not to cause offence. On a more strategic level, I 
subscribe to Marshall's (1963) approach where he sees political, social and 
economic rights as a long process of emergence; each occurring and 
emerging at different times and all having equal influence. I also subscribe to 
Twine (1994) who sees social rights as the all important component without 
which political and economic rights are impotent. For Franklin (11998: 56) there 
is no distinction between political rights (which he sees expressed in the right 
to vote) political participation (as expressed in the right to engage and use 
services such as health and welfare) and civil rights (as expressed as freedom 
from coercion and assault). Franklin acknowledges that historically, civil and 
political rights were seen as the only issues that were central to citizenship; 
this is because education, health and individual economic well being were 
seen as private matters attained through the market by an individual's own 
efforts. Within this model, citizenship did not provide social and economic 
status but a political and civil one which stood outside and could be attained 
despite inequalities in social and economic status. Twine (1994), however, 
argued that it was inconsistent to the sustaining of a harmonious and effective 
society if the third element - social rights - was absent as it provided the core 
underpinning of political and civil rights. 
The argument of the New Right according to Plant & Barry (1990: 62) 
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as embodied in Hayek, Buchanan, and Friedman is that genuine rights ought 
to be connected to some mechanism of enforcement, otherwise the rights are 
not genuine. Although Plant & Barry (1990) primarily refer to a top down 
approach from the state, through the institution and then to the individual, 
when we look at the ability of institutions which are charged with the 
responsibility of scrutinising and holding other institutions to account, the 
ability and power to enforce is a crucial element of the power to scrutinise and 
call to account (Day and Klein, 1987). The question this raises is, with all the 
statutory implements at its disposal, do police authorities use their powers 
effectively to bring the police service to account? For example, it has been 
argued that the strongest and most unambiguous power that police authorities 
have - which is to withhold budgets - is not as effective as one might have 
hoped and that this power is never used even when there are sufficient 
grounds to do so (Stephens, 1998: 169; Jones et al, 1994: 19). 
Whilst institutions with scrutiny, regulatory and oversight functions are 
created to aid the democratic process by increasing transparency and 
accountability, the creation of a police authority or indeed any other regulatory 
or scrutiny body does not constitute a right in and of itself. According to Flynn, 
(2002,206) the citizen does however have the right to be consulted, to 
participate and have effective mechanisms of accountability in place to ensure 
the effective use of public resources. The citizen is also entitled to protection 
against a potentially despotic or discriminatory state or indeed police service. 
The commitment to an infrastructure of institutions that facilitates consultation, 
enhances accountability and representation ought to be central to the rights of 
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the citizen, designed by the citizen and working on behalf of the citizen and 
the state in partnership. 
There have always been contentious issues around the subject of 
citizenship. The core contention relates to status and rights which impacts 
overtly on belonging and a sense of belonging (Parekh, 2000; Marshal, 1963; 
Bhavnani, 2001; Blunkett, 2002; Clarke, 1994; Bade, 1997). Encapsulated 
within any sense or notion of belonging is reciprocity, because an individual 
cannot be committed or be said to truly belong to any community be it 
political, social, religious or economic unless that community is also 
committed and belongs to them (Parekh, 2000). In order for a community to 
operate effectively there is an obligation on that community to value and 
cherish all its members/citizens through the granting of equal rights which is 
represented - although not exclusively - by the possibility of securing 
employment, having fair access to education, health care, housing and other 
opportunities in a way that is comparable to other members of that community 
so that each can contribute to the collective life of the community (Blunkett, 
2002; Brazier, 2005; Bade, 1997; Hoban, 2004). For access and opportunity 
to be tangible, the possibility of progress personally and collectively needs to 
be reflected in the structures, policies and conduct of the political, social and 
economic system. Without this access and - what I have termed - 'route to 
progreSS23 we are left with what Hall (1990: 175) calls the 'politics of closure' 
which attempts to restrict and exclude certain groups from acquiring full 
citizenship. For Hall (1990) those who have historically benefited from 
citizenship have usually been property owners, men, white people, the 
3 See Appendix 4 
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educated, those with particular skills, education or backgrounds: those that do 
not fulfil these criteria are excluded and are marginal beneficiaries. 
Historically, the language of citizenship and nationality primarily 
referred to the nation-state in which a single nation was dominant. These 
demarcated boundaries seal off and enclose one society, country, community 
or kinfolk from others, establishing order through a nation-state (Held, 1995; 
Rose, 1996). Nations tend to be composed of culturally homogeneous groups 
of people, larger than a single tribe or community and sharing a common 
language, institutions, religion, and historical experience. When a nation of 
people have their own state or country they are a nation-state (Hall and 
Jacques: 1990). Canada is an example of a state which has two nations. The 
United States because of its shared American culture and even with its 
multicultural society is referred to as a nation-state. There are also nations 
without states; for example the Kurds. The sovereignty of the 'nation-state' 
has arguably become much eroded and is reflected in the increased 
movement of people for economic, social, and political reasons. The opening 
up of trade between states, countries and regions has exacerbated this and 
has facilitated what I have termed the 'cross-cultural symbioseS4 of the 
human state'. 'Cross-cultural symbioses' is an eclectic environment where we 
experience the unavoidable cross fertilisation of ideas, terms, idioms and 
practices. For example, historically, each religion purported to be the only 
truth, politics was ideologically polarised between left and right, geographically 
and militarily, antagonisms were between east and west, and economically 
See Appendix 4 
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and politically you were either communist or capitalist. Today, however, we 
now accept that there are less overtly stark ideological barriers and there are 
significant areas of commonality and synergy. For example, economically, we 
no longer see communism as the direct antithesis to capitalism as businesses 
in both communist and capitalist countries trade on the international markets; 
the recent economic crisis which has seen western capitalist free market 
governments take commercial banks into public ownership is a contemporary 
example of this. Where religion is concerned there is commonality between 
the major religions and an infusion of ideas and practices like Feng Shui and 
other eastern religions which have become inextricably linked to our 
mainstream culture. Our recognition of diversity and its value has increased 
through diverse and divergent economic, social, religious and political 
experiences. The previously held ideas around citizenship and the relationship 
of the citizen to the state have also altered particularly with the decline in 
deference to the state (Marsh, 1977 and Hart, 1978). It is with this knowledge 
and in this context that I am attempting to discuss the role that our institutions 
can and ought to play in the shaping of our society and our experiences. 
Discussions on citizenship have a distinct subtext of race. In 1970s 
Britain the debate on citizenship primarily centred around the question of what 
to do with the influx of people who had been invited from the former British 
colonies to help rebuild Britain. After having been invited to help rebuild the 
country, should the new arrivals be encouraged to stay? The experience of 
many ethnic communities was that British institutions and the indigenous 
population saw and treated them and other newly arrived people from the 
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colonies and Ireland as second class citizens. Whilst simultaneously giving 
the impression that they were full citizens the new arrivals were discriminated 
against and treated as outsiders on the margins of society (Millen, 2003). 
Bulmer and Rees (1996) identified three periods in history when 
discussions of citizenship became heightened; i) just before the First World 
War, ii) from the Second World War up to the 1960s and iii) the period after 
1980 and Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class. In the UK a number of 
specific developments have contributed to the rise in politicians, academics 
and other commentators reflecting on the question of citizenship. Firstly, the 
intense pressure that public services have been under, coupled with the 
widely held view that particular services such as health, education and the 
welfare state could not continue to be financially supported in the way that 
they had historically been. Secondly, greater European integration has been 
aided by the explosion in travel and communications technology. There has 
also been a steady growth in international interdependence, globalisation and 
the increasingly stark contrast in wealth, health and economic prosperity 
reflected in the widening gulf between rich and poorer nations. All these 
issues have compounded discussions and analyses of the meaning of 
citizenship in the 21't Century. The former Home Secretary David Blunkett 
wrote: 
"... in setting out a policy on citizenship, immigration and asylum 
it is this recognition of global movement, mass communication and the 
changing international situation that has to inform our thinking if we are 
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determined to develop the type of society we all want to be part of" 
(Blunkett, 2002: 5). 
The third and final concern that has contributed to citizenship rising in 
prominence on the political and social agenda is the rise of international 
terrorism and the way western governments have responded to it. 
All countries face the challenges migration brings with it. British 
nationality is not overtly associated with membership of a particular ethnic 
group and as such people are not excluded from citizenship on the basis of 
their race or ethnic origin (Home Office, 2002: 11). It is however simplistic and 
blinkered to suggest that because this is not the case then the reason's for 
disharmony, discomfort and alienation are not to some extent linked to race, 
culture and ethnic differences. The rise in extreme politics as epitomised by 
the success of the British National Party (BNP) in gaining seats in the 2006 
local elections and two seats in the European elections in June 2009 
demonstrate that any discussion of citizenship, rights and responsibilities has 
undertones of race, culture and ethnicity. The enlargement of the European 
Union together with tighter controls on immigration (through the Asylum and 
Immigration Act 2002), restrictions on rights to work, the Welfare Reform Act 
2007 (at its heart there is a commitment to reduce the number of benefit 
recipients), in legal cases the removal of the right to appeal and the ending of 
trial by jury in certain cases implies that the governments commitment to 
community cohesion is at best fractured and disjointed but at worst it is 
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xenophobic and panders to those who wish to see a more separatist and 
exclusive Britain. 
Whilst Turner (1993) sees citizenship as being vital in creating harmony 
he also sees it as a socially disruptive process where social membership 
becomes universalistic and open-ended. He sees citizenship as providing us 
with a benchmark of modernisation breaking down systems of patriarchy, 
gerontocracy and patrimonialism and replacing them with the unbridled 
competition of the market where the professions and social classes compete 
to attain and preserve their access to privileged resources. Turner (1993) 
argues that despite the socially disruptive element of citizenship, the hope is 
that it can and will play a vital role in creating harmony. The solution that 
Hobbes (1980: 185-188) presents in 'Leviathan' is that in subscribing to a 
social contract and to a 'common power' we will prevent the otherwise 
inevitable collision between citizens and avert the perpetual state of 'Warre, 
where every man is enemy to every man'. 
Today, much weight and emphasis is given to the importance of the 
citizen and the role the citizen can and ought to play in civic society 
particularly in decision-making processes (Blunkett, 2002; Clarke, 1994; 
Coleman, 2005; Home Office, 2002; Social Exclusion Unit, 2001; Turner, 
1993). Those of a more sceptical persuasion may support the argument that 
on key issues the decisions have already been made and the participation of 
the citizen - whilst theatrical - is still a vital part of legitimising and maintaining 
the legitimacy of the political process (Hoban, 2004). Hoban's (2004) research 
92 
found that decisions had already been agreed prior to wider participation and 
consultation and that the required further involvement was to validate 
previously arrived at positions. 
Legitimacy and acceptance of a process is secured if it can be 
demonstrated that wide participation was sought and an even greater level of 
endorsement is achieved if participation is evidenced to have taken place and 
shown to have affected the decision making process. My belief is that the 
litmus test of inclusion and participation is not only evidenced through the 
participation of the citizen, but in order for the system to be viable it must do 
more than simply getting people to talk. People 'must decide and do things' 
(McHugh & Parvin, 2005: 22). There is however an inherent difficulty in relying 
on this approach: for example, how does one develop a formula for measuring 
the level of change brought about as a result of involvement; and is it 
necessary to consider measuring in this way? For example, using - as a 
barometer - the level of involvement and participation or the various stages 
leading to a conclusion or a decision does not make a decision any more or 
less valid, representative or effective, if anything, one could argue that it 
serves to complicate the process., In addition to a rigorous process, what is 
needed is an atmosphere that is conducive to a sense of belonging and a 
feeling that there is potential for change as a result of collective participation 
(Hoban, 1994; Parekh, 2000; Coleman, 2005). The formula that I have 
developed and applied to describe this is that the net benefit of participation 
leads to Enhanced Cultural Cohesion5 (ECC). It works like this: enabling a 
See Appendix 4 
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feeling of inclusion (171) + an opportunity for participation (OP) +a greater 
sense of being heard and belonging (HB) and Social Justice (SJ) = Enhanced 
Cultural Cohesion (ECC). Being heard and feeling listened to are critical 
components of any process of engagement. Coleman (2005: 1) explained that 
the problem his research identified was that the government believed that the 
public did not know how to speak whilst the public believed that the 
government did not know how to listen, resulting in an unending cycle of 
disengagement, distrust and suspicion. 
Alienation 
From Thatcherism to Blairism, British politics has undergone 
substantial change which has been marked by a decline in the 'old collectivist 
structures' such as membership of traditional democratic institutions like 
political parties, Trades Unions and reduced voter participation locally and 
nationally (McHugh and Parvin, 2005). There is increased politicisation of 
young people through single issue causes, resulting in varying forms of 
political engagement through website blogs, twittering and social networking 
sites. Other significant shifts include changes in the delivery of public services, 
the reduction in the involvement and influence of the public sector in transport, 
health and education provision and the increased involvement of the private 
sector (Kavanagh, 1990; Hall and Jacques, 1990). With these and other 
changes, there is a corresponding similarity in the alienation experienced by 
the citizen and that mirrored by the alienation between our institutions. For 
example; politically, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary have been 
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involved in robust discussions and consultations on their respective roles. This 
situation has emerged because Parliament has increasingly seen itself as 
being alienated from the decision making process and has found itself in 
regular conflict with the executive (Norton, 2001; Flinders, 2002; McHugh, 
2005; Brazier, 2005). The House of Commons through the Liaison 
Committee's report 'Shifting the Balance' (2001) indicated its concern about 
the balance of power between the executive and the legislature. The 
committee put forward reforms that it believed would go some way towards 
allaying the concerns that the executive had tipped the balance of power 
disproportionately in its favour. In its report the committee explained that 
Parliament was unable to exercise its supremacy over the executive because 
of the executive's tight party management and its control of the House of 
Commons timetable. The issue of Parliamentary reform and the strengthening 
of Parliament over the executive is a matter of increasing debate and 
controversy; groupings such as the Liaison Committee, Parliament First, the 
All Party Parliamentary Reform Group and the Cross-Party Group on Reform 
of the Second Chamber are actively working on this agenda as they see it as 
being a contributory factor in the low turnout (61 %) at the May 2005 general 
election. The recent controversy over MP's expenses has added new 
momentum to the challenge around Parliamentary and wider constitutional 
reform. Brazier, Flinders & McHugh (2005: 88) acknowledge that 'Parliament's 
authority rests on public confidence' which underlies the view that a significant 
proportion of the electorate have disengaged from the political process due to 
a lack of confidence. 
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In the fight by Parliament to reassert itself over the executive, the 
perceived wisdom is that greater Parliamentary control of the executive can 
only realistically be achieved by Members of Parliament changing their 
attitudes about their roles and understanding their importance (Norton: 1983). 
This is similar to the position of Jones et. al (1994) who maintained that police 
authorities and police authority members undervalued themselves and were 
unaware of their real powers. During my interview with the Former 
Commissioner of the City of London Police - Perry Nove6 - he explained that 
the ability of the police authority was dependent firstly on the police authority 
having a strong and capable secretariat and, secondly, on the police authority 
members 'not going native'. By assuming that because the chief constable is 
a good and nice person that they can accept what is said at face value. The 
battle between the executive and Parliament demonstrates that even within 
our highest political institutions, our elected representatives are uncertain 
about the degree to which they are able to bring about influence, change and 
indeed the level to which they are heard. In comparison to Parliament, our 
humble police authorities are in no way immune from these problems. 
On 28 th November 2003 the government launched the biggest 
consultation exercise the country had ever known; it was called 'The Big 
Conversation'. The 'Big Conversation' was an attempt by the government to 
re-engage a disaffected, unattached and apathetic public with politics. Many 
saw it as an exercise lacking in substance and today it is difficult to credit the 
6 Interviewed 8 th July 2008. 
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initiative with any tangible or long lasting developments either to the legislative 
process, the role of the executive, citizen participation or the political process 
as a whole. What the 'Big Conversation' did assist in doing however was to 
join the throng of voices elevating the role of citizenship and the rights of the 
citizen to be informed and engaged. The former Home Secretary David 
Blunkett (2001: 140) wrote that there was a gap that needed to be bridged 
between the aspirations of citizens and the ability of the government to act on 
them. What 'The Big Conversation' did was to further underscore the 
responsibility that the government has towards the citizen, firstly, in terms of 
disseminating information and, secondly, in relation to the citizen's right to be 
consulted. One of the architects of 'The Big Conversation, ' Mathew Taylor, 
explained that the real challenge was how to scale up a qualitative 
engagement with a small number of people into a legitimate contribution to 
national policy-making (Coleman, 2005). 
When consultation is undertaken it is important that sufficient 
information is available to enable the citizen to understand the process, the 
aims and objectives of engagement. Every attempt needs to be made to 
ensure that the consultation involves a wide breadth of participants from 
diverse interests and interest groups and that evidence of change can be 
demonstrated (Audit Commission, 2003; Cabinet Office, 2002; Coleman, 
2005; Hoban, 2004). Whether at a local, regional or national level, well 
intentioned decisions invariably have unintended consequences which are at 
times negative and offer only short-term solutions to very complex issues 
(Millen, 2002: 5). Whilst there is no guarantee that well thought out policies - 
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that are subject to the rigorous scrutiny of the legislature - will not fall foul of 
public opinion, if a greater proportion of citizens have the opportunity of being 
actively involved the risk and reward of decision making is shared. Not only 
are the risks and rewards shared but as Rousseau (1987) - over optimistically 
- explains, decisions arrived at collectively will always be right and beneficial 
for the collective good as the general will never errs. 
Rousseau's Social Contract (1762) begins with the often quoted line: 
'man was born free and he is everywhere in chains' (Rousseau, 1986: 49). 
This leads Rousseau to the conclusion that only through the law can man 
regain his freedom because the collective decision will always benefit men 
who ultimately must be forced to be free (Rousseau, 1987: 60). Feldman 
(2002) holds a counter position to this arguing that during the 1990s UK 
governments sought ways of protecting citizens' rights to public provision in 
ways other than through the law. For example, the Citizens Charter 
programme (HMSO, 1991) sought to improve effectiveness and accountability 
whilst securing standards of performance by monitoring and regulation and 
wherever possible relieving people of the need to depend on the state. This 
runs somewhat counter to the general thrust of Ignatief (1995) because whilst 
Feldman argued that the state enabled the citizen to rely on themselves rather 
than the state, Ignatief (1995) saw the reliance of the individual on state 
provision as being the central most important component of ensuring that the 
citizen was increasingly obliged and had a growing sense of responsibility to 
the state and its continued functioning. The centre ground between the 
positions of Ignatief and Feldman is that the state still holds the ultimate 
power, because whilst permitting the citizen a certain degree of control and 
autonomy, the citizen is still ultimately dependent on the benefaction of the 
state and that dependency appears not to be mitigated or reduced. According 
to C Wright Mills (1956) all politics is a struggle for power with the ultimate 
kind of power being violence. In this context our institutions have defined roles 
which we as citizens are unable to materially alter except through other 
institutions which we have imbued with power; i. e. we can have increased 
influence on the police service through police authorities. For C Wright Mills 
(1956) the ultimate power is violence and the state has a police service ready 
to do its biding; the logical conclusion of this is that police authorities have a 
very real and important role to play in protecting the citizen. I suggest that all 
citizens wish to be free but they do not wish to be forced to be free in the way 
that Rousseau implies. Notwithstanding, our institutions have a responsibility 
to gain the confidence of the people who have bequeathed them with 
responsibility. 
Perspectives on Citizenship 
For Janowitz (1980: 24; Turner, 2002: 43) the term citizen is expressed 
in a positive light denoting a level of morality with thought and consideration 
for the collective good. The term may also be said to be empirical and 
descriptive due to the way it links obligations and rights to eligibility. It is also 
analytical in the protection the state offers and in the opportunities it creates 
for political participation. Clarke (1994: 3) concludes that out of all the 
descriptions we have to define ourselves the description of citizen is the only 
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one that is solely political. He asserts that whilst other definitions may imply a 
political aspect and may in fact be dependent on some form of political 
framework only the definition of citizen is wholly and exclusively concerned 
with the individual as a political being. The relevancy of this point is that there 
is a need - indeed -a requirement for consultation and increased engagement 
which can facilitate consent and balance the sometimes competing political 
and social agendas. This can only be brought about through the citizen's right 
to be consulted being brought to life by the actions of our institutions because 
this is the only way to ensure a harmonious society (Scarman, 1986: 102, 
section 4.56 - 4.58). Notwithstanding this however, the consent secured by 
the police is always potentially tenuous and liable to disruption in times of 
crisis when the coercive powers of the police come to the fore (Silver, 1967: 
15 -24; Storch, 1975: 107-108; Cohen, 1979: 128-136). Again the police 
authority has a critical role to play. However, it cannot effectively affect 
situations if it is only able to respond after the event (Lustgarten, 1986). 
Active citizenship 
In ancient Greece, citizenship was not a commodity that anyone except 
the privileged few could attain. In order to attain citizenship one had to be free, 
and the ability to be free was based on affordability. Due to only a minority 
being able to secure the financial resources to acquire their freedom, the 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens was an arbitrary one based 
exclusively on financial wealth. There was also a clear distinction between 
citizenship which was participatory and citizenship which was passive. The 
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distinction between these two forms of citizenry was the difference in levels of 
participation and expectation between citizenship of the small homogeneous 
Greek polis and the large heterogeneous Roman Empire. The Greek ideal of 
citizenship was more aligned with the moral, cultural and the personal good of 
each citizen. Citizenship under the Roman Empire on the other hand was 
based around a notion of law making and administration (Low: 2000). Mouffe 
(1993) however warns against too nostalgic a view of the Greek polis in 
particular or any other idealised societal arrangement as the theoretical 
position does not always translate to the practical application. The 
uncomfortable juxtaposition between the ideal theoretical rights of the citizen 
against the practical application of those rights leads inevitably to the question 
of who belongs and who does not. In addition, the criteria for belonging and 
when citizenship entitlement commences or indeed when it is revoked are 
questions likely to always be part of the ongoing debate and controversy on 
citizenship and entitlement (Leonard, 2002: 10-20). 
Active citizenship is based on a participatory approach and works on 
the supposition that there is a consensus of values and an agreed concept of 
an objective common good (Low, 2000). From 1997 the Labour government 
attempted to bring the citizen closer to decision making processes by 
increasing the opportunities for participation. There was a plethora of new 
institutions to facilitate this such as the devolved authorities, the consultative 
and regulatory role of police authorities, in London the creation of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP), 
Regional Development Agencies (RDA), regional Government Offices, the 
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new Learning and Skills Councils (LSC), Connexions Service, Primary Care 
Trusts (PCT), Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), also known 
as Community Safety Partnerships were developed as a result of the Crime & 
Disorder Act 1998 and the Scottish Government and the Welsh Assembly. 
These initiatives - although not exclusively - have facilitated an increase in the 
number of voluntary and community organisations, pressure and interest 
groups, the creation within the Home Office of the Active Community Unit 
(ACU), the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU). They have also given wider 
access and knowledge of the proliferation of initiatives such as the Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB), Working Neighbourhoods Fund, the European 
Social Fund (ESF) New Deal initiatives, Ethnic Minority Outreach programmes 
(EMO) and all the regeneration monies being spent. The overall impact on 
people's lives is hotly contested, but what they have done is provided 
opportunities for increased consultation and involvement. 
Passive citizenry 
In contrast to active citizenship, passive citizenry is premised on the 
idea of a separation and distinction between the public and private spheres. 
The individual is able to pursue their own goals and interests because the 
protection of property and liberty are the responsibility of the state (Low, 
2000). For Rousseau (1987) citizenship was inextricably linked to the 
invention of private property, with private property being the defining element 
of a modern society and constituting a pivotal moment in society's evolution 
out of a simple state into one characterised by greed, competition and 
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inequality. Passive citizenry is arguably individualistic and competitive in 
outlook. Civic solidarity and a sense of community could only be built on the 
presumption that the more a citizen received from the state, the easier it was 
for him/her to equate and link private interests to that of the public; hence, the 
welfare state was a critical institution in that realisation (Ignatieff, 1995). 
Ignatieff (1995: 66-7) argued that the creation of the welfare state was 
therefore an attempt to make citizenship a real experience. 
In modern Britain one can see examples of citizenship as being both 
passive and active. Passive citizenship is evident because irrespective of the 
degree of equal access to resources and influence, the citizen is bestowed 
with status, rights and has responsibilities (Marshall, 1963). These rights and 
responsibilities include the responsibility not to cause offence, the right to be 
free from violence and the prevention of damage to others or the property of 
others. To be a citizen in ancient Rome carried legal rights and proffered 
protection allowing one to travel and trade unhindered. Citizenship at this time 
did not include within it a responsibility or obligation to participate in political 
life; the same is true in Britain today. 
The propensity to be active citizens does however, creep up on us, 
because, whilst there is no overt obligation to participate there is an 
expectation that within t6 structures of local, regional and national 
government and in an environment of increased political and social 
awareness - over issues of war, the environment, schools, education, health, 
the rising cost of living, increased taxation, pensions, MP's expenses and the 
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encroachment of all things political into our lives - that the citizen will be 
encouraged or lured into engaging and participating. Regardless of the 
degree to which one is actively participating we are all to some degree 
participating. It is worth noting at this stage that non-participation can be seen 
as a legitimate act of participation, because majority rule only works if the 
state is also mindful of individual rights. For example, it would be 
disingenuous to have five wolves and one sheep voting on what to have for 
supper. The non-voting sheep's legitimate abstention is part of the democratic 
process and speaks volumes about the options available (Healy et al, 2005). 
Our institutions thus have an important role to ensure they effectively 
represent the views of their constituents and are careful to avoid tyranny by 
the majority (J S Mill, 1906: 8). 
If people today are increasingly passive, then what is needed is a 
mechanism that will allow our belonging to different communities of values, 
languages and cultures to be compatible with our common belonging to a 
political community whose rules we accepted (Parekh, 2000; Mouffe, 1993). 
Therefore, the question to the five wolves and the one sheep needs to be 
broad enough to appreciate their collective state of hunger but also sensitive 
enough to prevent victimisation and tyranny. Conversely, we must also 
safeguard ourselves from the potential tyranny of the minority. Majoritarian 
democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient element of democracy. 
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Marshall and citizenship 
Marshall (1963) provided an important contribution to the discourse on 
citizenship. He saw citizenship as being concerned with the gaining of 
individual rights which were civil, political and social. Civil rights according to 
Marshall (1963) were primarily concerned with and related to legal equality 
including liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith. Within 
the constructs of civil rights, there is the right to own property, enter into 
contracts, the right to justice and most importantly, equality before the law. 
The institutions most associated with the establishment of these rights are civil 
and criminal courts. 
Marshall's second sphere of citizenship is political rights. By political 
rights Marshall refers to the extension of the franchise and the opportunity to 
participate in and to exercise political influence as a member of a body 
invested with political authority or as an elector of such a body. The 
corresponding institutions are Parliament, local elective bodies (regional 
authorities, the devolved authorities and police authorities). Whilst being an 
important and vital aspect of the democratic process, political rights tackle 
only one area of exclusion - disenfranchisement. What is needed however is 
the ability and facility to enable and encourage people to participate on a 
variety of levels (Coleman, 2005). Some of the other barriers to participation is 
that people feel that very little difference is realised by their involvement: add 
to this the lack of trust and low representation and it is apparent that there is 
much more work that needs to be done in order to fully engage the citizen in 
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the democratic process (National Consumer Council, 2002: 1; MORI, 2003: 
Audit Commission, 2002; Coleman, 2005). 
The third of Marshall's elements of citizenship is social rights. Social 
rights are for Marshall expressed through the right to economic welfare and 
security. Social rights are seen in action through the state caring for the citizen 
and providing tangible services through the provision of education, health and 
other welfare services. 
Klausen (1995: 245,247) disagrees with Marshall's association of 
social rights as being equivalent to civil and political rights. He argues that in 
doing this Marshall merges the provision of social policies like insurance and 
education as inevitable provisions of the state. Central to Marshall's ideas on 
citizenship, is his description that historically the citizen was the passive 
recipient of the status 'citizen' and he charts the struggles to leading to each 
stage of citizens rights. As passive recipients the citizen is by default entitled 
to provisions and a series of entitlements which includes protection under the 
law. For Marshall, being a citizen does not require any form of internalising by 
the individual, but is a political reality designed and created by the state. 
Social contract theorists do not however share Marshall's view on the passive 
nature of citizenship. Social contract theorists like Hobbes (1980) Rousseau 
(1987) Locke (1978) all have varying positions on this and other writers like 
Coleman (2005), Parekh (2000), McHugh and Parvin (2005) Clarke (1994), 
Blunkett (2002), Mill IS (1906) and Hall (1990), see the state as playing a 
fundamentally crucial role in ensuring that the basic principles of social, 
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political, civil and other rights are upheld. One of the crucial differences 
between the above mentioned writers and Marshall is that within their concept 
of citizenship, there is reciprocity of coexistence and active participation. For 
these writers this coexistence is not passive neither is it demonstrably 
prescript ve ut what it does, is it plays a central and evolutionary role in the 
creation and sustaining of society with its civil, political and social roles and it 
has the expectation that the citizen will realise the added value of actually 
participating. 
In defence of Marshall, what he is alluding to is the altruism of the 
state, where, regardless of individual wishes, the state seeks to grant equality 
of opportunity and status to all its citizens; for example, the Race Relations 
Act 1976 and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) under which all 
public bodies including police authorities were placed under a duty to promote 
race equality and the new child poverty bill that the Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions announced on 12 th June 2009 which will enshrine in law a 
duty on all public bodies to eradicate child poverty by 2020. This approach is 
not too dissimilar to Rousseau's argument, because whilst Marshall sees the 
individual as being the passive recipient with the state thrusting certain rights 
on them, for Rousseau the emphasis is on the state's ability to impose on the 
citizen, arguing that the state must force the citizen to be free by forcing the 
benefits of citizenship on to the citizen (Rousseau, 1987: 60). Divergence, 
therefore, occurs between Marshall and Rousseau in the area of reciprocity of 
duties; for Marshall citizenship is not predicated on reciprocity, whilst for 
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Rousseau it is a central component, which is partly driven by the state 
imposing freedom. 
Isin & Woods (2000) also provide a direct counter argument to that of 
Marshall, arguing that practices define an individual's membership and that 
membership could not be described as a bundle of rights and duties. For Isin 
& Woods (2000) people are not passive recipients but their actions create 
associations and liaisons which define their place within a grouping and 
society at large. Citizenship is therefore informed by practice and status. In a 
similar vein, many rights often arise as practices and then become embodied 
in law as conventions. Citizenship is therefore not a purely sociological, 
political or legal concept but is about the relationship between all three. Isin & 
Woods (2000) describe an evolutionary concept of citizenship which is 
constantly changing and reinventing itself within the confines of previous 
acceptability's. The term I have developed for this is 'the involuntary 
principle of participation'7 where by default our actions define through 
practice the parameters of our citizenship which is then upheld sometimes in 
law or in convention as being indicative of our statuS8. Current discussions 
and debates on citizenship in the context of European enlargement and the 
threat of international terrorism will provide an interesting evolutionary insight 
into how citizenship is defined, redefined and how it affects and influences 
government policy and the citizen. 
7 See Appendix 4 
8 The saying that 'Hard cases make bad laws' is particularly pertinent because following on 
from Isin and Woods the potential is for our actions and the actions of others in our 
communities to set precedents from which there is tacit acceptance and in time become 
enshrined in laws. 
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Twine (1994) introduces an interesting concept of citizens as 
commodities. He writes in Citizenship and Social Rights that the risks and 
experience of unemployment are unequally distributed and essentially reflect 
a person's position in the occupational class structure. Arbitrarily, and due to 
no action or fault on the part of individuals, citizens may be deemed as 
superfluous to requirements and made unemployed and unemployable. Whilst 
this is taking place the individual loses none of their rights as citizens and they 
maintain the same levels of access, influence and leverage within the 
democratic system. Twine largely concurs with Marshall that in order for the 
notion of citizenship to work, civil and political rights must be bolstered by a 
crucial third element. Twine's view is that if it is conducive to the continuation 
and development of our democracies, and in the interest of economic 
development that individuals are seen and treated as commodities - being 
employed and made redundant at will - who should pay the cost, the family or 
society? Twine (1994) references the commitment by governments to 
underwrite the citizen by providing welfare and developing various initiatives 
to tackle poverty and deprivation. This is where the social rights - Twine's 
third leg - element of T. H Marshall's typology comes to the fore and provides 
the support and necessary buoyancy to civil and political rights. Without the all 
important third leg of social rights, Twine sees the whole notion of citizenship 
in its current definition as being unworkable. This is in stark contrast to 
Klausen (1995,245: 247) who disagrees with Marshall's - and by extension - 
Twine's (1994) association of social rights as being equivalent to civil and 
political rights. For Klausen this all important 'third leg' cannot be selectively 
applied, the full benefits of citizenship are not restricted but extended to all 
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including those newly arrived people coming into a country; regardless of their 
economic contribution. To prevent access to resources that are available to all 
citizens from those newly receiving the status of citizen would be 
discriminatory, prejudicial and directly open to challenge by the European 
Court under the conventions of contravening human rights. Furthermore, to 
limit, restrict or prevent full citizenship on other spurious grounds would create 
an institutionally sanctioned and accepted second class of citizen that would 
lead to even more entrenched and sustained discrimination. Finally, 
I ... services that are collectively organised and paid for are 'public services' 
and there are a vast array of services that have to be provided for everyone if 
they are to be provided for anyone, and they must be paid for collectively or 
they cannot be had at all... ' (Titmuss, 1988: 123). 
Political context of citizenship 
When a country enlarges through its open borders and welcomes new 
arrivals it is the responsibility of the state through the government to calculate 
and ensure that the net benefit the country will derive from those new arrivals 
is greater than the potential cost. According to the National Employers Skills 
survey (2003: 6) there was a 19.9% skill shortage as a percentage of all job 
vacancies. This situation is compounded by the characteristic unwillingness of 
indigenous communities to work in certain sectors. The view of individuals as 
commodities thus facilitates a market driven economy which is seen as crucial 
for economic prosperity. This has echoes of Durkheim's thesis on the reserve 
army of labour that he developed in The Division of Labour in Society (1893). 
Ito 
The thesis developed by Durkheim described how women were brought into 
the work-place in times of labour shortage; however, when the services of 
these women were no longer needed they were encouraged to return to the 
home (Bilton, 1996: 668; Bruegal, 1979; Milkman 1976; Power: 1980). Seeing 
the citizen as a commodity when viewed in the context of Marx's reserve army 
of labour is problematic because the citizen gives the state its legitimacy and 
the notion at the heart of the reserve army is that the commodity may be 
dispensed with once their usefulness has been expended or exploited. This 
brings us to Twine's (1994) question of who should pay in times of economic 
inactivity. 
We identify ourselves and are identified by our association with and to 
particular groups or communities. We are identifiably recognised as men, 
women, children, mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, able- 
bodied or disabled. We are members of religious groups, clubs and societies; 
and all these various definitions intertwine and overlap with our racial, 
economic and social identities. Whilst our many groupings and alignments 
appear comparatively fixed and stable they are in fact fluid and subject to 
change. For example, sexuality, motherhood, fatherhood, one's capacity and 
willingness to earn; ownership of property, area of residency or the 
communities to which we simultaneously belong all hold a command over our 
life. Subsequent change in our relationship to these groups and communities 
has an impact whether known or unknown to the bearer to the extent that they 
are further defined by external agencies and companies in relation to their 
eligibility to realise specific entitlements afforded to other citizens. Agencies, 
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companies or associations like the Jobcentre Plus, the Inland Revenue, the 
police service, insurance companies, medical practitioners, banks and others 
have the power and authority to affect our ability to actively engage 
corporately in society because the categorisations and the definitions they use 
are supported by structures that are able to exact measures which include or 
exclude individuals and whole communities. Parekh (2000) understood the 
complexity and the plethora of communities in modern Britain and 
acknowledged that we are both a community of citizens and a community of 
communities with requirements that at times conflict (Parekh, 2000: ix). 
The atrocities of September 1 1th 2001 along with the London bombings 
of 2005 have catapulted the discussion of citizenship to the top of our political, 
judicial and media agenda. The renewed interest has raised the temperature 
on the question of defining what is meant by citizenship of an international 
community and specifically citizenship in terms of Britain, its relationship with 
Europe and the rest of the world. For some, the concept of national identity is 
in decline along with the ideal of the nation-state, whilst for others our (the 
UK's) multiple identities such as Afro-British or Asian-British reflect a healthy 
evolution away from the narrow prescription of Britishness (Upton: 2002). The 
former Home Secretary David Blunkett argued that the climate of mistrust 
could be arrested by promoting community cohesion through the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Bill and its subsequent act of 2002. there was much 
disquiet when during an interview on 25 th April 2002 on Radio 4's 'The Today 
programme' he described 'Britain as being swamped' by immigrants. He 
caused further upset in a collection of essays on Britishness in which he set 
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out his political philosophy and that of the government's on civil liberties, 
security, asylum and immigration and in which he controversially stated that 
'Asians should speak English at home as it would help defeat the 
schizophrenia between generations' (Blunkett, 2002: 77). 
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Sense of belonging 
In February 2002 the government published a White Paper 'Secure 
Borders Safe Haven' (Home Office: 2002). The White Paper had significant 
areas of contention, for example, it emphasised the degree to which members 
of the UK's ethnic communities had seen successive governments and the 
indigenous population extolling the virtues of diversity as a source of their 
pride. However, the reality was in fact very different as the experience of 
many members of ethnic communities was that far from the indigenous 
population and governments appearing to be proud of the increased diversity 
within the UK, ethnic communities had largely been ignored, sidelined and at 
times ostracised in the provision of services in education, policing, jobs, 
business, housing and social services. The impact of inadequate and poor 
facilities had been further compounded through violence, racial discrimination, 
police harassment, and disproportionately high numbers of ethnic minorities 
being incarcerated, resulting in a two nation Britain where differences between 
people and communities were amplified (Millen, 2003 and 2006). Examples of 
the disparity between communities has been discussed and analysed in 
numerous documents over the last few years including in the government's 
Strategy Units final report (March, 2003) and the National Employment Panel 
(NEP) report (May, 2005). The Strategy Units report sought to identify how to 
'capitalise on the immense resource and talent that exists in ethnic minority 
communities and it also acknowledged that there appeared to be a correlation 
between poverty and ethnicity, (March, 2003: 3 and 5). The National 
Employment Panel. (2005: 5 and 47) accepted that ethnic minorities were 
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more disadvantaged than their white counterparts and sought to present 
policy solutions comprising practical measures for addressing the array of 
labour market disadvantages. The National Employment Panel report (2005) 
acknowledged that ethnic minority engagement in the employment market 
was central to the future success of Britain, in particular it was central to the 
success of the UK's major towns and cities. The report went on to explain that 
between 1999 and 2009 fifty percent of growth in the workforce would come 
from ethnic minority communities (NEP, 2005; Saggar, 2002: 87). 
The White Paper Secure Borders Safe Haven (2002) was criticised 
secondly, because the government placed immigration, asylum and race at 
the heart of its agenda, the implication being that once these issues were 
addressed many other issues and areas of concern would fall smoothly into 
line. Thirdly, the White Paper was viewed as controversial because it tagged 
the issue of terrorism, identity cards and forced marriages together suggesting 
that there was some indelible connection between them. Holistically, what the 
White Paper presented was an unhelpful juxtaposition of citizenship with 
asylum, fraudulent activity, border controls, marriage/family visits, working in 
the UK and war crimes. The government through this paper made an 
association that was damaging to the perception of people currently living in 
the UK and those seeking refuge (Millen, 2003). 
At the time of the publication of the White paper I was the Chief 
Executive of a social policy think tank called Race on the Agenda (ROTA). As 
part of the government's consultation process, I produced a response to the 
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paper accepting that there was indeed a need to move towards re- 
establishing a sense of common values and shared civic identity and a sense 
of belonging around which to unite in an attempt to rebuild the social fabric of 
our communities and recreate a sense of common citizenship that embraced 
Britain's diverse experience (Millen, 2003). 1 emphasised that ethnic 
communities had for many years called for increased openness, inclusion and 
an adherence to a collective consciousness that was more than lip service but 
one that accepted all communities as full citizens contributing to Britain's 
success. There was, however, some feeling that there were many issues that 
ethnic communities needed to tackle and deal with within their communities, 
the White Paper appeared to be another attempt at blaming the victims whilst 
failing to deal with the real issues of the endemic racism that had for so long 
ostracised ethnic communities. 
There are inherent difficulties in the current discussion of citizenship 
and British values, one of those being that whilst emphasising the need to 
celebrate diversity we are encouraged to adopt British values. However, there 
is no clear meaningful definition which demonstrates a coherent 
understanding of what this means and how it transfers into government policy. 
The reality is that it may be impossible to directly reflect this experience in and 
through government policy because according to Wills (2002: 16) we are born 
British, English, Scottish or Pakistani but together we choose to be British. 
Our national Identity resides in our shared British values built on tolerance, 
openness, work, self-improvement and strong communities and whilst these 
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are by no means unique to Britain they are for Wills (2002) part and parcel of 
what it means to be British. 
The 'cross-cultural symbiosis' of cultures, the opening up of our 
borders, the changes brought through global refugees, free trade, the impact 
of international aid, the simultaneous increasing and decreasing role - and at 
times, marginalisation - of the United Nations and the increase in the role and 
power of the European Union along with other events and occurrences all 
serve to challenge the symbiotic notion of communities and by extension 
society (Ward, 1996). Ward sees these configurations as weakening the 
power of society to draw its citizens together as one, to govern and to endow 
all with a national identity and to speak with a single voice. Both Rose (1996) 
and Ward (1996) concur that whilst our political, professional, moral and 
cultural authorities speak happily of society they found that the meaning and 
the term 'society' was highly questionable because society was 
heterogeneous with a cacophony of communities with multifaceted and 
incompatible allegiances and obligations. Countering this Parekh (2000: ix) 
posited that we are a community of citizens and a community of communities, 
a position which is not contradictory or necessarily a source of conflict but a 
position that requires nurturing, understanding and sustaining. This is critically 
important because according to Rousseau (1987), decisions arrived at 
collectively will always be to the benefit of the collective good. 
As the bridge between local people and police forces, police authorities 
have a crucial role to play in building trust, gaining confidence and ensuring 
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that the collective will is reflected in local policing. Police authorities have a 
mandate to ensure that the views and expectations of local people are 
reflected in local policing services. 
If we are to accept that decisions arrived at collectively will always be to 
the benefit of the collective good, then we need to see tangible action to 
ensure that the decisions arrived at collectively will indeed by correct. Through 
the Police Act 1996 police authorities have the legislative powers to ensure 
that they play this central role which is to support the police service and the 
local community. Section 96 of the Act requires that police authorities should 
secure the views of local people to prevent crime in their areas and that local 
communities should be informed, consulted and involved in decision making. 
Emerging forms of citizenship 
Our concept of society has wide implications for our understanding of 
citizenship because there are new concepts and ideas of citizenship that have 
emerged and become prominent over the last ten to fifteen years. For 
example, there are those who see citizenship from an ecological perspective 
and focus their attention on the rights and responsibilities that each individual 
has to the earth (Van Steenbergen, 1994). There is cultural citizenship which 
focuses on the right of all to cultural participation (Turner, 1993; Blunkett, 
2002). There is minority citizenship involving the rights to enter a society and 
then to remain within that society actively participating and adding to its 
vibrancy (Yuval-Davis, 1997). There is also cosmopolitan citizenship 
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concerned with how people develop an orientation to other citizens, societies 
and cultures across the globe (Held, 1995) and finally mobility citizenship 
concerned with the rights and responsibilities of the visitors to other places 
and cultures (Urry, 1990). 
From within our new global community and with the multifaceted 
concepts of citizenship, citizenship can no longer exclusively be defined by 
physical boundaries but requires an appreciation of the impacts of global 
economics, macro and micro political changes including devolution, and 
environmental and communication influences. The difficulty experienced by a 
state in defining and specifically identifying the values that are unique to the 
identity of its indigenous groups and which is exclusive to it is widely known. 
How for example, does one define Britishness in terms that are uniquely 
British? What however, is the sole preserve of a state and a government is its 
ability to anchor and fashion its policies and future direction on concepts and 
ideas that it believes is current and relevant. In the UK, our membership of the 
European Union and our welcoming of the new accession states like Croatia 
and Romania into the European Union have resulted in us redefining our 
understanding of our borders. Coupled with the increase in international travel 
and trade and the ongoing communications revolution there is likely to be a 
significant impact on what citizenship means in a given place at a given time. 
It is therefore inevitable that as society becomes more of a melting pot of 
cultures, ideas and ideologies that there will unavoidably be a degree of 
mistrust and antagonism between communities. Blunkett (2002) discussed 
this potential problem arguing that whilst migration increased the diversity of 
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society and brought significant cultural, as well as economic benefits it 
required careful management to prevent migration becoming a threat to 
community stability and good race relations. He went on to add that 
democratic governments needed to ensure that their electorate had the 
confidence and trust in the systems they were operating or people would turn 
to extremists for answers. Alibhai-Brown (1999) and Hewitt (1996) shed 
further light on this. Hewitt argued that unless white kids are able to express 
themselves and feel proud of who they are then they will turn to extremists. 
Alibhai-Brown (1999) sighted the disturbances in UK northern towns in 2001 
where young white people felt that their needs were being sacrificed to the 
benefit of ethnic minorities as providing further support of this. In order to 
appeal to the disillusioned members of the host community, Blunkett argued 
that it was crucial to give content and meaning to citizenship and nationality. 
He wrote that: 
I an active concept of citizenship can articulate shared ground 
between diverse communities. It offers a shared identity based on 
membership of a political community, rather than forced assimilation 
into a monoculture, or an unbridled multiculturalism which privileges 
difference over community cohesion. It is what the White Paper 'Secure 
Borders, Safe Haven'called "integration with diversity"' (Blunkett, 2002: 
76). 
Parekh (2000) also called for a sense of belonging which would give 
meaning to the lives of the many. The social contract of Hobbes, Rousseau 
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and others chiselled out and laid the basic building blocks within which this 
common sense of belonging could find soil for its growth. 
In an attempt to place meaning to the concept of citizenship, in 
September 2002 the Home Office established an Advisory Groupg to look at 
citizenship and develop a naturalisation and citizenship test. The Advisory 
Group's mandate was to design the content of citizenship courses and to 
design a ceremony which would include swearing a formal allegiance to the 
Queen. Those applying for citizenship would be required to pledge to uphold 
democratic values and respect for human rights. The Advisory Group also 
advised on "the method, content and implementation of the test and 
considered how to promote language skills and practical knowledge about 
Britain" (The Guardian, 1 Oth September 2002). 
Today citizenship is a compulsory subject in schools. Its key aims 
being to promote pupil's spiritual, moral, social and cultural development and 
for pupils to learn about the workings of democratic institutions. The advisory 
group recommended that citizenship was taught through an appreciation of 
three main ideas: a) social and moral responsibility, b) community involvement 
and c) political literacy (where students learnt about the institutions and issues 
of a practical democracy). The advisory group saw the teaching of citizenship 
as more than a statutory responsibility because understanding citizenship and 
9 Chaired by Sir Bernard Crick (also responsible for introducing Citizenship in to schools), the group included: 
Selina Ultah (Chair of an Asian Women's Centre in Yorkshire) 
Satpal Hira (Birmingham City Education Department) 
David Muir (Senior Lecturer In Caribbean Studies at University of North London 
Ashok Ohrl (Scottish Consultant on Diversity Issues). 
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subscribing to its values would be instrumental in enhancing democratic life 
for all citizens (Crick, 1998). 
The need for a collective outlook, pride and shared belonging and a 
collective identity may be said to be at odds with the emerging sense of 
individualism that is evident around us. Parekh (2000) highlighted the 
importance of the government being clear about what it was/is trying to 
achieve when it spoke about citizenship and for increased clarity on the role 
both the state and the citizen ought to play. For instance; if we take a critical 
look at Britain's development over the last 15 - 20 years, it has like many other 
industrialised countries moved steadily towards a society characterised by a 
preoccupation with individualism along with a strong inclination to acquire 
private wealth, revering the individual above the collective. Indeed, according 
to McHugh and Parvin (2005) the old collectivist structures have declined 
considerably. During the last century Benjamin Disraeli had a view of Britain 
as one nation incapable of being divided through political action or on class 
lines; a nation where the free market would be allowed to dictate the terms of 
engagement and involvement on a national and international stage. One 
nation would be realised at the time by developing the interests of the empire 
revelling in patriotism and seeing the achievements and goals of the party as 
being synonymous with that of the whole nation (Norton, 1991: 128-130). 
Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) acknowledged that individuals were essentially 
self centred and their sole motivation was hope of pleasure and fear of pain. 
Hobbes argued that as we move towards our pleasures a more conflicting 
individualistic society develops. This common driving force would see us 
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inevitably collide and engage in conflict with others. Hobbes presented a 
vision of a society that would continually be at war with itself in the absence of 
a covenant with which citizens agreed (Hobbes, 1980: 186). Today, we are 
still embroiled in this heated debate on citizenship, what it means and the best 
ways of achieving it harmoniously. There is, however, a quest by political 
leaders on all sides of the political spectrum to engage with communities 
through existing and new institutions. What this signals is an awakening and 
acknowledgement of the need for the citizen and institutions to work closely 
together through consultation and other forms of engagement, which is now 
seen as part of the staple diet of re-engaging communities. 
The Social Contract 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau believe that without the acceptance of 
social conventions and without citizen involvement and participation our 
fundamentally selfish drive will ultimately collide. This can only be abated if we 
allow ourselves to fall under the consensual control of a social contract or as 
Hobbes describes it as a supreme 'common-wealth' or a 'leviathan' (Hobbes, 
1980: 227). 
British history is littered with occasions which have tested the social 
contract. For example in 1778 Parliament passed the Relief Act repealing 
harsh anti-catholic legislation from the seventeenth century. In June 1780 
violent anti-catholic riots broke out in London as protestors marched on 
Parliament petitioning the repeal of the Relief Act and a return to Catholic 
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repression. Chapels, Catholic homes, prisons, public buildings and individuals 
in the street were attacked. There were running battles between the 
demonstrators and the authorities. It took the government and London 
authorities ten days to restore order in the capital. By that time, 12,000 troops 
had been deployed and over 700 people had been killed. 
The result of these and other occurances has been the gradual 
development of our police service. In a liberal democracy policing forms an 
important part of the social contract between the citizen and the state and the 
state guarantees that the powers of the police will be exercised equitably and 
impartially. Police are thus given powers of arrest, they are able to exercise 
force and they have the resources to restrict our freedom in the pursuit of 
social order and the public good. In exchange for these, the police are 
required to act within the clear parameters of their authority and the laws 
which give them their authority. The 4 pillars of policing as identified by 
Scarman (1986) are 1) accountability and independence, 2) consent 3) 
balance and 4) discretion which is the most prized possession for individual 
officers to use in their interactions with the citizen (Scarman, 1986: 147). 
According to Scarman the police ought to use discretion and strive to 
keep the 'Queens Peace' by maintaining law and order above enforcing the 
law (Scarman, 1986: 103, ). The relationship between the citizen and the 
police should not be complex; the police are the citizens and the citizens are 
the police, whilst occupying different positions at particular times, they are one 
and the same. Whilst the police may at times act as the repressive arms of the 
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state they are in fact the agents of the citizen. In the twenty seven years since 
Scarman, there has been a significant growth in community policing initiatives 
developed directly to provide an interface with local communities and in 
particular in the last seven years Police Community Officers and Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships have begun to realise the importance of 
wholesale engagement in an effort to recover an original sense of a 
communal responsibility for public safety and order (Newburn and Jones, 
2002). 
Dependency and manipulation 
The purpose of the social contract is that it glues together the various 
components of society within agreed parameters. Institutions play a crucial 
role in cascading and disseminating the vision and the ethos of the 
government. With the full resources of the state at its disposal, the 
government is able to promote and follow through its political ambitions. 
According to McMahon (1994: 25), political power is the most important form 
of power because through it the government has the power to make other 
people the way they want them to be. According to C. Wright Mills (1956), all 
politics is a struggle for power with the most oppressive kind of power being 
violence. In order to ensure that the citizen is kept informed and understands 
how their rights and associated responsibilities are being affected or changed, 
it is important that the government is clear about the messages it is trying to 
relay because clarity will enable each institution to play a pivotal role in 
unpacking and presenting that message. 
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There is however a fine balancing act which needs to be struck to 
ensure that our institutions remain politically objective and bi-partisan. In 2005 
during the House of Commons vote on the Terrorism Bill - and Clause 23 - 
which called for the extension of the period of detention to 90 days. Concern 
was raised that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair appeared 
to be acting in favour of the proposed government bill. Sir Ian Blair was seen 
by opposition parties, some Labour MPs and political commentators to have 
acted in a partisan manner compromising the neutrality of the police service. 
Rt Hon Charles Kennedy MP - the former leader of the Liberal Democrats - 
said that the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police had overstepped the 
mark in the way that he had supported the proposals (Kennedy, 2005). This 
was supported by Silverman (2005) who felt that chief constables were under 
greater political pressure than ever before. In 1982 Sir James Anderton the 
former chief constable of Manchester conceded that: 'Community participation 
in police affairs, or the improvement of democracy.... is the first conscious 
step towards political control of the police... ' (The Times, 18 March 1982) 
What Anderton was alluding to was that politics - with a small 'p' - was 
the exercise of power and with the increased intention to involve communities 
and enhance democracy, policing was being politically interfered with. This 
view however failed to acknowledge that in a society characterised by 
inequalities, the impact of laws, even when enforced impartially can reproduce 
or reinforce inequalities (Wilson, 1981). This is also supported by Reiner 
(1992) who maintained that whilst the impact of the law may reinforce 
inequality it does not follow that the enforcement is partisan by intention. This 
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inevitably places police authorities in a difficult position, as they are 
simultaneously a watch dog scrutinising the police service and bringing it to 
account whilst at the same time they are dependent on it for their existence. 
Firstly, as discussed in more detail in chapter five, police authorities are 
dependent on the Home Secretary for the funding they receive and the police 
service is reliant on the police authority to agree its budget and release the 
funds. This arrangement could easily be described as a series of conflicts of 
interest. Police authorities are therefore inevitably reliant on the Home 
Secretary legislatively, because in order to have the potential to be effective 
they require the buoyancy and force afforded to them by acts of parliament. 
Secondly, the police authority is also dependent on the police service 
through the commissioner or the chief constable to relay information to them 
via reports presented to the police authority. Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) 
concur with Marshall (1978) and draws our attention to section 12.3 of the 
Police Act 1964 because it provides chief constables with an exit clause if 
they think that by submitting a report it would result in the disclosure of 
sensitive information that could jeopardise, influence or otherwise affect 
operational policing. Chief constables are permitted to refer such requests for 
a report to the Home Secretary who has the final decision on what if anything 
is presented. This places the police authority at the mercy of the police service 
(Day & Klein, 1987). It is quite possible that the Home Office and the chief 
constable could agree to support each other in decisions to the exclusion of 
the police authority (Lustgarten, 1986; Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982; Marshall, 
127 
1978). Lustgarten (1986) sees this level of dependency as unsatisfactory and 
for Jones et. al. (1994: 27) the 'tripartite system is ambiguous, not at all 
transparent and [this confused arrangement is in their opinion] intentionally 
constructed'. The reality is that many of the powers conferred on the police 
authority are only exercisable through the authority of the Home Secretary. 
Even though there have been a number of acts of parliament reorganising our 
police service and the role of the police authority within the tripartite structure, 
very little has actually changed - since the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 - to 
affect the spread of power between the members of the tripartite system. The 
potential for further confusion or tension is heightened by the fact that police 
authorities - in their current form - are a newly introduced partner juxtaposed 
between two long established institutions - the Home Office and the police 
service - that have developed strong working ties and systems of operation 
over many years. 
Finally, police authorities are further challenged by their primary duty to 
secure the maintenance of an 'adequate and efficient' force for their area (The 
Police 1964 Act, section 4.1; APA, 2005; Boateng, 1985: 238) which could be 
seen as in conflict with their scrutiny role. 
Police authorities are also potentially emasculated and manipulated by 
secret rituals which exclude non-members from scrutinising the activities of 
others (Day & Klein, 1987). One of the ways in which this occurs is through 
coded language where outsiders are unaware and are unschooled in the 
subtle cues, nuances, established systems and procedures that are taken for 
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granted by those on the inside: this serves to further exclude others from fully 
participating. Through the regular and sometimes unwitting use of coded 
language, wider participation is stifled: police authorities should endeavour to 
safeguard themselves against being perpetual outsiders by increasing police 
accountability and the systems of checks and balances. Police authority 
members do need to learn the coded professional language of the police. The 
more familiar they become with this language the more likely it is that they will 
be able to hold the police to account. However, what became clear during my 
interviews was that the language used by many of the police authority 
members sounded very similar to what one would expect from police officers. 
This raised the question of whether police authority members were trying too 
hard to fit into the police culture and inadvertently relinquishing some of their 
autonomy and trying too hard to fit in. 
It is clear that exclusion operates at numerous levels, through 
language, structurally through systems and through processes and practices. 
According to Jones et. al (1994), there is another level where efforts can be 
thwarted and nullified. Jones et. al argue that police authorities and their 
appointed members were not as aware as they ought to be of the powers they 
could exercise and by definition they were not as fully schooled in the subtle 
nuances of the police service and its personnel, as a result the proverbial wool 
could be pulled over their eyes. 
In chapter four, I discuss examples where it can be argued that police 
authorities have been undermined. Of course, the counter response to the 
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argument that police authorities are being undermined is that the government 
is democratically elected, the Home Secretary is a democratically elected MP 
and for up to five years the government has a mandate to direct the 
institutions under its control and to direct the delivery of services as proposed 
in their manifestos. Whilst police authority members are appointed, they do 
not have as wide or as popular a mandate as the government which is 
governing on behalf of all citizens. 
The interesting thing about the interplay and the relationship between the 
members of the tripartite system was that it was never based on equity or 
equality of power. Decision making and the way the tripartite system works is 
on the acknowledgement that each member brings something of benefit to the 
table. The police provide a service which aids the sustaining of law and order 
which prevents a constant state of 'warre' (Hobbes, 1980: 186). The Home 
Secretary/Office provides the police authority with the mandate and the 
authority to regulate and scrutinise the police service (PACE, 1984: 2). Police 
authorities bring local knowledge of issues from magistrates, independent and 
local authority members. The police authority is separate and distinct from the 
police service and it has an express mandate to consult, which enables the 
tripartite system to broaden the involvement of communities in policing 
(Scarman, 1986). 
The erosion of trust in one institution can lead to an erosion of trust in 
others and a questioning of legitimacy (Beer, 1982). Securing and sustaining 
trust can be an illusive goal particularly as one can never be too sure of the 
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real intent of those who wish to gain the citizens trust. According to 
Machiavelli in his most famous work, 'The Prince' (1532), the state is 
presenting an illusion to the citizen. Machiavelli questions whether it is better 
to be loved than to be feared and argues that whilst one would like to be both, 
it is difficult to combine them Machiavelli therefore concludes that it is 
therefore preferable to be feared. For Machiavelli, the state should actively 
seek to deceive and colour its actions; knowing good, following charity, 
goodness and faith but it should also know how to do evil when necessary: in 
essence it should gain the trust of the citizen so that it can realise its own 
selfish aims (Machiavelli, 2003). 
There is a feeling reflected in the writings of many scholars including 
Beer (1982) and Kavanagh (1980) that over the last twenty to thirty years the 
public's trust and confidence in the government - irrespective of which party is 
in government - to discharge its responsibilities effectively and efficiently has 
diminished significantly. Beer (1982: 119) argued that civic culture was not 
only in decline but was collapsing because old institutions were failing to meet 
new expectations causing legitimacy in government to falter and effectiveness 
to decline. Norton (1991: 401) refuted Beer's claim arguing that the data used 
by Beer did not substantiate his position because his data was too narrow and 
time-bound. 1, however, agree with Beer (1982), Marsh (1977) and Hart 
(1978) that there has indeed been a decline in trust reflecting a change in 
values away from deference to the government and its institutions. 
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One of the key responsibilities of any state is to defend the life and 
liberty of its citizens whilst maintaining social harmony. I subscribe to the view 
of John Locke (1978) that this can only be done when there is government by 
consent because when a government fails in its primary undertaking and 
loses the trust and consent of its citizens it stands the risk of having its powers 
revoked or at least its authority significantly undermined. 
The drive to engage the citizen through forums and various 
consultation groups represent an attempt by the government to increase its 
contact and reinvigorate its relationship with the electorate. As I discussed 
earlier, the'Big Conversation' was an example of the government re-engaging 
a disaffected, unattached and apathetic public with politics. The real 
challenge, however, is how to scale up a qualitative engagement with a small 
number of people into a legitimate contribution to national policy-making 
(Coleman, 2005). Otherwise these attempts will be viewed as an inadequate 
dressing or plaster over the festering wound of our ailing democracy. 
According to Sedgwick cited in (Clarke, 1994: 160) in order for the 
government to be effective, it needs to have the consent of at least a majority 
of its citizens. Sedgwick argues that this does not necessarily mean that the 
consent should extend directly to every government decision - for example 
through referenda - because the government needs to have the power of 
decision making without the active consent of the citizen. What Sedgwick is 
suggesting is that like Locke (1978) tacit consent is sufficient. Rousseau 
(1987: 60) believes that there will be times that the citizen may need to be 
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forced to be free because the citizen cannot be given the liberty to decide 
whether to fulfil their responsibilities to the sovereign whilst still receiving the 
rewards and benefits of citizenship. The citizen must, according to Rousseau 
be forced to adhere to the general will and by extension be forced to be free. 
Notwithstanding, at the very least, in order to protect the citizen from the 
tyranny of the state there ought to be checks, balances and various levels of 
accountability. There also needs to be a realisation by decision-makers that 
they can ultimately be brought to account for the decisions they take. Day and 
Klein (1987) maintain that accountability defines the relationship between 
actors through identifying who can call whom to account and who owes a duty 
of explanation; it also establishes power relationships the roles, forms, and 
direction of accountability which in turn define the distribution of authority. The 
bedrock of our expectations and the expectations of our state is steeped in the 
understanding that as citizens we are all stakeholders in society; we are also 
all recipients of those things (consent, legitimacy, accountability, shared 
values and a sense of belonging to a common community) that enables our 
society to operate in a functional manner (Parekh, 2000). The state and its 
institutions are in place to support and ensure that society and the functioning 
of its institutions are conducive to the well being of all its members. The citizen 
as the ultimate architect of the state and its apparatus has an entitlement to 
be consulted and be accountable because the social contract demands it. 
'The services that are provided by the state are provided for the citizen 
by the citize'n (Reith, 1956: 287). The mandate for the citizen to be consulted 
and that police authorities are accountable comes through the Police Reform 
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Act 2002 where police authorities were instructed to publish policing plans and 
strategic three-year force plans in consultation with the local police, the local 
community and the divergent interest and pressure groups in the area. One 
can never be entirely certain however if these interactions are able to bring 
about real change or if the agenda has already being set and decisions 
already been agreed. Hoban (2004) found that whilst there were positive 
examples of good participation, participation was more often used as a tool to 
achieve largely pre-decided outcomes and the wider community interpreted 
calls for their participation in this way. For Hoban (2004), participation is 
concerned primarily with building bridges, cementing, repairing and 
strengthening existing frameworks and processes rather than necessarily 
making or changing decisions. One of the consequences of this is that 
participants often do not feel like equal partners in the process; therefore, 
rather than creating more constructive forms of dialogue and sharing between 
different experiences and expertise, it leads to conflicts and tensions. 
Accountability through consultation and participation 
What does all this consultation, crime reduction strategies, policing 
plans, measurements and targets really mean? What is the relevancy of the 
pay and position of authority members and why should we be concerned 
about the tripartite relationship? 
The importance and relevance of all this is that having bequeathed 
responsibilities and powers to the state in the exchange of rights, 
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responsibilities and obligations, the relationship between the citizen and the 
state must be reciprocal both in intention and implementation. Today it can be 
argued that our institutions are more accountable than at any other time in the 
past; they are checked and scrutinised at various ways and at numerous 
levelslo. Society through its myriad of institutions, individuals and group 
preferences alights upon decisions which reflect an aggregate position which 
seeks the highest level of happiness for the greatest number of people (Mills, 
1906). Despite this our first-past-the-post voting system is capable of 
returning a winner who may have secured only 36% of the vote with the 
runners up collectively securing 30%, 20% or 14%. The winner whilst gaining 
36% of the votes in fact had 50% of the voting population voting against them 
but yet that party or individual wins. In scenarios like this the question that is 
waiting to be answered is what is the value of being consulted and 
participating if your participation cannot materially affect the decision? 
Questions such as these go to the very heart of citizen involvement and 
participation because engagement needs to be real and evidenced otherwise 
there is a dislocation in the public's mind between their participation and their 
ability to make a difference (Hoban, 2004; Coleman, 2003). 
If we look at the model provided by Downs (1957) he argues that those 
who we expect to participate in the democratic process should be seen as 
consumers and as consumers there is a need for incentives to encourage the 
consumer/citizen to participate. The main incentive is the potential of there 
10 Direct election of officials; nationally, regionally, locally or at a institutional level; legislatively; through bills 
and acts of Parliament; through committees and members; through the civil service; through Independent auditing 
agencies and bodies; Independent and Informed media; independent research institutes. 
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being a difference in outcome that would not otherwise have occurred. Downs 
however saw little evidence of real incentives on offer. The accusation that 
very little incentives are on offer can be leveled at police authorities with their 
apparent inability to be catalysts for change or because there is very little 
evidence of them affecting the way the other two members of the tripartite 
system work. The reality is that regardless of the intended role for police 
authorities, the relationship amongst the tripartite is not a relationship of 
equals. I fear that viewing the relationship in term of equal partners leads 
observers to erroneously see every aspect of the relationship between the 
tripartite members through the binoculars of equality of influence, powers and 
outcomes. 
In The Logic of Collective Action Mancur Olson (1965) presented a 
different position arguing that participation and those who take part do so 
essentially for selfish reasons and are driven by self-serving desires. Olson 
maintained that even when one found organisations doing charitable work, the 
motives of those working for the organisation have self rather than the public 
good at heart. Olson's argument is very interesting as it builds on the theory of 
the consumer or the personal individual benefit as outlined by Downs (1957). 
Olson identified that it is in the individual's interest to support collective action 
when s/he will benefit. Given that the numbers of those taking part in 
consultations with police authorities are very small, one could conclude that 
the majority of the population see very little incentive or benefit in their 
participation. Those who do participate through Community Police 
Consultative Groups (CPCG), Independent Custody Visiting Panels (ICVP) 
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and other consultation forums are beneficiaries of selective incentives which 
according to Olson are in their own personal self interest. 
The increase in attempts to consult can be described as an attempt at 
realigning and rejuvenating the social contract between the state, its 
institutions and the individual. Social contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau also believed like Olson (1965) and Downs (1957) that the human 
driving force was fundamentally self-interested and geared towards acquiring 
resources that benefited individuals to the exclusion of others. I conclude 
therefore in line with Olson (1965) and Down (1957) that those who participate 
expect to see elements of change, they expect that the goods of change are 
not only affordable but reachable to them. 
On the surface it can be argued that the typology of viewing and 
describing the citizen and the citizens response to participation in terms of self 
interested actions or viewing the citizen as a commodity can be verified and 
does stand up to ascertain amount of scrutiny However, on further 
examination the principles of the free market cannot so easily be applied to 
policing because public services and services provided for the public good are 
provided on a very different basis and most importantly, policing is not a 
standardised service (Jones et al, 1994). For example, democratic values will 
inevitably conflict with a market based approach because the key concern of 
the 'market-based' approach is with cost-effectiveness in service delivery. 
Delivering the service that people want more cheaply and effectively may well 
be achievable, however, the need to ensure that the decision-making process 
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itself reproduces the wishes of the people involves lengthy decision-making 
processes, consulting as many people as possible and allowing minority 
interests to participate: this is democracy, but this is also very expensive 
(Jones et. al, 1994). Those who wish to use public services have a democratic 
right, because they pay for the service out of their taxes. In view of this 
democratic right of citizenship, Elock (1994: 194) argued: 'We need to bear in 
mind that in applying consumer models to local authority services we are not 
dealing with customers in the commercial sense but with citizens'. 
Myhill et. al (2003) found that the vast majority of people had not heard 
of or did not know what the role of their police authorities were. Those who 
were aware of the existence of police authorities believed that they were 
useful. Docking (2003) in Public Perceptions of Police Accountability and 
Decision making outlined the lack of knowledge of police authorities and how 
police accountability was seen negatively amongst key target respondent 
groups by race. 
The Home Office report Survey Civil Renewal (2003: 48) shed further 
light on this. The report explained that people from different ethnic groups 
varied in the extent to which they trusted the institutions of the police, courts, 
councils and Parliament. This lack of trust is therefore likely to result in less 
direct participation from this group. During my interview with Mr. David Dean 
of Nottingham police authority he explained that if the citizen does not 
participate they 'cannot complain later if they do not receive the service they 
want'. The clear implication of this is that one must participate in order to take 
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hold of ones rights. 
The government has made provision and attempts at redressing some 
of the imbalances; for example under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
(2000) all public bodies including police authorities have a duty to consult on 
the likely impact of proposed policies on the promotion of race equality. Police 
authorities and other public bodies are required to publish the results of their 
consultations in order to ensure that the public is aware of the steps that they 
are taking. 
Comparative representation and diversity in our institutions 
The lack of representation from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 
communities in our institutions and the stark disparities in employment rates 
between communities - evidenced by the 15% gap in employment of ethnic 
minorities compared with that of the overall population see table 4: 1 - 
demonstrates that more needs to be done by our institutions to address this 
issue (NEP: 2005). Furthermore, ethnic minorities tend to reside in the poorest 
and most deprived areas, suffering poorer health, low employment and for 
those who are employed, they are more likely to be paid less and have less 
invested in them by their employers despite the fact that ethnic minorities tend 
to be more highly educated having stayed longer in higher education (see 
table 2) (Cabinet Office: 2002). 
Table 4: 1 
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Employment rates of communities (2005) 
Group Employment 
levels 
Pakisia-n-i 44% 
Bangladeshi 45% 
Black African 57% 
nal I Ethnic min 
employment rate I employment rate 
75%% 1 60% 
Source: National Employment Panel (2005: 6) 
Table 4: 2 
Entry to Higher Education 
Group % entering higher education 
Asian 85% 
Black 82% 
White 69% 
Source: (Cabinet Offic,: 2002) 
If we look at the House of Commons and the House of Lords, there 
were only 3.4% ethnic minority ministers represented in both houses (House 
of Commons Library, 2004). 
The House of Commons' primary role is that of representation. Once 
elected, members of Parliament are expected to represent all of their 
constituents. The 'core defining function' of the House of Commons is 
described as the legitimisation function which permits the elected assembly, 
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acting on the people's behalf, to grant (or withhold) its approval for most 
actions o the government (Norton, 2001: 313). The former Home Secretary 
David Blunkett acknowledged the importance of governments maintaining 
their legitimacy and argued that legitimacy would be lost if citizens felt that the 
shared moral principles on which they based their lives were lost in the 
delivery of government policy. It was therefore important that the government 
worked with the citizen to achieve harmony (Blunkett, 2001: 109). Such 
harmony can surely only exist if institutions perform their primary functions 
whilst increasing representation and participation from as diverse an 
electorate as possible. 
Figures from the House of Commons Library of Social and General 
statistics (April, 2004) provide the following summary of ethnic minority 
representation. 
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Table 4: 3 
Ethnic minority representation (2004) 
Institution % from minority ethnic group 
Cabinet 9.5% 
Other Government ministers & whips 3.4% 
House of Commons 1.8% 
House of Lords 4% 
MEPs 4.6% 
Local councillors (England & Wales) 2.5% 
Public Bodies 4.4% 
Scottish Parliament & Welsh Assembly Nil 
Greater London Assembly 4.0% 
Source: House of Commons Library of Social and General Statistics 'Ethnic Minorities in 
Politics and Government'April 2004 
The other important function of the House of Commons is its 
responsibility to scrutinise the executive. The House of Commons plays an 
important role in scrutinising the policies and actions of the government in 
debates, Parliamentary questions and within cross-party select committees. 
Interestingly, Parliament has two seemingly contradictory roles; firstly, it is 
there to sustain the executive -a role that is mirrored by police authorities 
who have the responsibility to sustain an efficient and effective police force - 
and secondly, it has the responsibility to hold the executive to account -a role 
which the police authority is also mandated to perform in relation to the police 
service. According to Flinders (2002: 2) Parliament does not perform its latter 
role of holding the executive to account very well. It is highly probable that 
police authorities - in a similar vein to Parliament - are unable to effectively 
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hold the police to account whilst simultaneously sustaining an efficient service. 
This is one of the issues that I will be looking into as this thesis unfolds. 
Coleman (2005) found that seventy two percent of his sample of 2,273 
people felt disconnected from Parliament and the political process. It is 
therefore reasonable to question what we can reasonably expect from police 
authorities if well known historic democratic institutions like the Houses of 
Parliament fail to adequately represent the citizen, fail to reflect the diversity of 
the United Kingdom and fails to connect with the- citizen. This is brought into 
stark relief when we consider that parliament is well known and police 
authorities as institutions are barely known (Myhill, 2003). 
As far as police authorities are concerned, there is no comprehensive 
or single source of data on the numbers of ethnic minorities who are members 
of police authorities. I approached the Association of Police Authorities for 
information on this and I was informed that no up-to-date information was 
available and that I had to consult each police authority individually. As a 
result of my own investigations, I found that with the exception of two police 
authorities (Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and the West Midlands Police 
Authority) police authorities were not dissimilar to other public institutions and 
indeed government in that they all had low levels of representation and 
diversity. The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) has 23 authority members 
8 of which are from ethnic minority communities (34%) and out of 17 members 
of the West Midlands Police Authority 4 were ethnic minorities (0.6%). 
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Table 4: 4 
Numbers of Ethnic Minority members in police authorities 
Police Authority Numbers of Ethnic Minority 
hAptrr)nr)litnn 
West Midlands 
West Mercia 
Lancashire 
Nottinghamshire 
North Yorkshire 
West Yorkshire 
Source: individual police authority websites, 2005 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Most would agree that it is in the government's interest to engage with 
all its citizens and it is the responsibility of governments through its institutions 
to build trust at all levels. Berkeley (2003) argues that public authorities should 
focus on the needs of minority communities because by doing this they will 
gain a glimpse of the actions required to gain the trust of all sections of 
society. 
John Stuart Mills (1906: 5-8) had an additional concern about the rights 
of minorities, particularly women. In his treatise On Liberty and Utilitarianism 
he warned against the 'Tyranny of the Majority. Mills argued that in the past 
Members out of 17 
8 out of 23 
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monarchs held power at the expense of common people and during this time 
the struggle was about gaining liberty by limiting the government's power. 
Now through democratic processes, power is much more accessible to the 
citizen. The danger today is that if the legislature and policy makers blindly 
respond to public opinion, framing and constructing legislation and regulation 
in response to majority wishes, the unintended consequences could result in 
minority interests being ignored, diminished and sidelined which could lead to 
unrest that challenges the government's primary goal of maintaining security 
(Bentham, 1960; Mill, 1960; Held, 1999). The potential for this to happen 
should not be underestimated because our elected officials are elected 
seemingly with a mandate from the majority in whose interests they proceed 
to pass laws. It is with this knowledge that I argue that despite there being 
poor representation from ethnic groups within institutions at the local, regional 
and national level - including in police authorities - that legislation should 
continue to compel or forces our institutions - in a Rousseau like way - by 
placing direct responsibilities and duties on them through legislation like the 
Disability Discrimination Act 2005, the Race Relations Act of 1976 and the 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA) to actively promote equality 
and opportunity. Under these new arrangements one could argue that the 
individual is forced to be free because the state is taking action and 
demanding and forcing other citizens to desist from discriminating and 
bringing harm to others (Rousseau, 1987). 
Whilst Marshall sees citizenship as being a passive experience and 
one that is bestowed on those who are full members of a community, Jones's 
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(1994: 33) concept is more strongly linked to the individual seeing 'the good of 
the community as [being] inseparable from the good of the individual'. For 
Jones, the individual is simultaneously made by society and society is made 
by the individual. For this mutually beneficial coexistence to occur, self 
realisation is required; this self realisation is an understanding of one's 
position as an individual, a member of a group and one's relationship to the 
state and its institutions. In our participatory democracy, citizens are 
encouraged to be more active than passive particularly in relation to the 
structures and modus operandi of our institutions. For example our police 
authorities have a clear mandate to consult, provide an efficient service and 
facilitate the involvement of users. Within Jones's (1994: 142) typology of 
rights and responsibilities, citizens 'propel legislation' rather than follow it. The 
argument that flows from this is that if there is an absence of evidence 
demonstrating the ability of police authorities to affect, influence or change 
legislation or if there is little evidence of them impacting directly on people's 
lives then the effectiveness and the role of police authorities is brought into 
question. The difficulty that police authorities have is that whilst they may have 
the necessary tools at their disposal to affect change; police authority 
members appear unable or unwilling to exercise the powers that they have at 
their disposal. In my interview with Perry Nove (former Chief Constable of the 
City of London Police), he explained that it was important that police authority 
members did not simply accept everything that was presented to them by their 
chief constable because police authority members should be acting on behalf 
of society. Within this complex negotiated arrangement, the citizen is both the 
beneficiary and the scrutiniser of the police service and has a tangible vested 
146 
interest in enabling the police authority to fulfil its raison d'etre vis-6-vis the 
police service. A society characterised by passive citizenry is therefore not 
ideal for the effective working of our police authorities. A note of caution 
should be sounded that we do not limit the effectiveness of our institutions 
solely by their legislative potential or simply by their ability to stimulate 
participation, what we need to see is a comprehensive suite of offerings that 
reflect the police authorities ability and willingness, to engage, affect, 
influence, scrutinise and where necessary assert itself. As explained by 
Coleman (2005: 6 and 9) citizens understand that their every whim cannot 
always be implemented into change, however, what the citizen does not want 
is a representative that operates like a 'ventriloquist dummy'; the citizen 
wishes to be heard, acknowledged and engaged with. 
Obligation & consent 
Regardless of age, social status and ethnicity all citizens have equal 
access to interact with society's institutions whether to challenge or accept 
them (Boaden, 1982). However, as citizens we are encouraged to accept our 
institutions like police authorities regardless of their perceived added value 
and the degree to which they offer protection and support? 
Rawls (1971) argued that only the most socially advantaged in society 
could truly be said to have a political obligation". The logical conclusion is 
therefore that minority groups and other excluded communities are under no 
" Political obligation is a notion developed by social contract theorists and primarily sees the individual 
as being or having obligations to the state in later writings the notion that obligations can be owed to 
fellow citizens emerged. 
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political obligation to participate. For Hobbes the central issue was not 
equality because any system manned by unequalled individuals could still rule 
and govern all equally because the whole would be made equal because it is 
made up of the unequalled parts - at the heart of this is the implication that 
when completed, the jigsaw will fit together neatly and that in the first instance 
all the component parts are available and consistent with the overall picture. 
However, we all know that society, its norms and its institutions evolve 
iteratively and we are not handed a completed template or a pattern to work 
to. The Audit Commission (2002) reported that irrespective of race, religion or 
colour, the public did not believe that the police treated people equally. 
However, it can be argued that regardless of the perceived advantage or 
disadvantage, all citizens have obligations to the state and to one another 
because within the social contract each citizen is afforded protection from 
harm, access to welfare, education and the opportunity and right to participate 
in civic life. Therefore even at the most basic level the state does provide 
Even if the police service has been found to discriminate or that it is 
predisposed to acting prejudicially, Elock (1991: 162) describes a directional 
accountability which is a multi-directional layer of accountability upwards to 
politicians, outwards to professional colleagues and downwards to the citizen. 
Police authorities have been established to form part of that system of scrutiny 
and to bring the police service to account. The state itself is obliged through 
its institutions and all its processes to service the needs of all its citizens. 
Hobbes (1980) in Leviathan argues that we all enter a social contract 
voluntarily and that within the confines of this agreed protocol our freedoms 
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and rights are protected through the impartially administered rule of law where 
our status collectively exists independently of any differences between 
individuals. For Hobbes (1980) and Locke (1978) the central element is that 
we give over to the government, its institutions and representatives the right to 
make political decisions and crucially within this agreement we voluntarily 
become obliged politically and socially. For Pateman (1979: 49) our obligation 
is not simply to let things happen but the content of our obligation becomes 
defined by our participation and by us calling others to account. 
A system secures its legitimacy and accountability if those who are 
able to bring the institution to account are aware of the institutions existence, if 
they understand its roles and responsibilities and if they understand the 
mechanisms through which an account can be brought (Audit Commission, 
2003b; Docking, 2003; Myhill, 2003). What we have in police authorities and 
the tripartite system is an arrangement which ought to facilitate transparency 
and a higher degree of accountability: in reality however there appears to be 
insufficient access to the process and methods by which the citizen can 
influence policing and by which it can be understood: according to Jones 
(1994: 27) there is confusion and this confusion is intentional. Whilst 
accountability is being channelled to the citizen it is important that the citizen 
is made aware of the importance of their own engagement and the value of 
that engagement. 
The policing issues which concern local people can be highly emotive 
and there are a multitude of voices vying to be heard; questions are inevitably 
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asked as to why there are such low levels of participation from the public. It is 
therefore questionable how effective police authorities are in representing the 
diverse views of those they are serving. The availability to participate in and 
the frequency of consultation is in itself an insufficient barometer of 
accountability. The involvement of stakeholders on all sides of the political and 
social spectrum does not make an organisation any more or less accountable 
but provides an amalgam of consenting and conflicting positions which will 
facilitate the process of decision making. The Audit Commission (2003a; 
2003b) conducted research on accountability, public trust and confidence in 
public services. The commission found that people trusted individuals much 
more than organisations because the notion of trust was based on 
relationship, familiarity and experience. The report found that public trust in 
the accountability structures of public organisations was driven by various 
factors including useful and credible information, the existence of external 
watchdogs, personal contact, and - unsurprisingly - whether they were seen to 
be honest and trustworthy (Audit Commission, 2003a). The audit commission 
rated the police as the worst of three services in providing information 
although the police was the institution that was seen as most likely to be 
controlled by an independent watchdog. The Audit Commission (2003a) found 
that generally, public trust in local authorities was low and the reason that it 
was much lower in the police was primarily because the public did not think 
that the police would listen to their views and also the public awareness of the 
regulators was low. 
According to Ignatieff (1995) civic solidarity is built, strengthened and 
enhanced by the increased dependency of the citizen on the state which 
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results in the citizen being more likely to buy into its institutions. It can then be 
asserted that as the state increases its role as provider, as regulator and as 
arbiter that increased participation in society's institutions through 
consultations, referendums and other forms of representation will inevitably 
result in our institutions being more accountable and operating in our interest. 
Whilst this may be true there is a dichotomy at the very heart of policing and it 
is the distinction between the operational remit and the non-operational 
function of the police service. Lustergarten (1986) argued that there was no 
real distinction between policy and operational matters because they are 
intertwined one affecting the other. 
The balance between operational and non-operational policing is 
particularly delicate in relation to the experience of ethnic communities. It is at 
times difficult to see how consultations and other forms of citizen 
representation, participation and activity will have any lasting meaningful 
influence on the way policing works at an operational level. Members of ethnic 
communities invariably experience the direct punitive effects of operational 
policing. For example, according to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
data, the stop and search rates of Black people in London increased by 30% 
between the years 2001/01 and 2001/02; for Asian people by 41%, while for 
White people it only increased by 8%. 
'The number of stops and searches conducted in 2001/02 rose by 18% 
in the MPS, although during the same period this number fell by 1% in 
the rest of England and Wales. In the MPS this rise is mainly 
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accounted for by the rise of stop and searches on people from ethnic 
minorities': (MPA, 2004; 21). 
The report into the death of Stephen Lawrence by Sir William 
McPherson was published in 1999 and highlighted the importance of the use 
of stop and search powers in the context of police/community relations and 
made a number of recommendations designed to ensure they were exercised 
in a way that would be as effective as possible in reducing crime whilst also 
promoting trust confidence and raising the level of accountability in policing 
amongst ethnic communities (McPherson, 1999). 'if the police are left to their 
adversarial function their contact with the public will be consistently 
confrontational eroding their legitimacy and public confidence' (Jones et, al 
1994: 33). For obligation and consent to be realised there is a requirement 
that discretion is used as a primary asset in the police armoury (Scarman, 
1986). 
Having being charged with certain responsibilities, duties and functions 
police authorities have an obligation to be directly accountable to the 
communities within their geographic boundaries as much as they are 
accountable to the Home Secretary and chief constables within the tripartite 
structure. In the first instance accountability to the local community is of 
paramount importance because it is here that the effects of policing or lack of 
it will be felt. For particular groups, the distinction between operational and 
non-operational policing is irrelevant because their primary experience is 
adversarial. The preoccupation with the tripartite structure I believe implicitly 
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denies the place and importance of the citizen. It is important for the effective 
functioning of the service that we begin to acknowledge and readjusting our 
sights to understand that the tripartite is in fact a quartet of Home Secretary, 
chief constables/commissioners, police authorities and the citizen; this 
acknowledgement and inclusion enables us to see the role of the citizen as 
important if not more important than the current deference to the tripartite 
system. The system ought to work on behalf of the citizen not the citizen on 
behalf of it. Scarman (1986,4.60) noted; '... they enforce the law on behalf of 
the community; indeed they cannot effectively enforce it without the support of 
the community'. 
This can only be realised if there is clear and transparent lines of 
communication and accountability within and outside the infrastructure. In his 
work on the democratic social contract Rousseau argues that the law giver's 
programme can only be presented and not enforced on the citizen due to the 
citizen's right to choose. Rousseau goes further and argues in a similar vein to 
Broaden (1982) that it would be impossible for all citizens to be involved in the 
decision making process and as Pateman (1985: 152) concurs 'what is 
needed is a smaller body made up of representatives who act on behalf of 
citizens but who cannot decide for them because authority remains squarely 
in the hands of the citizen' (Pateman, 1985: 152). Interestingly Pateman 
(1978) discusses the notion of voluntarism which social contract theorists see 
as an emphasis on the assent of individuals whether through voting, 
acceptance of benefits or actual participation. Essentially abstention is not a 
neutral position; deciding to abstain brings forward Locke's (1978) 
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assessment that those who abstain have given tacit consent to the status quo. 
The contentious question is however whether tacit consent is being given or 
are we and some of our institutions simply powerless? 
Conclusion 
Historically, the vast majority of the public had little or no access to 
decision-making or decision makers. Today, however, with the increase in 
disaffection evident in all strata of society, policy makers, bureaucrats and civil 
servants have moved increasingly towards engaging larger numbers of people 
and have attempted to tap into the ethos of collective responsibility (Millen, 
2003). 
In this chapter, I have discussed citizenship and our relationship to our 
institutions in the context of a sense of belonging and identity. I have 
discussed how the functions of our institutions legitimise or potentially 
undermine the social contract between the state and the individual. The key 
questions are what does citizenship mean for us all, what does it mean for the 
diversity of individuals and the diversity of our institutions and how can we 
provide a pathway to give people the capacity to participate in civic society? In 
all areas of public services those who think they do not and will not be 
receiving the same rights and the same access can only be said to have equal 
citizenship in name only. Access is not about being able to attend accident 
and emergency, It is not simply about being registered at you local primary 
school; it is not just about having the opportunity to have representative 
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individuals from various communities sitting on the board of police authorities; 
neither is it about being able to speak to your police authority member about 
the policing plan for the area or neighbour policing. Therefore the fundamental 
question is what difference does our representation on institutions like police 
authorities make? Do minority interests see variation and change in the way 
the local police service responds to concerns as a result of police authority 
activity or is there a visible tyranny by the majority? 
For Locke (1978), any government rules by consent which is 
underpinned by the legal system, ownership of property and being within the 
geographic boundaries of the state. The status quo is further strengthened 
and legitimised by the government's responsibility to protect life, liberty and 
property. Citizenship ought to embody a balanced reciprocal relationship 
between the state and the individual and an acknowledgement of the 
multiplicity of roles individuals inhabit and an understanding of the macro and 
micro responsibilities of the state. If communities and other groups feel that 
they are not afforded the access, treatment or resources of others and that 
there is little parity of outcome then the reciprocity engendered by the act of 
being a citizen is compromised. It then becomes difficult to argue that there 
ought to be the same degree of allegiance or obligation (a theme that is 
developed in chapter five) from all citizens including the disenfranchised. 
An example of an attempt to nullify any conflict between the individual 
and the institution arose out of the Scarman report (1981) and its landmark 
recommendations which had wide implications for citizenship, ethnicity, the 
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police service, police authorities and the Home Office. Police authorities as an 
institution with their role of scrutinising the police, representing the interest of 
local people, ensuring that sufficient provisions are in place to facilitate an 
effective police service along with their responsibilities to bring the police to 
account do appear to support the notion of active citizenship by encouraging 
involvement and participation and by making provision for the inclusion of all 
citizens. The evidence on the ground paints a picture of police authorities as 
regulatory bodies that if understood and used correctly can herald the benefits 
of equality of access and the benefits of citizens engaging through an 
adherence to the reciprocity of the social contract. The problem that initially 
needs to be overcome is that police authorities are little understood or indeed 
known about. Myhill (2003) found that those who had heard of them did not 
know what they were or what their role was and the name police authority was 
indistinguishable from that of the police. 
As an institution that demands increased accountability from the 
service it oversees, police authorities appear to be mysterious and 
unidentifiable. Despite this, the existence of such an institution of 
accountability has the potential to bring increased legitimacy to the police 
service, whilst ultimately ensuring that the citizen still has control over the 
structures and institutions working on its behalf. 
According to Coleman (2005) if our institutions - including police 
authorities - wish to maintain their authority and legitimacy, they need to 
understand that the public does not want paternalistic modes of governing but 
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wishes to have direct engagement. Moreover, the public do want a 
conversation and not simply consultation. Coleman (2005) notes that on an 
everyday level, people converse informally on politics. However, what was 
found was that there is rarely an opportunity for the representative to converse 
with the represented. Finally, the public requires ongoing rather than sporadic 
conversation and they require accountability and transparency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Introduction 
'... the notion of authority as the right to call people to account needs to 
be complemented by the notion of power as the ability to call people to 
account' (Day and Klein, 1987: 9). 
The United Kingdom has no written constitution or bill of rights, there is 
no single text or document which embodies our raison d'etre and the terms 
under which we agree to live together. The elements of our constitution are 
held within four principle sources; i) Statute Law - which are acts of 
Parliament - ii) Common Law - from which certain basic principles are derived 
including freedom of expression, assembly and association, the royal 
prerogative and judicial decisions, iii) conventions of the constitution, for 
example, the convention that parliament must meet at least once a year, that 
the sovereign does not attend cabinet meetings, and that ministers who lose 
the confidence of the House of Commons on a major issue must resign. - 
conventions are not enforced by the courts -; and iv) Works of authority which 
have persuasive authority due to their age and/or the clarification brought to 
aspects of the constitution. It is therefore in the areas of Acts of Parliament, 
judicial pronouncements, principles of common law and works of authority that 
we underpin our institutions (Norton, 1991: 73-88; Jones, 1991: 277-280). 
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According to Jones (1991) from the 1970s the constitution came into 
question due to successive governments failing to deliver on their promises 
and being unable to cope with the rise in unemployment and the slowdown in 
the expansion of the British economy. For Jones, it was symptomatic that at 
the point at which governments were seen as being unable to cope, the 
system of government became questioned. Our system of policing was not 
exempt from this questioning, and as a result, accountability and transparency 
rose in importance. In order to support the functions of our police service an 
additional tier of management and accountability was consolidated into one 
system which involved a partnership between police authorities, the home 
secretary and chief constables - known as the tripartite system. 
In the previous chapter, I explored the emergence of police authorities, 
charting their progress from the seventeenth century through the 1964 Police 
Act to the Police and Magistrates' Court Act 1994 which saw police authorities 
become independent authorities. The role of police authorities was further re- 
defined under The Police Act 1996 which paved the way for police authorities 
to take on an acute scrutiny role and a more direct involvement in the policing 
of their local areas. The Police Act 1996 gave police authorities' specific 
additional responsibilities which included the requirement to publish local 
policing plans in consultation with local communities and other interest 
groups. The act also gave police authorities' the responsibility of monitoring 
performance, collecting and publishing performance information, producing 
efficiency and Best Value performance plans, delivering best value, 
accounting for the constabulary's finances, managing the constabulary's 
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resources, planning and deciding budgets, investigating complaints against 
senior police officers and monitoring overall complaints procedures through to 
appointing chief police officers (The Police Act 1996). 
During this chapter I will be discussing the role of police authorities as 
accountable bodies who also have a mandate to ensure that we have an 
efficient police service. I will also discuss the importance of citizen 
involvement for accountability and I will discuss the level of additional 
accountability - if any - this brings. 
The Stakeholders 
All members of society are intrinsically interested and are key 
stakeholders in our police service. There are however, a number of 
organisations that have a legal responsibility to work with and interface with 
the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland these are: 
9 Association of Police Authorities (APA) 
Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), and Audit 
Commission 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 
* Police Federation, 
Association of Police Authofities (APA) 
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The Association of Police Authorities (APA) represents all 44 police 
authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Police authorities came 
together to form this national umbrella body in April 1997. The APA is similar 
to the Local Government Association (LGA) which is an association of all local 
governments. The APA has two main roles; a) to act as the national voice for 
police authorities and b), to support police authorities in improving how they 
carry out their role locally. The Association of Police Authorities is funded by 
subscriptions raised from all police authorities. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and Audit Commission 
Despite being outside the tripartite structure, both Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission are powerful 
bodies in the governance of policing. Her Majesty's Inspectors have a 
statutory responsibility under the Police Act 1964 to inspect and report to the 
home secretary on the efficiency of all police organisations. The exchequer's 
grant of 51% to the police authority is conditional on the police force receiving 
a certificate of efficiency from HMIC (Jones and Newburn, 1997). 
HMIC has three main functions; i) the formal inspection of the police 
forces in England, Wales; and Northern Ireland, ii) it advises the home 
secretary on senior appointments to the police service, via the Senior 
Appointments Panel which it chairs and iii) it fosters links with international 
agencies such as Interpol and the FBI (HMIC, 2004: 7). 
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HMIC is an important channel between the home office and the police 
service. It is through HMIC that the home office conveys to the police its policy 
concerns, ideas or suggestions and is able to gauge how its policy priorities 
are being implemented locally. The police service also utilises the HMIC as a 
means of enabling the home office to be aware of the views and thoughts of 
the police. The role of HMIC is central to the operational functions of the 
police. 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was set up over 50 
years ago to facilitate the development of policing policies on behalf of the 
police service as a whole, rather than separately in the forty four force areas. 
The Association advocates strong local policing sustained through the 
tripartite framework of local chief constable, the local police authority and the 
home secretary. ACPO is not a staff association but works on behalf of the 
police service. It is funded by a combination of home office grants, 
contributions from each of the forty four police authorities, membership 
subscriptions and by the proceeds of its annual exhibition. ACPO's members 
are police officers who hold the rank of Chief Constable, (Commissioner - in 
the case of London) Deputy Chief Constable or Assistant Chief Constable, or 
their equivalents, in the forty four forces of England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, national police agencies and certain other forces in the UK (APA, 
2006). 
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Police Federation 
The Police Federation of England and Wales is the representative body 
to which all police officers up to and including the rank of chief inspector 
belong. It was established by the Police Act 1919 following a strike by 
constables and sergeants in the Metropolitan Police demanding pay 
increases, a widow's pension, the recognition of their illegal trade union, and 
the reinstatement of those who had been sacked for their union activities. The 
strikers won on pay and within months the police union was smashed and the 
Police Federation of England and Wales was established (Police Federation, 
2004). Since this time police officers have been prohibited - by statute - from 
striking: this prohibition was reinforced by the Police Act 1996. The Police 
Federation represents the interests of over 136,000 police officers and 
although it is not a union it negotiates on all aspects of pay, allowances, hours 
of duty, annual leave and pensions. The Police Federation is a staff 
association and operates as a professional body and is consulted when police 
regulations are made, dealing with training, promotion and discipline. 
Accountability Defined 
Being accountable is not solely a matter of presenting reports and 
accounts, but it is also about power, authority and ownership and it is the tool 
to help stave off feelings of being disconnected and powerlessness (Day and 
Klein, 1987; Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Mulgan, 2003; Gray et al, 1997). 
Accountability is also about the conduct and performance of an individual, a 
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group or an organisation and the criteria used for assessing these (Day and 
Klein, 1987; Jenkins and Goetz, 1999; and Mulgan, 2003). Accountability 
generally identifies shared expectations; provides a common currency for 
justification; puts agreements into context (Day and Klein, 1987: 5) and 
provides a sense of obligation, or a right to be called to account (Gray et al, 
1997: 329); According to Mulgan (2003: 30), accountability has three 
interrelated elements - information, discussion, and rectification. Day and 
Klein (1987) maintain that accountability defines the relationship between 
actors through identifying who can call whom to account and who owes a duty 
of explanation. According to Day and Klein (1987), accountability establishes 
power relationships, the roles, forms and the direction of accountability which 
in turn define the distribution of authority. 
A lack of access to accountability by others is synonymous with a lack 
of power and to be unaccountable to others is to be all-powerful. In this 
respect, being accountable is more than providing access to information, but 
implies a capacity of those to whom one is accountable to being able to affect 
change in actions. This is what Mulgan (2003: 30) refers to as 'rectification' 
and Keohane (2002: 479) calls 'the ability to impose a cost'. The very poor 
often lack capacity and the ability to demand accountability and so depend to 
some extent on the actions and assistance of others (Jenkins and Goetz, 
1999). 1 subscribe to the view of Kilby (2004) who maintains that the nature of 
'downward' accountability of public bodies to their local constituency is central 
to the empowerment process as it determines the distribution of power 
between the participants, local people or constituency. As stated by Day and 
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Klein, (1987: 9). '.... authority as the right to call people to account needs to be 
complemented by the notion of power as the ability to call people to account'. 
For Fox and Brown (1998) accountability is a process where actors 
hold other actors responsible for actions. Moore (2000) says that 
accountability is primarily about responsibility whilst for Fetterman (1996) it 
means giving an account for decisions with particular attention to expenditure 
whilst having a responsibility to the people affected directly. Ultimately, 
accountability is to stakeholders - which include beneficiaries, boards, donors, 
staff, partners, and peers - for the results and impacts of performance and the 
use of resources to achieve that performance. 
Fetterman (1996) acknowledges that whilst accountability is used 
synonymously with transparency, there are distinctions between the two. 
Accountability is about providing an account for decisions, actions, and their 
consequences whilst transparency is about providing information not 
necessarily an explanation. 
For Pyper (1996: 3) accountability is about stewardship and 
responsibility. For stewards to be effective and to meaningfully undertake their 
responsibilities the allocation of resources is essential. In addition to 
resources, the ability to place restrictions in order to enforce or underscore the 
seriousness and/or importance of an issue is vital. In short, the steward needs 
control of the issues for which it is accountable and needs the ability to 
implement punitive measures as it sees fit thus supporting Day and Klein's 
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perceived importance of power. In short, according to Fetterman, (1996: 211) 
institutions must respond to demands that emanate from multiple sources. 
Accountability Described 
There are a number of accepted mechanisms through which 
accountability may be realised. 
1. There is the democratic model where elected representatives are able 
to communicate with an institution on the sort of service they require 
and hold that institution accountable for delivering it. 
2. There is also accountability through the direct election of officials 
(Howard, 2005; Loveday and Reid, 2003). 
3. Accountability can also be aided through the legislative process where 
the actions of governments and institutions are defined, strengthen or 
curtailed by legislation. 
4. There is legal accountability, by which an institution is held to account 
for the use or misuse of public resources. 
5. Accountability can also be realised through committees and appointed 
members. 
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6. There is also accountability through an impartial civil service where 
elected representatives are supported by qualified and experienced 
staff capable of offering independent advice and information, 
7. There is financial accountability, by which an institution is audited and 
held to account for delivery, value for public money and appropriate 
public spend. This involves the use of efficiency models, quality 
standards and other tools that report on the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the institution and how it uses public resources (Gray: 
et. al: 1997). 
Other ways by which accountability can be achieved include through 
the media, through the work of independent research institutes and the 
involvement and participation of charities, think tanks and lobby groups. 
Along with internal accountability where officers are accountable within 
an organisation there is what Elock (1991) calls directional accountability 
involving ministerial and parliamentary accountability. If policing is to be 
effective, efficient, fair and impartial, all these and other permutations of 
accountability need to be factored in. Loveday and Reid (2003: 58), however, 
maintain that rather than aiding accountability, multiple lines of reporting may 
be more confusing to the public and in their experience leads to police chiefs 
evading responsibility for their performance. 
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Due to the many interconnected and different levels on which 
accountability operates it cannot simultaneously be achieved at all levels. It is 
therefore important that we understand the type of accountability or 
transparency we desire and ensure that our institutions are malleable and 
capable of providing this. 
Society, clearly recognising and accepting the importance of law and 
order, enters into a social contract conferring authority to the state which in 
turn constructs laws and establishes order through institutions, such as the 
judiciary, the legislature, the criminal justice system, health and education 
institutions and the police. These institutions are interrelated in their 
respective remit of ensuring life and property is safe and protected from harm. 
This, however, can only be achieved effectively and consistently with consent, 
which is not unconditional but subject to trust in our institutions being 
maintained by sufficient checks, balances and systems of accountability which 
prevent the erosion of trust (Home Office, 2003a; Audit Commission, 2003a 
and 2003b; MacPherson, 1999). 
The Audit Commission (2003a) found that people trusted individuals 
more than organisations because the notion of trust was based primarily on 
relationship, familiarity and experience. Public trust in the accountability 
structures of public organisations was driven by various factors including 
useful and credible information, the existence of external watchdogs, personal 
contact and whether they are seen to be honest and trustworthy (Audit 
Commission, 2003a). One of the inherent difficulties with realising 
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accountability is that the citizen invariably accepts that those in control of 
public resources are accountable yet the average citizen is unable to 
adequately verify this. The mistake that public servants make is that they 
assume that as citizens we understand and are able to identify which 
institutions and through which process a call for an account can be made. It is 
often unclear who accounts to whom, at what level, at what stage and the 
degree of that accountability and who has the power to demand and realise 
this call for accountability (Day and Klein, 1987). This may invariably lead to 
an erosion of trust (National Consumer Council, 2002: 1; MORI, 2003; Audit 
Commission, 2002; Coleman, 2005; Blunkett, 2002; Beer, 1982; Marsh, 1977; 
Hart, 1978). Day & Klein (1987) viewed accountability in relation to 
occupations and saw some occupations as intentionally adopting methods of 
working and communications that excluded non-members from scrutinising 
their activities. This can logically lead one to question whether police authority 
members - who incidentally are not experts on policing - are sufficiently 
informed and knowledgeable about the language and culture of the police 
service to ensure that they are effective at bringing the police to account. 
Jones (1999) thinks they are not. 
The creation of regulatory authorities like the Financial Service 
Authorities (FSA), the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), the British Medical 
Authority (BMA), the Audit Commission, - and although it was set up in 
another era (1856) - Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPPC) are part of a holistic 
attempt to provide an increased layer of scrutiny and accountability ensuring 
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that at a national, regional and a local level there are clear guidelines and 
areas of responsibility to ensure accountability for the services being 
delivered. 
As far as accountability and the police service are concerned the police 
are subordinate to the law; just as all other citizens and institutions are. 
However, for Marshall (1978: 61-63), the police ought to be accountable not in 
the subordinate sense but in the 'explanatory and cooperative sense'. The 
primary concern of the citizen is that they receive the service they require, that 
money is spent wisely and that there are structures in place to ensure 
transparency and accountability. Things can only be effectively achieved if the 
police see themselves as subordinate, accepting that they must explain their 
actions and cooperate with others. 
In Marshall's explanatory and cooperative sense and as seen in the 
recommendations from Lord Scarman in the Scarman report (1981), it is 
imperative that the public and the police have clear lines of communication 
working in partnership to maintain trust and ensure effective policing. In recent 
years there has been a shift in the tone of policing to community policing, 
intelligence policing and policing by consent. This re-emphasis has opened 
the way for new levels and types of engagement through consultations with 
local communities and interest groups. It has become clear that the police 
themselves now acknowledge that policing is not a task for the police alone 
but one in which the wider society has a stake. Credit for this new emphasis is 
due to the work in 1970s of the former chief constable for Devon and Cornwall 
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John Alderson. The views of John Alderson greatly impacted on Lord 
Scarman when he gave evidence to the 1981 Scarman inquiry. Scarman 
concluded that 'the police enforce the law on behalf of the community and 
cannot effectively enforce it without the community' (Scarman, 1986: 4.60). 
Rank and file police officers were critical of policing by consent and saw it as 
a distraction from the core task of fighting crime (Reiner, 1991: 106). This 
feeling was particularly prominent because the concept of community policing 
and policing by consent was a difficult notion to grasp, to monitor or to assess. 
There was and to some extent still is no uniformity or clarity on how policing 
by consent should operate (Stephens, 1988: 92). 
Public knowledge of the existence of police authorities is crucial if the 
authority is to be effective and have the credibility required to undertake its 
role. Both Myhill (2003) and Docking (2003) in their respective research found 
little public awareness about police authorities and their roles. The call for 
greater public accountability dictates that the institutional mechanisms set up 
to bring about that accountability have: a) sufficient expertise, b) that there is 
knowledge of the institution its role and mechanisms, c) that it is autonomous 
of being unduly influenced and d) that it has the resource capability to deliver. 
In most cases the above requirements have indeed being met: for 
example police authorities arguably have the basic structural framework, 
resources and relevant powers to enable them to perform their functions. 
They have responsibility for setting the police budget; they have the additional 
resources and expertise of its members who are magistrates, independent 
and local authority members. There is also the appointment of civil staff 
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whose role it is to support the appointed members in their work for the 
authority. Both police authority members and the civil staff work closely with 
the local police force to produce local policing plans and the chief constable or 
commissioner reports on a monthly basis to the authority on the activities of 
the force. 
In addition to the above, there have been calls for the strengthening of 
police authorities which has, according to Jones and Newburn (1994) sprung 
from concerns that the division of responsibility between the home office, 
police authorities and chief constables are deliberately confusing and thereby 
obscures the decision making process; and secondly, that there is a shift of 
power away from police authorities to the home office and chief constables 
(Reiner, 1993). The compound effect of this according to Jones (1994) is that 
there are very few checks and balances in the system not only because police 
authorities and its members have insufficient knowledge but because they 
lack the formal powers they need to exert real influence: 
Notwithstanding this, police authorities and other public bodies have a 
responsibility to ensure that; 
9 Public funds are spent as agreed and in accordance with procedures. 
* That resources are used efficiently. Justifying and quantifying the 
degree to which resources have been used efficiently is a problematic 
task and requires that one measures the outputs against the value of 
the service and compares it with the cost of provision. Later in this 
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chapter I will be discussing the various mechanisms that have been 
used to facilitate this like the best value reviews, the 37 performance 
indicators collectively known as Professional Policing Assessment 
Framework (PPAF) and Activity Based Costing (ABC). 
* That resources have been used to achieve the intended results (Flynn, 
2002: 206). 
In Guardians of Race Equality Millen (2003: 39) stated that '... unless 
you measure, how will you know and if you measure, what will you know ?'I 
underscored that the terms of measurement require clear parameters. 
Measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of an institution and its processes 
are fraught with difficulties. For example, if arrest rates are used as a 
significant indicator of police success, then by simply increasing the arrests of 
trivial offenders the figures will reflect that the police are having more success 
and are more effective at arresting criminals. If, however, the indicator is the 
clear up rate, again the figures can be skewed by those who are arrested 
agreeing to accept responsibility for other similar offences to which they may, 
at best, have spurious links and, at worst, have no connection at all. The 
potential for this increases when a convicted person can receive no further or 
additional punishment for accepting responsibility for other crimes. The 
degree of success in police performance cannot therefore be adequately 
measured by reference to quantitative analysis or performance indicators 
alone. The Audit Commission (1996) explained that increased police 
presence on the street had not proved to have a direct impact on crime. 
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However, the general public felt a greater sense of safety and security with an 
increased street presence even if the action was not cost effective. 
Performance indicators ought to be refined and used with caution and they 
ought not to be used solely or primarily as indicators of public satisfaction or 
to assess police performance. 
In order to develop any effective measurement for reviewing 
performance, an understanding of the ethos of the police service as outlined 
in its statement of common purpose is required. 
'The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly: 
to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to 
keep the Queen's peace; to protect, help and reassure the community and to 
be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement. We 
must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour 
or prejudice to the rights of others. We need to be professional, calm and 
restrained in the face of violence and apply only that force which is necessary 
to accomplish our lawful duty. We must strive to reduce the fears of the public 
and, so far as we can, to reflect their priorities in the action we take. We must 
respond to well-founded criticism with a willingness to change' (Metropolitan 
Police, 2008) 
The Policy Studies Institute (1996) concluded that in order to carry out 
this mission statement the police service needed a large pool of skill and 
resources at all levels and that measuring in a quantitative way through the 
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use of performance indicators that were decreed from the centre worked 
against this. The Policy Studies Institute stated that the relationship of the 
tripartite system could not be understood in contractual terms or in terms of 
command but required an understanding and acknowledgement that the 
relationship had to be one of partnership. Loveday and Reid (2003) reported 
that their research supported the proposition that central control did not 
deliver more effective policing and furthermore, top down performance 
measurements distorted police priorities whilst a bottom up approach was 
more conducive in helping police forces become more effective. 
Accountability through financial allocation 
The home office pays 51 % of the police budgets for each force and the 
police authority pays the remaining 49%. Interestingly, police authorities are 
also dependent on the'home office for its money; this raises questions about 
the degree of authority and autonomy police authorities really have. The 
immutable fact, however, is that all funding ultimately comes from the state 
and it does not necessarily follow that this arrangement necessarily 
compromises the independence, autonomy or objectivity of police authorities. 
Under the provisions of the Revenue Support Grant the actual 
contribution from central government to the police has increased substantially 
(Jones & Newburn, 1997: 19). The total central government contribution 
including the Revenue Support Grant generally amounts to over 76% (Jones 
& Newburn, 1997: 19). If after an inspection Her Majesty's Inspector of 
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Constabulary (HMIC) refuses to issue a certificate of efficiency to the police 
force the home office has the authority to refuse to pay its share of the police 
authority budget. The reality, however, is that the withholding of funds has 
never happened. Reiner (1991: 268) also found that chief officers had little 
regard for the influence and power of HMIC. Loveday (2000: 45) supported 
this conclusion stating that the influence of HMIC had declined significantly 
since the 1980s and that the members of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) did not view HMIC as important in the policy making process. 
This is yet another reminder that the process and ability to bring to account 
requires legitimacy and power without which the process is rendered useless. 
Jones (1997) recounts that the home office is seeking to strengthen the role of 
HMIC by the appointment of relatively young chief constables to the 
inspectorate where in the past inspectors tended to be retired chief 
constables. In addition, the decision in 1989 to publish the reports on 
individual forces - which hitherto remained private - further underscored the 
seriousness of this change (Jones et al, 1997: 20). 
Stephens (1988) explained that the police authority budgetary powers 
were draconian and not as effective as a means of influence as it implied. 
Hewitt (1996) saw police authorities as performing house-keeping functions 
and for Reiner (1992) they were largely ineffective. In recent times police 
authorities have been found wanting even in performing their house keeping 
roles. As a result of the Bichard enquiry (2004a) the former Home Secretary 
David Blunkett described the Humberside police as poor and as ranking 42nd 
out of the 43 police authorities, Mr Blunkett demanded the resignation of the 
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chief constable as a result of the failings that the inquiry identified. It is 
surprising however that the endemic failings found by the Bichard enquiry and 
referenced to by the then home secretary had not been identified by HMIC 
inspection. The prima facie evidence supports the conclusion of Reiner (1991: 
268) when he found a lack of respect for HMIC because if HMIC had identified 
and noted these failings it (HMIC) would and should have refused to issue a 
certificate of efficiency until such time that the police service in question met 
the minimum requirement. 
Trust and confidence in a public body and its officials is crucial if it is to 
undertake its responsibilities effectively and efficiently. Any perception of 
failings or that the organisation is ill prepared whether due to a lack of 
expertise, or inept systems and procedures impacts significantly on the 
perceived legitimacy and the trust that the public will have in it (Locke, 1978; 
Blunkett, 2001; Clarke, 1994; Hoban, 2004; Beer, 1982; Blunkett, 2001,109; 
Berkeley, 2003; Hart, 1978). 
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Accountability, trust and the police authority under fire 
As a result of the police strikes of 1918 and 1919 the Desborough 
Committee was formed and its recommendations were embodied in the Police 
Act 1919. The Police Act 1919 gave the home office increased powers over 
pay, conditions and discipline. A department was set up in the home office 
which had responsibility for policing. From this time police accountability 
became more centralised and some argued at the expense of local 
accountability (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1994; Lustgarten, 1986). 
Lustergarten saw local accountability being eroded; this was evidenced when 
one looked at the very strong influence and control that the home office has 
through legislation and through constabulary independence which increased 
the freedom of chief constables. For Jones, Newburn & Smith (1994) the 
Police Act 1946 provided additional evidence of the systematic erosion of 
police authority power because through this act the Home secretary received 
the power to forcibly amalgamate police forces with populations of less than 
100,000 people. However, simply having the power to invoke legislation does 
not automatically mean that change is inevitable because in order to bring 
about change, a certain amount of partnership, consultation and negotiation is 
required. 
There is nevertheless a growing feeling that police authorities have 
little real control or power and are unable to bring chief constables and their 
police services to account (Reiner, 1999; Loveday, 2005; Jones, 1997). Whilst 
the tripartite system is designed to ensure clarity and accountability, on close 
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scrutiny the arrangement appears to be ambiguous and as Jones (1994: 27) 
argues this ambiguity is intentionally created. For example, there have been a 
number of high profile cases in Humberside and in Nottingham which have led 
to confusion about the relationship between police authorities', the home 
office and chief constables. 
The Humberside Police Authority 
As a result of the Bichard inquiry report in 2004, the Humberside Police 
and its Chief Constable Mr David Westwood were heavily criticised for failings 
in the handling of intelligence on Ian Huntley the Soham murderer (Bichard: 
2004). 
Lawyers acting for the then Home Secretary Rt Hon David Blunkett 
MP lodged legal papers with the High Court in an attempt to force the 
suspension of David Westwood (Humberside's Chief Constable). Despite 
receiving correspondence from the Humberside Police Authority - the direct 
employers of David Westwood - arguing that the chief constable should 
remain in his post the home secretary pressed ahead and used his powers 
under the Police Reform Act 2002 to direct the police authority to suspend Mr 
Westwood in order to maintain public confidence in the force. 
The Humberside Police Authority failed to comply with the request and 
the Home Secretaries asked the High Court to enforce the law. In a television 
interview (Channel 4 News 22/06/04) Rt Hon David Blunkett MP asserted, 
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I remain of the view that Chief Constable Westwood should not have 
operational control of the force while Humberside Police Authority and I 
consider the appropriate way to respond to Sir Michael Bichard's 
findings. " Source: Channel 4 News 22106104 
Although the home secretary won the High Court battle upholding the 
suspension of Mr Westwood the government were facing legal challenges 
which would result in a lengthy procedure to sack Mr Westwood; it therefore 
agreed to reinstate Mr Westwood as chief constable on condition that he 
retired in March 2005 - 12 months earlier than he had originally planned. The 
will of the police authority was overruled by the home secretary but the chief 
constable still remained in post for no other reason than to prevent a costly 
legal battle in the event of the chief constable deciding to pursue the case. 
The central argument that the public confidence needed to be re-established 
was relegated by financial and political considerations. 
Nottingham Police Authority 
A much earlier example occurred in Nottingham in 1956. The chief 
constable asserted that the duty of enforcing the criminal law belonged to him 
and not the committee. The then Home Secretary Gwilym Lloyd George 
upheld in his favour concluding that the actions of the committee (police 
authority) amounted to a deliberate interference with law enforcement 
(Critchley, 1967: 270-2). There was also Fisher v. Oldham Corporation (1930) 
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where constabulary independence served to undermine the position of the 
authority. This case underscored that the ultimate authority over the actions of 
a police officer was and still is not the commanding officers, the police 
authority or even the home secretary but that it is up to the personal 
judgement of the individual officer to interpret the law as he/she sees fit at the 
time. Day & Klein (1987: 105) identified conscience as being the most 
important master which sat above the police authority, the home secretary and 
the chief constable as the unique authority held by individual officers. Jones, 
Newburn, & Smith (1994) believed this overemphasis on discretion and 
conscience to be wrong and argued power was conferred directly on many 
other officials without the same conclusions being drawn and also that police 
discretion needed to be understood in reference to the overall structure of 
policing. 
The structure of police authority accountability 
There are a number of steps that have been taken to further enhance 
the legitimacy and accountability of the police service. The three members of 
the tripartite system - the police authority, the home secretary and the chief 
constable - are accountable to each other. They are also individually and 
collectively accountable to parliament the executive, the cabinet and the 
citizen. Police authority staff are accountable through the line management 
structure and then to police authority members. The police authority members 
are magistrate members, local authority members, and independent members 
selected based on their specific expertise and are accountable for the 
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decisions they make on behalf of the authority. This is what Elock (1991: 162) 
describes as directional accountability: a multi-directional layer of 
accountability upwards to politicians, outwards to professional colleagues and 
downwards to the citizen. There may for example be disagreements and 
conflicts between the different layers and groupings within Elock's directional 
accountability model: for example, the call for an increased police presence 
on the street needs to be weighed against budgetary considerations such as 
the real impact on crime prevention, the impact on local and national policing 
plans and securing agreement through the tripartite system. There is potential 
for confusion and ambiguity in the decision making process and as decisions 
meander through the various levels of accountability, it can be cumbersome 
and confusing. 
By setting out four guiding principles the former home secretary Rt Hon 
David Blunkett MP maintained that he was clarifying and strengthening 
accountability arrangements for policing in England and Wales. The four 
principles he identified were: 
i) The need to protect the political independence of the police; 
ii) The need for clear accountability mechanisms to support more 
effective services; 
iii) Transparency about who is responsible for tackling crime and 
holding the police accountable; 
iv) Improved public understanding of policing and its effectiveness 
(Home Office, 2003: 38). 
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At times what is required is greater transparency, a term which is used 
interchangeably and is seen as synonymous with accountability. There are 
however distinctions between the two. Accountability provides an account for 
decisions, actions, and their consequences, whilst transparency is about 
providing information and not necessarily an explanation (Fetterman, 1996: 
212). However, as discussed earlier, the power to call to account is central to 
accountability, the legitimacy of one's mandate and to ensuring that there is 
transparency (Day and Klein, 1987). This is because the power to call to 
account defines the relationship between actors clarifying who owes a duty to 
whom (Raine et al, 2006: 9). 
As already discussed there is - what I would call - an inherent 
confusion between the members of the tripartite system which is compounded 
in three ways. Firstly, a'... chief constable is not obliged to report to the police 
authority but can make representation to the home secretary circumventing 
any requests of the authority' (Reiner, 2000: 188). Secondly, as will be 
discussed in more detail, most members of police authorities know very little 
about policing and are at the mercy of the police service to provide them with 
the data and information from which they make decisions, and finally, citizens 
are largely unaware of police authorities and their role. Myhill et al, (2003) 
found that those who had heard of police authorities did not know what they 
were or what their role entailed and, furthermore, the name police authority 
was not distinguishable from that of the police. Despite there being systems 
and processes in place designed to facilitate increased transparency and 
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accountability, in light of the above it is hard to see how police authorities can 
effectively be said to bring real accountability on behalf of the citizen. 
Accountability through regulatoty bodies 
Consultation and engagement are important constructs for the 
architecture of any public body that wishes to increase its accountability. The 
landscape for engagement has changed and broadened significantly since 
The Police Act 1964. 'Historically, most people had little or no access to 
decision-making or makers, today however, there is a tangible move on the 
part of our institutions towards engagement, involvement and an attempt to 
tap into the ethos of collective responsibility' (Millen, 2003; 2). This has been 
evidenced in recent years by the creation of regulatory bodies and the 
emergence of numerous agencies and QUANGOS like Regional Assemblies, 
Local Strategic Partnerships, Regional Development Agencies, Government 
Offices, Learning and Skills Councils (LSC) and the Connexion Service. 
Despite these attempts to engage the wider population and to 
demonstrate increased accountability, there has been a compendium of 
incidents and occurrences including the Hatfield crash 2000, the death of 
Victoria Climbie and the subsequent Larning (2005) report, the inquiry into the 
death of Baby P (2008); the Alder Hey hospital organ scandal, the 1986 BSE 
crisis, failings and underperformance in the health service, the murders and 
subsequent inquiry into the GP Harold Shipman, the killing of Zahid Mubarak 
in his prison cell, the high numbers of deaths in police custody (Home Office: 
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2004), Westminster Council and the Dame Shirley Porter votes for home 
scandal in the late 1980's, the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the police 
reaction and the resulting Macpherson (1999) report, the Iraq war and MP's 
expenses: these and many other incidents have all contributed to an erosion 
of trust and have led to the significant drive for in-depth discussions and 
strategic input from those sections of society that have been perceptibly on 
the margins and likely to experience higher levels of deprivation, exclusion 
and discrimination (Alibhai-Brown, 1999; Hart, 1978; Hewitt, 1996; Blunkett, 
2002; Beer, 1982). 
Accountability through public bodies necessitate that plans, strategies 
and ideas for the development and progress of the organisation are put into 
place and implemented. When problems occur corrective actions are 
identified and implemented. 
Corrective action and accountability through policing plans 
Following the Scarman report (1981) into inner-city disturbances, the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) required the regulatory body of the 
police - the police authority - to consult the public prior to setting local police 
objectives. The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 gave increased 
responsibility to police authorities to consult locally on their policing objectives. 
The legal requirement for police authorities to make arrangements to obtain 
the views of people in their local area and to take account of the views of 
communities in setting local police priorities was consolidated under the 
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Police Act 1996. 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) created Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) under which police forces and local 
authorities, in co-operation with police authorities and other agencies, were 
required to consult the public on a local audit of crime and disorder and a 
strategy for tackling them. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was a significant 
step forward in the drive towards increased accountability and representation 
because under it, and for the first time, local authorities became 'responsible 
authorities having a statutory responsibility to develop local crime and 
disorder strategies with the local police. The onus for crime prevention was 
now a joint responsibility between the police and local authorities (Crime and 
Disorder Act, 1998: section 5 (1-3)). The act required that all authorities - 
which included police authorities - should conduct audits to review the levels 
and patterns of crime and disorder in their area and to publish an analysis of 
that review. The purpose of the crime and disorder audit is to inform the 
partnership of crime and disorder in their area and identify the methods of 
developing and implementing plans. An important requirement that was set 
out in the act was that the audit involved local people and consequently 
looked to develop a wider perspective of how crime impacted on the 
community and how the community could have an impact on it. Police 
authorities were however not afforded the same status as local authorities or 
the police service: the passing of the Police Reform Act (2002) rectified this 
and police authorities were being given the same status as police forces and 
local authorities on Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP). 
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The Police Reform Act 2002 also introduced the requirement to publish 
policing plans and strategic three-year force plans which was supported by a 
5.4 per cent increase in funding in 2003 and a minimum 4 per cent increase in 
2004 and 2005 to help implement police reform. 
Pulling together policing priorities in one place, setting national 
objectives to measure how police forces were performing was a key aspect of 
Section 8 of the Police Act 1996. The first National Policing Plan was 
published and was introduced as part of the Police Reform Act 2002. The plan 
set out key priorities including; fighting serious crime and anti-social 
behaviour, driving up detection rates, tackling the fear of crime in order to 
improve public reassurance and engaging all sections of the community in the 
fight against crime. 
All police authorities are required to produce an annual policing plan 
which must consider the views of the Community Police Consultative Groups. 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provided the remit for partnerships to be 
inclusive of agencies and individuals in their area. There was however a fear 
that because local authorities had more resources than police authorities that 
local authorities would expect to have a greater degree of influence over the 
local police leaving the police authority with very little influence as they each 
attempted to reach their targets of crime reduction and agree policing 
priorities. It is true that this situation could possibly arise because police 
authorities do not appear to impact (directly) on operational policing in the 
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same way as the activities of the Crime Reduction Partnerships at the local 
and district level. At the end of their study of six police authorities Jones and 
Newburn (1997) concluded that although chief police officers still dominated 
policy and the planning process the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 
gave police authorities potential strength that was yet to be applied in full. 
They concluded that if police authorities worked in a seamless way with the 
chief of police then there would be very little room for the authority to be 
undermined or sidelined at the local level. We can therefore see that police 
authorities are potentially more powerful than may be initially apparent. 
However, the degree of influence and power that they can exert is very much 
dependent on their ability to work in a unified way at the local level with local 
authorities, fire and rescue authorities, local health boards (in Wales), Primary 
Care Trusts (PCT) as outlined in The Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
Prior to the Police Reform Act 20021, Jones and Newburn (1997: 80) 
had found that following the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 the first 
policing plans that were produced had very little involvement from police 
authorities and local communities and were very 'police-d riven'. Jones and 
Newburn (1997) researched the various types of police authority involvement 
in police plans and identified three categories of police authorities, the 'rubber- 
stampers', the 're-drafters' and the'junior partners'. 
The rubber stampers 
I Police Reform Act 2002 instructed police authorities to publish policing plans and strategic three-year 
force plans in consultation with the local police, the local community and the various interest groups in 
the area. 
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The rubber stampers were found in a minority of police authorities and 
was typically characterised by the chief constable producing a draft plan quite 
late into the process which only enabled the police authority to make cosmetic 
changes before the plan was published. 
The re-drafters 
Jones and Newburn (1997) found that the re-drafters were the largest 
group and had more of an input as they were involved in a more extensive 
consultation process. 
The junior partners 
The third group was the 'junior partners'. Whilst this group had more 
involvement they were called junior partners because the police force 
continued to take the lead on the design and development of the plan. All of 
the police authority members that I conducted in-depth interviews with 
recorded that they were involved in the design and planning of the policing 
plan. However, without conducting detailed comparative research similar to 
that of Jones and Newburn (1997) it would be difficult to assess the level and 
depth of that participation. For example, Jones and Newburn (1997: 215) 
found that 'information was largely controlled by the police and that the 
information presented had already been subjected to the political process of 
decision-making'. This concurred with Hoban (2004) when he found that 
participation was often used as a tool to achieve largely pre-decided 
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outcomes. Jones and Newburn (1997: 15) go on to state that in their case 
studies, it was apparent in one of the forces that they observed 'that the flow 
of information was, if anything, too great and overwhelming' which resulted in 
the police authority being unable to effectively scrutinise. 
Accountability through performance monitoring and efficiency targets 
Police authorities were required through the Magistrates Court Act 
1996 to monitor performance measures. As part of the development of the 
Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF), New User Satisfaction 
Measures (NUSM) were developed which improved on the 2003/4 Best Value 
performance indicators. User satisfaction measures take account of the 
experience of users not just at the initial stage of police action, but in the 
subsequent activity. The surveys are structured around three identified stages 
of user contact: first contact, response and then follow-up. Delivering 
information about user experience which can be implemented by forces and 
police authorities to improve service delivery is seen as a critical aspect of 
monitoring performance. 
PPAF was developed by the home office and HMIC and was launched 
in October 2005 with support from the APA and ACPO. Its ultimate aim is to 
drive up police performance in seven key performance areas of; 
i) Reducing crime, 
ii) Investigating crime, 
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iii) Promoting safety, 
iv) Providing assistance, 
v) Citizen focus, 
vi) Resource use 
vii) Local policing 
(The Police Act 1996, Section 6). 
In order to assess the efficiency of the service the Magistrates Court 
Act 1996 demanded the production of an efficiency plan because the home 
office saw efficiency targets as an important tool for ensuring that increased 
public funds were being used as productively as possible. The argument was 
that increased value for money would contribute to the delivery of better 
quality policing outcomes, recycling resources to the front line and increasing 
citizen focus (Home Office, 2005). 
The home office categorises efficiency in terms of cashable and non- 
cashable gain. in its guidance it explains that an increase in efficiency is 
achieved when: 
'A particular level of output of a particular quality is achieved for less 
cost (cashable gain); or more output and/or output of better quality is 
achieved for a particular cost (non-cashable gain)' (Home Office, 
2005a: 1). 
In their annual policing plans for 2005/06 police authorities were 
expected to account for spend by including a statement of planned actions to 
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deliver efficiency gains, whether the intended gains are cashable, or non- 
cashable and how the gain will be applied. Police authorities are also 
expected to indicate the potential impact of measures beyond 2005/06. For 
efficiency gains in excess of E100,000 police authorities are required to 
identify risks to performance arising from the planned actions and how they 
are being managed (Home Office, 2005). 
Since the inception of efficiency plans all police authorities and police 
forces have had an annual target for efficiency gains equivalent to 2% of their 
net revenue expenditure. In 2003/04 the service claimed it delivered gains of 
E242.05m (2.65%) and has been requested to make efficiency improvements 
of 3% per year from 2005/06 to 2007108. Half the gains are to be cashable to 
support policing activity or to be used to balance budgets (Home Office, 
2005: 1). Whilst'cashable and 'non-cashable' efficiency gains are not in and of 
themselves indicators of performance, they are increasingly being used by the 
government and its agencies to measure the results and effectiveness of its 
policies and interventions. 
Accountability through Best Value reviews 
Ensuring that there is best value in the provision and execution of 
services is important to ensure that there is transparency and accountability. 
There are three core elements within the best value review framework a), an 
obligation to review all functions of the authority b), the use of performance 
measures to assess the extent to which an authority is securing best value via 
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performance indicators and c), the production of a Best Value performance 
plan to report on how an authority is securing Best Value. Police authorities 
have a central role in reflecting the concerns of the public and in shaping the 
local police service to ensure it meets the needs of the communities being 
served. Wholesale reviews of all functions of the authority must be carried out 
on a five year programme showing performance against the Best Value 
performance indicators. Given the current financial crisis government 
departments are been asked to make efficiency savings of up to 10%. 
The Local Government Act 1999 (Section 6) placed a duty on all public 
bodies to achieve Best Value in the provision of services to the public. This 
duty applied to police authorities from 1st April 2000. Amendments were made 
to the Police Act 1996 by the Local Government Act 1999 amending sections 
8(2) and 54 of the Police Act 1996. Section 8(2) amendment meant that the 
Best Value local performance plan would become part of the local policing 
plan and section 54 amendment gave HMIC the power to inspect police 
authorities for the purposes of Best Value. 
Through the duties and responsibilities under Best Value and also the 
general duty under the Police Act 1964 to secure the maintenance of an 
efficient and effective police force for its area, the police authority are in an 
ideal position to show leadership in encouraging a focus on the key 
challenges facing the police service and in ensuring the effective delivery of 
policing services to the public. This can be further enhanced as under this 
duty police authorities are required to consult users of its services. 
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The performance indicators of the Best Value review are geared 
towards assessing the value of provision through the four C's of Comparing 
the service, Consulting with the local community and relevant stakeholders, 
Competing to ensure that the authority receives a fair deal and Challenging 
the way the service is provided by working in partnership with other 
stakeholders from within the public, private and voluntary sector in order to 
secure an efficient and effective service. 
Both Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit 
Commission are involved in inspections and an implementation officer is put 
in place to ensure implementation of any recommendations from the reviews. 
Generally, each recommendation is budgeted and aligned to a performance 
indicator so that it can be measured. Milestones are set and anticipated 
efficiency gains and benefits are included in the plan which is audited at the 
post implementation review stage. An action manager is allocated for each 
recommendation and a target date is set for implementation. The 
implementation plans are monitored by the Police Authority Performance 
Scrutiny Committee and audited by HMIC. A Best Value steering group 
consisting of the police authority and police members has been established 
nationally to oversee the Best Value process. Its purpose is to advise, inform 
and make recommendations to the Police Authority Performance Scrutiny 
Committee and to The Strategy Team on the development of the Best Value 
approach, efficiency plans and delivery of continuous improvements in Quality 
of Life Policing. 
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Very few would doubt that the process of Best Value can act as an 
effective tool for transparency and accountability for the expenditure, 
processes and procedures adopted by public bodies. What is however 
unclear is the extent to which the reviews act as an effective method of 
accountability between police authorities and the police service; i. e. is the 
police authority able to place the police service under effective scrutiny as a 
result of the conducted reviews? This is a subject that I will return to in 
chapter 6 where I discuss Crime Data Recording in the Metropolitan Police 
Service. 
Accountability through financial resources 
Another important responsibility of the police authority is the power to 
plan and decide the constabulary's finance and overall budget (The Police 
and Magistrates' Courts Act, 1994: Section 27). The police authority receives 
approximately 85% of its funding via central government grants has the 
responsibility of holding the chief constable to account on how the budget is 
spent. 
The costing system that is used is known as Activity Based Costing 
(ABC). ABC focuses on the Borough Command Unit (BCU) focusing on the 
total cost of policing enabling comparisons to be made over time across police 
forces and between BCU. The benefit of this system is that it provides 
managers with a suite of information on Best Value processes, enables police 
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authorities and forces to identify how resources are being used and provides 
guidance on how to make efficiency improvements. At the heart of ABC is the 
promise that it increases accountability and identifies gaps between resource 
usage and priorities thus allowing better comparison between forces. From 
2003-04, ABC became a mandatory requirement of the National Policing 
Plan. 
Delivering the service that people want more cheaply and effectively 
may be seen as desirable. However, the need to ensure that the decision- 
making process reflects the wishes of people may be less definable in terms 
of cost and resource allocation. The priorities of effective service delivery and 
inclusive participatory decision-making appear to conflict. Lengthy decision- 
making processes, insistence on consulting as many people as possible, 
allowing minority interests to participate is democratic but may well undermine 
effectiveness (Jones et al, 1994). 
Complaints and Investigations 
Another important and powerful tool of accountability is the police 
authority's remit to investigate complaints against senior police officers and 
monitor overall complaints procedures against all police officers (The Police 
Act 1996, Sections, 67- 69). 
HMIC externally monitor police complaints performance. The focus of 
HMIC is on overall efficiency and effectiveness measured against national 
standards and priorities whilst police authority's measure performance against 
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their own local policing plans and also have an interest in complaints from a 
public accountability perspective especially in relation to complaints against 
senior officers. 
Whilst police authorities have certain statutory dutieS2 in relation to 
complaints, it appears that the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) is better placed than police authorities to undertake investigations. 
This is because of the four important components of the IPCC's guardianship 
role when dealing with complaints against police officers and staff. The first 
component is to monitor, review and inspect police force complaints systems, 
the second component is, promoting confidence in the complaints system as 
a whole, thirdly, ensuring the accessibility of the complaints system and 
finally, drawing lessons and promoting the role of the IPCC (IPCC, 2005) 
Jones et al. (1994) explain that the police like other public 
bureaucracies have very little real interest in being more efficient and cost 
effective because they are not incentivised in this way. According to Jones et 
al. (1994: 31), due to the monopolistic like nature of policing, the police are 
largely able to follow their own agenda due to a lack of external constraints. 
2 Keeping themselves Informed about complaint and discipline matters within their force; Provide the IPCC with the information and 
documentation to carry out its functions (including InspecHon); Ensure that the IPCC or person nominated by the IPCC has access to any 
police premises and material/documentation within those premises during the course of an Investigation; Ensure that the Investigating 
Officer carrying out the investigation Is given all the assistance that they may reasonably require; Refer complaints or misconduct matters 
to the IPCC, where the Chief Police Officer has decided not to; act as the 'appropriate authority' In the recording and Investigation of 
complaints and conduct matters against officers of ACPO rank. This Includes a statutory requirement to obtain and preserve evidence In 
such cases. 
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Their overriding objective as with other public bodies is to secure increasingly 
more resources from the government. Jones et al. (1994: 31) have stated that: 
4 not only have the police not moved on from their outdated 
management practices and models but police authorities have 
consistently adopted the police line that a decline in the service is 
primarily due to a lack of sufficient resources from central government. ' 
Evans, (1991: 12) has maintained that '-symptornatic of the monopoly 
culture there has been a deficit of innovation and no need for the police to 
maintain a competitive edge as seen in the private sector'. The highly 
debatable assumption of Evans is that the private sector is better than the 
public or indeed the voluntary sector. It is important to appreciate that Evans 
is writing for the right wing think tank the Adam Smith Institute. 
Increased accountability through Independent Custody Visiting (ICV) and 
Police Community Consultative Groups (CPCG 
Disturbances occurred in Liverpool, Birmingham, Sheffield, 
Nottingham, Hull and other cities in the UK. Scarman (1986) argued in the 
aftermath of the riots in Brixton and the high numbers of deaths in police 
custody that in order to strengthen local accountability a provision for random 
checks 'by persons other than police officers' were to be undertaken; these 
were Lay Visitors (1986: section 7.7,7.10). Scarman also recommended that 
a statutory duty should be imposed on police authorities to consult locally 
about policing priorities. In his report into the 1981 Brixton riots Lord Scarman 
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recommended the setting up of Police Community Consultative Groups 
(PCCG's - sometimes referred to as CPCG's) or liaison committees as a 
demonstrable structure for enhancing the accountability of the police. 
Scarman (1986: part V, 8.39) explained that police consultation with their local 
communities would not undermine police independence or have any negative 
impact on police secrecy. 
Police Community Consultative Groups (PCCG) were established 
under section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Both 
CPCG's and ICV's were set up specifically to facilitate harmonious police- 
community relations and to involve communities in discussions about their 
police service. Today, police services conduct consultations primarily through 
the Police Community Consultative groups (PCCG) or its interchangeable 
name Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCG). As discussed in 
chapter 3, when one speaks about consultation the question of representation 
is pertinent because. Communities need to feel that'their representatives are 
ordinary enough to represent them and extraordinary enough to be 
representatives of them' (Coleman, 2005: 5). The other problematic issue is 
that the participants wish to feel that they are a valued part of the process with 
the potential to affect change: however invariably, there is a feeling of 
alienation (Hoban: 2004). 
Along with the recommendation to set up Community Police 
Consultative Groups Scarman also recommended establishing Lay Visiting 
Panels (LVP) now renamed Independent Custody Visiting Panels (ICVP). 
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Section 51 of the Police Reform Act 2002 became effective Ist April 2003 
finally placing Independent Custody Visiting (formerly known as Lay Visiting 
on a statutory basis. ICV is a system where volunteers attend police stations 
to check on the treatment of detainees and the conditions in which they are 
held. The visits take place unannounced and as long as those conducting the 
visits have gone through the appropriate checks as outlined in the Joint 
Guidance of Association of Police Authorities (APA) and the home office 
(2002) they are permitted to inspect the overall conditions in the custody suite. 
For Scarman (1986) the independence and accountability of the police 
were critical elements for effective policing. Scarman shared a common belief 
that was shared with other writers like Marshall, G. (1967: 16,33-36) that 
neither politicians, pressure groups nor anyone else should be able to tell the 
police what decisions to take, how to employ their resources or whether to 
enforce the law or not in particular cases (Scarman, 1986). Scarman 
maintained that the exercise of police judgement had to be independent, he 
also emphasised the regulatory role of police authorities along with the 
consultative role of Police Community, Consultative Groups. Scarman 
emphasised that the police were subject to the law and needed to act 
appropriately within it, adding that as servants of the community they were 
enforcing laws on the community's behalf therefore accountability and 
effective consultation were the methods by which independence and 
accountability could and ought to be sustained (Scarman, 1986). 
An agreed or preferred method of consultation has never been 
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prescribed for police authorities; each authority decides on the process and 
method it feels is most appropriate. Despite the focal role CPCG's need to 
play in facilitating harmonious police relations they appear to be little more 
than discussion forums and as such lack any real powers and are unable to 
affect change in police authority or police service priorities. Similarly, police 
authority members and consultative group members appear to be too reliant 
on the information they receive from the police. Both groups are inclined to 
accept explanations provided by the police regarding their actions or lack of 
actions and they are likely to accept explanations of constraining factors on 
the police which may be due to inadequate resources, particular policy or 
political priorities affecting the ability of the police to provide a reasonable or 
effective service. Even if they disagreed vehemently there is very little that 
they can do and the perception is that the scrutiny by authority members and 
CPCG's is insufficient, ineffective and far from rigorous (Reiner, 1991 and 
1992; Jones and Newburn 1994). Jones et. al (1994) found that police 
authority members had a strong pro-police bias; whilst there is no suggestion 
that the only way to be rigorous is for police authority members and CPCG 
members to be consistently opposed to the police, what it does suggest is that 
the forum of the CPCG needs to be part of the authoritative process that 
enables change and not a forum whose views are predetermined. 
Accountability is also served through Independent Custody Visiting 
(ICV) administered by Independent Custody Visiting Panels (ICVP). 
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Both ICV and CPCG have historically been funded through the 
respective police authority with the exception of the Metropolitan Police 
Service area. Before the creation of the Metropolitan Police Authority in 2000 
by the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Metropolitan Police Service 
was directly answerable to the home secretary, rather than a police authority 
as other borough and county police forces were. With the creation of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority there was concern about the degree of 
autonomy Independent Custody Visiting Panels and Community Police 
Consultative Groups would have from the new police authority. Up until then 
ICVP's and CPCG's were answerable to the home secretary who had little 
real input or overview of the work being undertaken. 
The other important area of responsibility of the police authority is its 
remit to appoint chief police officers. This power is subject to the approval of 
the Home secretary and is covered by section 11 of the Police Act 1996. In 
practice, the police authority draws up a list of candidates in consultation with 
the home office. The Police Reform Act 2002 gave police authorities the 
power to dismiss chief police officers in the interests of efficiency or 
effectiveness and gave them more extensive powers to require resignation 
not just retirement. Reiner (1992: 237) found chief constables paid more 
attention to the home office than to local police authorities whom they 
regarded as the 'junior partners' Reiner also felt that the influence of chief 
constables had increased since the reconstitution of local authorities due to 
the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 because it made police 
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authorities independent of local government thus giving chief constables more 
powers at the expense of police authorities. 
Accountability through Representation 
During the Thatcher years 1979 - 1992 the idea that public services 
were inefficient and needed to adopt market based business models mirrored 
the private sector grew in credence. The Labour government from 1997 
adopted the principle of introducing the market into public service delivery 
through Public Private Partnerships (PPP) funded through Public Finance 
Initiative (PFI) schemes. As discussed above, this quickly led to the concepts 
of value for money and Best Value. Regulatory bodies like the Audit 
Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) were 
engaged with increased vigour to report and advice on police efficiency 
(Jones, 1991). The real reasoning behind this was that from the 1970s due to 
successive governments failing to deliver on their promises and being unable 
to cope with the rise in unemployment and the slowdown in the expansion of 
the British economy, the government was seen as being unable to cope and 
the system of government came in for questioning (Jones, 1991). Our 
system of policing was not exempt from this questioning and as a result 
accountability and transparency rose in their importance and in order to 
support the functionality of our service an additional tier of management and 
accountability was created in 1856 which involved a partnership between the 
police authority the Home secretary and chief constables: otherwise known as 
the tripartite system 
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By virtue of its unique responsibilities and powers, the act of policing 
can easily destabilise society. In order to operate efficiently the institutions of 
the state and in particular policing, require holistic acceptance, understanding 
and consent from the citizenry. Society, including its institutions, processes 
and procedures has consented to unite around certain core values enshrined 
not in a single written constitution as discussed earlier but in the hearts and 
minds of citizens reflected in statute, judicial pronouncements, common law 
and conventions thereby ensuring that the rules of engagement and methods 
of application are consistent within the parameters of that consent (Hobbes, 
1980; Locke, 1978; Rousseau, 1987; Norton, 1991). Given the delicate balancing 
act that must be struck, the home office is eager that police authorities play an 
increasingly high role in engaging with local communities and bringing citizens 
into the consultation process (Home Office, 2003). 
The involvement of the voluntary and community sectors in policing 
has also being realised and increased in priority through Crime & Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRP). The home office and the Association of 
Police Authorities (APA) have also set up a National Practitioner Panel (NPP) 
to develop a knowledge base in the area of consultation and citizen focus and 
to devise a strategy for disseminating good practice which involves pilots to 
test innovative ways of building dialogue with the public. 
Often a connection is made between accountability and demoqacy; 
the implication being that one begets the other and that a high level of 
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accountability infers a greater degree of democracy which will be reflected in 
increased political participation. This however does not necessarily follow. 
Scarman (1986) found that increased accountability did not automatically 
result in increased consultation and participation. The Maud committee (1964) 
also found no evidence to support the premise that local government with its 
multifaceted functions and layers of bureaucracy was anymore democratic. 
The Maud committee looked at election polls and the extent to which 
the public individually or through various associations were drawn into 
involvement and found that the system of local government (at that time) was 
obsolete and only relevant when local government provided limited services. 
From Maud, a model was developed and used in local government which 
enabled greater accountability coupled with effective control. Under this model 
members collectively controlled officers and were politically responsible and 
accountable to the public. Members also had the responsibility to be selective 
and take decisions by committee in regards to the work and agreed direction 
of the authority. They were responsible for reviewing progress and reporting 
back on issues of concern or interest and officers were responsible for the day 
to day administration of the authority. This division of labour emphasised that 
members should be more concerned with outputs, whilst officer's primary 
concern ought to be with inputs and the process. The Maud committee also 
recommended that there should be open public meetings where members of 
the public could meet with authority members. 
All public authorities - including police authorities - adopted this 
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approach and it is now interwoven into the way they undertake their work and 
engage with their primary and secondary stakeholders. The Metropolitan 
Police Authority (MPA) for example, has regular rotated monthly meetings in 
the 33 boroughs of London. These meetings provide the public with the 
opportunity to meet and discuss issues of concern in the local borough. 
Generally, the borough commander or another senior officer will attend and 
representation will be sought by the MPA from the Community Police 
Consultative Group and the Independent Custody Visiting Panel along with 
other voluntary and community groups from within the borough. 
Attendance at these meetings tends to be poor and unrepresentative of 
the local community. The fundamental issue of accountability remains one of 
whether the citizen sees the police authority as a sufficiently robust institution 
to bring the police to account and whether police authorities - who occupy a 
pivotal position of influence - can influence the police. 
Accountability through mergers 
Following HMIC's 'Closing the Gap' (2005) report, the former Home 
Secretary Right Honourable Charles Clarke MP asked police authorities and 
forces to develop proposals for merging their police forces. Police authorities 
across England and Wales rejected the home secretary's request to commit 
to voluntary mergers and made it clear on 7 th December 2005 that they were 
not prepared to meet the home secretary's deadline of 23rd December 2005. 
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As the 23d December deadline approached, no police authority or 
police service had submitted a business case despite a government offer of 
financial incentives to those who agreed to the mergers. A further incentive 
was presented which was that the extra money would be found by taking 
funds away from those police authorities who were not prepared to agree to 
mergers by 23 rd December 2005 (Home Office, Sept 22nd 2005). 
On 22nd September 2005 the Association of Police Authorities 
reiterated its demands for assurances from the government on how the new 
arrangements would be funded and on local accountability and timescales 
before it would advise police authorities to consider voluntary mergers. In a 
press release issued by the Association of Police Authorities, its Chairman 
Bob Jones said: 
'No police authorities have submitted full business cases to the home 
office. Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP's offer of financial inducements to 
police authorities that agree before Christmas to voluntary mergers was 
an attempt to divide and rule... ' 'Police authorities have unanimously 
rejected the Home secretary's plans to force these proposals through with 
indecent haste, and we believe there are also credible alternative options 
which should be considered very seriously... ' (APA: 2005). 
There are of course other occasions where there is consensus 
amongst the members of the tripartite system and the citizen is discontent and 
at odds with the decisions taken. For example, the police response during the 
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May Day disputes in London in 2002 - and most recently in 2009 - saw huge 
crowds of protestors blockaded on London streets and prevented from 
dispersing -a technique known as kettling. The Metropolitan Police Authority 
fully supported the police service and the police actions of containing the 
crowds in an attempt to prevent further disturbances as witnessed in previous 
years (MPA, 49/02). Members of the Metropolitan Police Authority (had been 
embedded with the Metropolitan Police in Scotland Yard viewing the activities 
on the day on CCTV. In the subsequent MPA meeting after the event it was 
clear that there was disquiet from members of the public about the tactics the 
police had used; there was however much praise for the police by the chair of 
the police authority Lord Toby Harris. A similar situation occurred again in 
September 2004 during the pro-fox hunting demonstrations outside the 
Houses of Parliament. Police officers were witnessed beating demonstrators 
with their batons in an attempt to disperse the crowds: in the following 
meeting the MPA supported the methods of the police service despite a) 
members of the public and the media showing discomfort with the treatment 
handed out and b) despite police guidelines which strictly forbade officers 
striking individuals on the head with batons. As a result of continuing events of 
this nature the IPPC is now investigating a series of complaints as a result of 
alleged police brutality during the anti-capitalist rally in 2009. 
For Jones et al. (1997) there is a palpable inability by police authorities 
to be effective instruments of accountability outside the explanatory and 
cooperative forms, and on subtle and controversial issues they see police 
authorities as falling short of the expected mark. 
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Police authority members and committees 
Police authorities are free-standing bodies, independent and separate 
from local councils. As outlined in chapter 4 police authorities generally have 
17 members -9 are councillors, 3 are magistrates and 5 are independent 
members. 
The home secretary may increase the size of the police authority if 
appropriate but councillor members must always comprise a majority of one. 
Appointment of members 
* Members are appointed for a term of four years. 
* Councillor members are appointed by the relevant council, or where 
there is more than one council in the police authority area they are 
appointed by a joint committee of the relevant councils. 
* Appointments must ensure, as far as practicable, that political parties 
are represented on the police authority in order to reflect the proportion 
of their members on the council. The Metropolitan Police Authority has 
twelve members of the Greater London Assembly who have party 
political allegiances and are appointed by the Mayor. 
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Magistrate members are appointed by the local magistrate's panel or 
Magistrates' Courts Committee. 
Independent members are appointed by a process which involves a 
selection panel consisting of the home secretary and the councillor and 
magistrate members of the authority (Home Office, 2004). 
Police authorities usually hold full authority meetings once a month. In 
attendance at these full authority meetings will be the chief constable 
/commissioner, members of the police authority, the public and the press. As 
well as participating in full police authority meetings, members of police 
authorities work through a number of separate committees that contribute to 
providing an efficient police service. These committees fulfil an advisory role 
and whilst some committees meet in private, the vast majority report to the full 
police authority, covering important areas of constabulary management and 
the authority's legal responsibilities. 
Payment for members 
The Scheme for the payment of member's allowances is made in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 107 of the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001. 
Table 5: 1 
Basic and special responsibility allowances 
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Position Payment 
Authority member E10,200 
Chairman E, 15,960 
Deputy Chairman E6,792 (Extra) 
Chairmen of committees (and Audit), E 5,640 (Extra) 
Community Engagement and Corporate 
Policy, Performance and Review 
Committees 
Chairmen of Complaints and F- 2,832 (Extra) 
Professional Standards and Standards 
Committee* and the Health and Safety 
Board 
Source: greater Manchester Police Authority website 27 Ih August 2007 
There are variations between police authorities in the way they adopt 
and implement payment schemes. Within its scheme the MPA makes an 
additional distinction to that expressed in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 
2001. Under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, those Greater London 
Assembly members appointed to the MPA are disbarred from claiming an 
allowance in respect of their membership of the MPA as they already draw a 
salary from the Greater London Authority. These members can however, 
claim travel and subsistence expenses. Independent and Magistrate members 
are however, eligible to claim both an allowance, travel and subsistence 
expenses. From 1st June 2005, the basic allowance payable to all 
Independent and Magistrate members of the MPA in the financial year 
2005/06 was as follows; 
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Table 5: 2 
Basic and Special Responsibility Allowances 
L. Position I Payment 
Independent & Magistrate member F- 17,154 
Chairman payable in addition to the basic 
allowance: 
E17,772 
Deputy Chairman E6,792 
Deputy Chairs of the Authority, Chairs of 
main committees and members with 
responsibilities for agreed portfolios 
E3,463 
Source: MPA Website Is'April 2005 
Very little is known about the make up of police authority members 
nationally or the role local communities play in the nomination of 
representatives. Most people are unaware of their police authority let alone 
who the police authority member is and due to the nomination process not 
being promoted significantly in local areas the degree to which they can be 
said to speak on behalf of various communities is questionable-, as a result the 
question of who is actually being represented is a contentious one. 
It would appear that the overarching criticism of police accountability is 
that despite the very clear duty of the police authority to secure an adequate 
and efficient police force for an area it is still unclear who is ultimately 
responsible for policing (Jones, 1994). For Loveday and Reid (2003) the key 
ingredients of accountability are the power to appoint and dismiss chief 
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constables as well as the ability to set and determine the force's budget. For 
Loveday and Reid (2003: 58) further accountability can be realised by 
introducing elections for all police authority members as they believe this 
would give the police authority a visibility and legitimacy it currently lacks and 
would give local people an opportunity to get personally involved. For 
Loveday and Reid, (2003: 59) directly electing the police authority chairman 
supported by a panel of appointees consisting of local councillors and HMIC 
experts is a preferable way forward. The advantage of this is that it would 
create high visibility, a focus for local accountability and would be based 
around existing structures. 
Police authorities have been criticised for being out of touch 
unrepresentative bodies that need to be more relevant and accountable to the 
citizen. In his Manchester speech 'Respect for Others' (February: 2005), the 
former conservative party leader Michael Howard unveiled plans to scrap 
remote and unaccountable police authorities and replace them with directly 
elected local police commissioners. Mr Howard insisted that elected 
commissioners would improve accountability and allow the citizen a far 
greater ability than they currently had to influence the type of policing and 
police priorities in their local area. The net result of this according to Michael 
Howard would be that communities would be better able to hold chief 
constables to account, the new commissioners would have the powers which 
existing police authorities currently had and police commissioners would be 
created in 42 of the 43 police force areas, while in London the Metropolitan 
Police force would be accountable to the elected Mayor of London who would 
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assume the responsibilities of the Metropolitan Police Authority and the 
appointment of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner would continue to 
remain the responsibility of the home secretary. 
Mr Howard explained that the police were more formally accountable 
than they had ever been; the trouble however was that they were accountable 
to quango's and bureaucrat's instead of local communities. The citizen was 
separated from the police by a wall of bureaucracy and political correctness; 
his new approach would provide real local accountability through police 
commissioners being visible and elected. These tangible changes with direct 
accountability appear to be Michael Howard's attempt to sure up the social 
contract. Loveday & Reid (2003: 59-60) whilst not arguing for directly elected 
commissioners go much further arguing for the police to be more directly 
accountable to mayors and council leaders. They argue that chief constables 
and commissioners should be put on short term contracts and be subject to 
being dismissed by the mayor or council leader. These and other measures 
would in their opinion significantly increase police accountability and provide a 
more desirable service to the citizen; doing this would however overtly 
politicise the police service in a way that many would see as undesirable. The 
evidence from my research (see chapters 6 and 7) does not support the 
assertion expressed by Michael Howard that directly elected commissioners 
would be beneficial in creating more accountability. 
Whilst there are police consultative groups which do offer an 
opportunity for accountability through discussion and debate; these groups 
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are unrepresentative and there is little evidence of their impact or holistic 
effect on policing policies. In practice, local people do not have the opportunity 
to really influence local policing either through the police authority or through 
consultative groups because the perception is that the police service is 
accused of merely informing the police authority after the event and the police 
authority itself appears to essentially inform the community of what has or is 
taking place (Day & Klein, 1987; Marshall, 1978; Reiner, 2000). Whilst there 
may be opportunities for debate, most interactions between the police 
authority and local communities appear to serve the function of justifying the 
position of the police service and supporting the general thrust of police 
action. 
Conclusion 
The tools at the disposal of the police are considerable and can be 
used in a very direct and physically imposing way. The police are one of the 
many institutions that play an important role in upholding, sustaining and 
reaffirming society's protocols, behaviour and our obligations to each other 
and to the state. The uniqueness of policing above all other institutions is that 
we have thrust upon the police the potentialy limitless and timeless power to 
act in a physically repressive way to preserve property and life. At the very 
minimum, the police service has our tacit consent to physically coerce citizens 
by detention and restraint when our systems or agreed protocols are 
challenged or placed under extreme levels of strain. The institution of policing 
is the ultimate physical buffer and the last standing ground that prevents a 
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complete breakdown of our civilisation and its values. Ironically, because as 
citizens we have given this power away, it is questionable whether we can 
easily demand it back. 
In some limited way I think we can demand it back, not through 
emasculating the police but by working in partnership with police authorities 
as responsible authoritieS3 (Jones & Newburn, 1997). In theory, police 
authorities provide us with a tier of control, regulation and accountability and 
give us the opportunity to roll back the powers of the institution of policing. 
Scarman (1981), however, was of the opinion that we could not seize this 
power back, but he believed that we could significantly influence it by ensuring 
that the police were independent, accountable and that there was consent 
and balance between the responsibility to prevent crime, protect life and 
property and the preservation of public tranquillity. 
The police authority's ability to bring the police to account is also 
potentially hampered by the combination of it being at once, part of the 
system of policing and also being required to monitor that service and hold it 
to account. As similarly reflected by Flinders (2002: 2), who found that the 
relationship between parliament and the executive with its dual role was 
largely ineffective. The relationship between the police service and police 
authority is in some respects a relation between collaborators rather than one 
between a service provider and a regulator. Whilst I accept that collaboration 
3 The definition of responsible authorities represented a levelling of the field as police authorities 
became responsible authorities under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
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is essential for effective policing, the difficulty appears when scrutiny and 
accountability are being sought. 
On consent and balance, Scarman asserted that the police 
responsibility to prevent crime, protect life and property and the preservation 
of public tranquillity warranted the use of particular skills which emanate from 
the conflict which inevitably arises between the duty of the police to maintain 
'the Queen's Peace' (maintaining law and order) whilst at the same time 
enforcing the law. Scarman (1981) noted that the priority of keeping the 
Queen's Peace had long been accepted by the police as requiring higher 
prioritising than enforcing the law. Scarman brought forward another idea that 
he saw as been central to common sense policing. At the heart of effective 
balanced and consensual policing is the requirement for the police to use 
discretion. For Scarman crime and public disorder were aberrations from 
normality, law enforcement therefore had the potential of putting tranquillity at 
risk if it were enforced to the exclusion of other sensitivities - which in the long 
term is counterproductive. Police discretion therefore ought to be utilised as 
the central tool in the police armoury which in turn contributes to maintaining 
harmony, rather than enforcing law and order at the expense of harmony and 
tranquillity. 
Police are accountable through the law and although there is no direct 
evidenced link between accountability and representation, for Scarman, the 
only way to establish a link is through setting up a liaison committee 
(Scarman, 1986: 5.58,5.61). Day & Klein (1987: 6) maintain that political 
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accountability began with the division of civic labour where individuals were 
charged with carrying out activities for their fellow citizens. This responsibility 
was not a personal one and as such carried no individual or personal 
guarantee or commitment. This delegation of responsibility gives rise to the 
need for political and institutional accountability which in turn ought to give 
rise to accountability through representation. 
I am interested in who or what defines the scope of accountability and 
discretion and what issues can or cannot be discussed in the open. Who sets 
the parameters for judging performance because at present performance is 
set and monitored against the police's own plans? Surely accountability ought 
to be more than a responsibility, commitment or obligation to explain. 
Accountability is in my view inextricably linked to -hierarchy; it is about 
answering in relation to delegated powers or functions. It is the possibility that 
these powers and responsibilities can be revoked if the answers or responses 
are deemed insufficient. This is what Mulgan (2003: 30) refers to as 
'rectification' and Keohane (2002: 479) calls 'the ability to impose a cost'. As 
stated previously accountability is linked to obligation and the responsibility of 
all parties to source representation and participation (Day and Klein, 1987, 
Jenkins and Goetz, 1999; and Mulgan, 2003). 
The discussion of police authorities as threatened, undermined or 
sidelined leaves one uncertain about the real role and influence they have. It 
would appear that police authorities are primarily bureaucratic institutions 
having a procedural and process relevance but in reality having little ability to 
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alter or define key issues that directly impact on them or their locality. 
However, if one looks at the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 and the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, there is provision within the acts to ensure that 
police authorities are stronger when they work together as responsible 
authorities (Jones and Newburn, 1997). Police authorities have an arsenal of 
resources that they can draw upon and it is not that they have insufficient 
powers that is limiting their effectiveness but police authorities undervalue 
themselves and are unaware of their real powers (Jones et al, 1994: 56). 
Where confidence and trust are concerned the public is satisfied that 
the police are controlled by an independent body (Audit Commission, 2002: 
9). In Policing after the Act (1997) Jones and Newburn's research found that 
police authority clerks expressed that as a result of the Police and Magistrates 
Courts Act 1994 they were operating in a more business like way. Smaller 
authorities conducted most of their business in full authority meetings and less 
in committees whilst the larger police authorities did the opposite. The 
meetings in the smaller authorities were mainly concerned with the police 
authority's business as opposed to the business of scrutiny and 
accountability. This is significant because it highlights that the size of a police 
authority is a defining factor in whether scrutiny and accountability are of a 
higher priority than managerial expediency. The researchers also found that 
the introduction of policing plans added another interesting dimension to the 
equation because policing plans required increased monitoring on a local 
basis. However, police authorities were increasingly preoccupied and 
focussed on managerial and organisational issues rather than the strategic 
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policy issues governing local policing. The researchers concluded that there 
was a move towards a calculative and contractual accountability as opposed 
to accountability based on explanation and cooperation. 
True accountability is about knowing the questions that need to be 
asked and ensuring that within the structure of the system there is sufficient 
information, checks, balances and power to support and enhance that ability. 
There needs to be a wider understanding of what the strategic areas of police 
authority controls are, the varied levels of accountability and the mechanisms 
for halting or changing a course of action. Boaden (1982) offers a convenient 
opt out by stating that it is easy to develop a greater degree of accountability, 
representation and democracy in smaller communities. Maybe he is correct 
and the level of accountability we are expecting from our larger institutions in 
larger communities is unrealistic. I conclude, however, that even if what we 
are seeking is unrealistic, it may be worth striving to achieve as much equity, 
accountability and transparency as possible. 
Accountability should run through the bloodstream of the whole body of 
a police service and it is at least as much a matter of the culture and ethos of 
the service as it is of the institutional mechanisms which allow it to take place. 
All the mechanisms and procedures are worthless if the culture works against 
openness. Essentially if the police refuse to be fully accountable does the 
police authority have the ability to force through and demand that 
accountability? 
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In chapter 41 discussed the role of the Police Act 1964 and discussed 
how it further defined police authorities and their relationship to chief 
constables and the home secretary. I discussed some of the inherent 
problems with the act, for example, it provided little actual leverage for police 
authorities because the only statutory duty that the act placed on the chief 
constable in relation to his police authority was the requirement to submit an 
annual report - after the event - in which the police would explain the policies 
they had followed or actions they had taken (Marshall, 1978; Reiner, 2000). 
This explanatory accountability was for Elock (1991) fundamentally flawed. 
Moreover, through the act police authorities had no powers to instruct chief 
constables to change or amend policies presented to them. In addition, due to 
operational independence the police are not answerable to anyone because 
no one could tell them what to do. I also discussed the transforming effects of 
the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 which made police authorities 
independent of local government and the further levelling of the field as police 
authorities became responsible authorities under the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998. 
Given these and other legislative changes, their implications and the 
ongoing polarised debate regarding the strategic and operational 
responsibility of police authorities and the police service, I am interested in the 
impact of all this on the police authority's mandate of enhancing accountability 
and facilitating increased representation and ensuring that the service 
provided is driven and supported by the government and the community in 
partnership. 
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In the forthcoming chapters I will be exploring the perception of police 
authority members, and attempting to demystify the police authority, whilst 
assessing the degree to which police authorities have engaged with their 
communities and looking at whether there has been any tangible impact on 
local participation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POLICE AUTHORITY: 
INTERVIEW AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
Interview and questionnaire results 
There are 760 police authority members in the 43 police authorities in 
the United Kingdom. In November and December 2007 1 sent questionnaire 
surveys to all police authority members and initially had 81 returned and 
completed. In January 2008 1 resent a further 200 questionnaires to police 
authority members and received a further 27 completed questionnaires 
totaling 108 (14.2%). New empirical ground has been covered by this 
research as the literature reveals no similar survey which has focused on 
police authority members has been undertaken. I received questionnaire 
responses from 14% of police authority members and I conducted 23 in-depth 
interviews with specific individuals who are significant gatekeepers between 
the community, the police service and the police authority. My 25 interviewees 
included 17 interviews with police authority members, the former Home 
Secretary - the Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP- the Chairman of the Association of 
Police Authorities, the Executive Director of the Association of Police 
Authorities, the Policy Officer of the Association of Police Authorities, the 
Clerk to the Metropolitan Police Authority, a former chief constable and a very 
senior grade 5 civil servant. The identity of a senior Civil Servant has been 
withheld due to the sensitivity of the comments they made. 
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Between 1964 and 1994 there has been a small body of work on 
police authorities (Jones & Newburn; 1994,1997; Brogden; 1977; Reiner, 
1991). In the last decade however, the research undertaken for this thesis is 
the most recent academic work on police authorities and the only academic 
work to look at the role of police authorities in the context of citizenship and 
accountability. What I have sought to do through this thesis is to add to the 
existing body of work on police authorities and to explore ideas and thoughts 
around the following: 
a) The relevancy of police authorities, their potential and their 
actual impact, 
b) The role of police authorities in relation to the citizen, the 
police service and accountability. 
C) The views of police authority members on how they perceive 
their role and the role of the police authority. 
As mentioned above, the total number of respondents that returned 
completed questionnaires was 108. However, the total number of responses 
for each question varies considerably as some respondents provided multiple 
answers to some questions. As I stated in chapter 2, this was a very small 
research sample and there are limitations to the extent that the results from 
this research can be extrapolated and applied more widely. The results of my 
research are as follows. 
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Ultimate responsibility for policing 
This research has shown that 68 out of the 126 (54%) responses by 
police authority members to the question of responsibility accepted that the 
police authority was ultimately responsible for policing in their area and as far 
as responsibility was concerned they ranked the police service and the home 
office in second (29) and third (21) place respectively (Fig. 6: 1). 
Figure. 6: 1 
Who is ultimately responsible for policing? 
68 
29 
21 
11 
Home office Police Ser\Ace 
35 
Police Tripartite Other 
Authority 
The question of 'who is ultimately responsible for policing' was - in 
effect -a statement of duty rather than legal responsibility. Whilst members 
accepted that responsibility for policing ultimately lay with them as police 
authority members, further analysis of the responses reveals a clear 
disconnection between the perceived balance of responsibility (Fig. 6: 1), the 
I 
right to make final decisions in disputes (Fig. 6: 2), and the perceived 
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possession of power (Fig. 6: 3). Responses to Figure. 6: 3 show that whilst 
members felt the police authority had the least power within the tripartite 
system, they perceived that it had the most responsibility. This viewpoint was 
further reinforced when members responded to the question: 'who they 
thought had the final decision in disputes? " (Fig. 6: 2). The overwhelming view 
was that the home secretary clearly had the final decision. In-depth interviews 
with police authority members shed further interesting light on this issue. Mr. 
Chris Drew an independent member of Llandudno Police Authority forcibly 
emphasised during the interview that wherever the power and final decision 
lay, it was most definitely not with the police authority. He explained: 
'... I sometimes ask in a meeting - and publicly - if we vote against this 
[action, policy or direction] what will happen? and the answer is that it 
will go ahead anyway! ' 
In contrast to the view of Chris Drew, Gary Bell (Councillor member of 
Lancashire Police Authority) believed that if there was a way to block a policy 
or plan of action that members felt would have an adverse effect on 
communities they could - if they so desired - find a way of blocking it. Colin 
Mann (Councillor member of Gwent Police Authority) said that there were 
times when it was clear that the chief constable felt that he had to pursue a 
particular operational measure and would do so regardless of opposition from 
the police authority. During this interview Councillor Mann explained that 
whilst the police authority is not involved in the day to day operational 
management of budgets, it has an overall responsibility to look at 
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departmental budgets. He went on to explain that the absolute overall control 
that the police authority can exert is in setting the precept. For example, in the 
2008 settlement the Gwent chief constable wanted a 5% increase in the 
precept. The police authority however rejected this and set the precept at 
4.5%. Whilst this was not necessarily an example of a dispute, it was 
evidence of how the police authority could effectively use its power and 
influence to go against the wishes of the chief constable. Colin Mann (Gwent 
Police Authority) went on to add that the police authority has the power to 
dismiss the chief constable and this is a very powerful tool to have (in reality 
the police authority can recommend that the Chief Constable is dismissed but 
the ultimate decision remains with the Home Secretary. As I conclude in my 
final chapter, having the power to do things is only part of the jigsaw. 
Figure. 6: 2 
In disputes who has the final decision? 
Fig. 6: 2 shows that the vast majority of my sample show of police 
authority members believe that the home secretary has the final decision in 
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disputes. Fig. 6: 3 also provides contemporary support to the position 
expounded by Reiner (1991) that the home secretary and chief constable hold 
the balance of power. Reiner (1991) observed that during the dispute over the 
purchase of plastic bullets and CS gas in Northumbria, the chief constable got 
his way primarily because the police authority could only exercise influence as 
long as the chief constable and the home office permitted the police authority 
to do so. Even though the police authority appealed against the original 
decision, the Court of Appeal rejected their appeal on the grounds that the 
home secretary had powers under the Royal Prerogative to do what he felt 
was necessary in order to keep the Queen's Peace (Reiner, 1992: 240). 
According to Reiner (2000: 189) and Brogden (1977) in cases of real conflict 
between a chief constable and his police authority not only would the chief 
constable always prevail but the police authority would defer to the expertise 
of the chief. 
Figure. 6: 3 
Where does the balance of power reside? 
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In relation to the tripartite system, the questionnaire asked where 
police authority members thought the balance of power rested. The results 
are interesting because even though Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) sits 
outside the formal tripartite system arrangement, thirteen police authority 
members felt that HIVIT wielded sufficient power and in fact had more power 
than the police authority and came close to the power and influence of the 
chief constable (Fig. 6: 3). During our in-depth interview, Councillor Michael 
Ash (Cumbria Police Authority) explained that those members who saw the 
Treasury as an important power base did not quite understand how public 
finances worked. He explained that the balance of power was - in his opinion 
- tilted in favour of the home office. Interestingly, he also cited that the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) potentially wielded more power 
than the police authority or the police authority's representative organisation 
the Association of Police Authorities (APA). 
On the question of the balance of power, one police authority member 
explained: 
'[the balance of power] is at different places on different things, Budget 
largely lies with the mayor, legislation and regulation lies with the home 
office and operational policing lies with the commissioner... the police 
authority provides the consistencey that does not exist with the other 
tripartite members; the rest influence and exert power at particular 
times, we [the police authority] are the thread that runs through, we are 
not only involved sporadicaly but we are there side-by-side throughout 
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and have the input on recruitment, discipline and setting objectives'. 
(Cindy Butts - MPA). 
Closer analysis of Fig. 6: 3 suggests that there is a lack of 
understanding by a large number of police authority members of the full 
responsibility and powers to affect change that they - through the police 
authority - have, particularly budgetary powers. Fig. 6: 1 reflects that police 
authority members accept their responsibility: however, the collective 
responses between figures 1,2, and 3 suggest that much more needs to be 
done to train and re-skill members. This concurs with the views of Catherine 
Crawford (Clerk of the Metropolitan Police Authority) who explained during our 
interview that because the police authority receives the funds and is 
responsible for the budget, it is crucially important for members to understand 
fully the budget and the impact it has on policing. 
Operational and strategic responsibility 
Interviewees expressed a variety of views on the issue of operational 
and strategic responsibilities. Karim Murji, independent member of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority, explained that whilst it could be argued that 
historically there were operational and strategic roles, there never has been 
and there is still no clear distinction between activities deemed to be strategic 
and those purporting to be operational and furthermore, legally, the distinction 
does not stand up. For Lord Harris (Independent member and former chair of 
the Metropolitan Police Authority): 
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'... Some issues are strategic in that they have a wide ranging impact; 
but it all blurs into one and drawing a hard and fast line was never 
helpful. As a police authority we ought to be able to take a view on all 
things rather than be preoccupied on whether it is an operational or 
strategic issue. ' 
Perry Nove, the former Commissioner for the City of London Police, 
saw no distinction between operational policing and strategic policing. He 
argued that before implementation, all decisions are strategic then as they are 
implemented they become operational. Catherine Crawford (Metropolitan 
Police Authority Clerk) explained that people were drawn into defining 
operational independence but as one could not fully define it '... it is better to 
have a loose definition behind which police officers cannot hide'. Catherine 
Crawford explained that the benefits of applying a wider definition included 
that the police authority would not be restricted when looking into and 
reviewing police activity, whilst a narrower definition rather than making it 
more robust, could emasculate the police authority and reduce the scope of 
the scrutiny function of the authority. It is possible that the fear of 
transgressing into areas that could be defined as operational has already 
paralysed some police authorities and is what led Jones and Newburn (1997) 
to conclude that many police authorities narrowly interpreted their role and 
failed to effectively use the powers they had. 
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The former Home Secretary Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP interestingly 
saw the balance of power as primarily residing with the chief constable and 
saw that the onus was on the police authority to find a way to work with the 
chief of police whom he saw as controlling operational policing. Jones et. al 
(1994: 27) believed that there was an intention to cloud the decision-making 
process through unclear roles and responsibilities. Reiner (1993) noted that 
over time there had been a detrimental shift of power away from police 
authorities to chief constables. Chris Drew (independent member of 
Llandudno Police Authority) felt that the relationship was '... more about 
influence rather than power' which suggested that far from the 'self limiting' 
description of Jones, Newburn and Smith (1994: 62), the police authority was 
able to exercise its influence through a more complex process of negotiation 
rather than through the overt display of power. Even those interviewees like 
David Rogers (Sussex Police Authority), who thought the police authority was 
not as effective as it could be or other members like Chris Drew (Llandudno 
Police Authority) who felt that the police authority would be unable to push 
through things that the chief constable or the home secretary did not support, 
agreed that the authority could exercise its influence through negotiation 
rather than through the overt display of power. Furthermore, and 
unsurprisingly, those who I interviewed accepted that the ability to influence 
was a more potent tool in the armoury of the police authority than the actual 
use of sanctions. 
According to Councillor David Rogers OBE (Sussex Police Authority) 
'the home office consistently tries to tip the balance in its own favour but the 
231 
police authority's role is to remind them [the home office] that the local view is 
of crucial importance. ' 
Training 
Whilst 96 members had received regular training (Fig. 6: 4), 38 
members (Fig. 6: 5) thought that the training they had received was insufficient 
for the tasks they were expected to undertake: four members were unsure of 
its usefulness, whilst 25 respondents thought the training was sufficient. 
Figure-6: 4 
Do you (police authority members) have regular training and briefing 
days? 
96 
13 
yes no 
232 
Figure. 6: 5 
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Figure. 6: 6 
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Is the tripartite system relevant? 
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majority of police authority members - 81 out of 94 - agreed that 
,e system was still relevant (Fig. 6: 6). Karim Murji (independent 
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member of the Metropolitan Police Authority) explained that '... whilst the 
structure is a tripartite one it is not a tripartite relationship because the three 
legs of it are not equal and have never been so'. Mr Murji explained that the 
relationship has in reality been a bipartite one between chief constables and 
the home office with the home office being the dominant player setting the 
precept' and controlling the overall strategic direction of the police service. As 
I discussed in chapter 3, according to Fred Twine (1994), where there are 
three supportive pillars in any structure, each pillar plays a key role in 
ensuring the equilibrium and the stability of the structure. If the tripartite 
system operates in a bipartite way - as described by Karim Murji - or if the 
role of the authority is diminished (Jones and Newburn, 1994; Loveday, 2005; 
Reiner, 1992) a structural problem arises which potentially challenges the 
stability of the whole system. In this context, and with the knowlwdge of the 
police authority as the third leg providing a scrutiny and an accountability role, 
we should not understate or undersestimate the important function it plays in 
nurturing and supporting community cohesion, by encouraging local 
involvement. 
I The precept is set by the police authority in consultation with the chief constable or in 
the case of London, the commissioner. 
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Figure. 6: 7 
The position of the police authority within the tripartite structure is? 
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The responses were evenly balanced between those members who saw 
the police authority as subservient (35) or equal (35) within the tripartite 
system. However, 48 members saw police authorities as being neither 
subservient nor equal but as playing a different and complementary role. 
Despite this, there has been a consistent ambiguity about the roles of 
the members of the tripartite system. Catherine Crawford (Clerk of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority) acknowledged that the relationship within the 
tripartite system was indeed ambiguous and was made even more confusing 
because the parameters of the operation of the tripartite partners had not 
been set out clearly in any single document. Catherine Crawford cited the 
Patten Report (1999) on the setting up of the Northern Ireland Policing Board 
which looked at the relationship with the policing board (police authority) as 
the most comprehensive and useful document so far produced as it provided 
what she described as 'a hitherto unrealised clarity on the role of the three 
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partners'. Fionnuala Gill (Executive Director of the Association of Police 
Authorities) also acknowledged that if the Patten Report were applied to 
England and Wales, it would reduce any confusion and provide clarity of roles 
and responsibilities between the members of the tripartite system. 
Rachael Whittaker, (Magistrate member of the Metropolitan Police 
Authority) effectively summed up the inherent confusion between the police 
authority, the chief constable and the home office. 
'the home office have a role to play but they do not know what role they 
want to play, they fail to understand democracy and democratic 
accountability, they are overly prescriptive as shown during the 
proposed merger2. The home office has too many low level people 
ticking boxes and there is a lack of joined up thinking... ' (Rachael 
Whittaker, Magistrate member of the Metropolitan Police Authority). 
2 In 2006 the Home Secretary Charles Clarke proposed a number of changes to the police 
service. A then significant part of the reform agenda involved the merging of the police 
service from 43 to 12 police areas. 
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Figure. 6: 8 
Within the tripartite system is the police authority proactive or reactive? 
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On the question of whether members thought their police authority was 
proactive or reactive, Fig. 6: 8 shows that over 81 of the 157 responses 
indicated their belief that the police authority was more reactive than 
proactive. 
Lord Harris (independent member of the Metropolitan Police Authority) 
saw the police authority as primarily a proactive body; setting the agenda, the 
tone and actively pursuing issues. Lord Harris believed that in order to 
effectively fulfill its role police authorities had to be proactive. ClIr David 
Rogers (Sussex Police Authority) explained that as a police authority Sussex 
tried to be proactive but '... at the end of the day we are lay people and are not 
involved 24 hours a day, seven days a week'. Mr Chris Drew (1-lancludno 
Police Authority) also echoed this and saw his police authority as more 
reactive than proactive. '... there is a degree of inevitability because just in 
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terms of energy and resources there is a squad of people [police and civil 
staff] paid and working fulltime... this is where the power lies'. 
Figure. 6: 9 
Who is responsible for investigating complaints against senior police officers? 
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Figure. 6: 1 0 
Is this responsibility compatible with the strategic role of the police 
authority? 
75 
yes 
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no 
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16 
unsure 
Fig. 6: 9 shows the complexity of police authority members 
understanding of who is responsible for investigating complaints against 
senior police officers. Seventy five members (Fig. 6: 1 0) see a clear fit with the 
authority's strategic role and its responsibilities for overseeing complaints 
against senior officers - an area that has huge operational implications. It 
does however appear contradictory that in Fig. 6: 7,35 respondents saw the 
police authority as subservient yet 75 responses received in Fig. 6: 1 0 reflected 
an understanding and acceptance of the police authority's pivotal role of 
overseeing complaints against senior officers. The apparent contradiction is 
brought into sharp focus when one considers that overseeing complaints 
against senior officers could not be effectively undertaken by a subservient 
body; ergo, the police authority cannot be as subservient as some would 
conclude unless the process of complaints is not as transparent as we 
assume it is, or the police authority members are too sympathetic to the police 
service to offer any real challenge. Simultaneously, 75 respondents (Fig. 6: 10) 
saw the responsibility of overseeing complaints of senior officers as being fully 
compatible with the overall role of police authorities. It is therefore highly 
probable that members do not see themselves or the police authority as being 
as powerless or as subservient as suggested in figures 6: 1,6: 2 or 6: 3 and in 
relation to Fig. 6: 8. The police authority is capable of being assertive when 
necessary. 
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Figure. 6: 1 1 
Who do members represent? 
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Eighty four members (Fig. 6: 1 1) see themselves as primarily 
representing the residents in their local areas while 39 saw that they had a 
responsibility to represent the police authority. What is clear is that in order for 
police authorities to be effective there needs to be a balance between the 
responsibilities of members to represent and consult with local people - which 
is a responsibility given to police authorities under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (1984), The Police and Magistrates Courts Act (1994) and The 
Crime and Disorder Act (1998) - and the responsibility of the police authority 
under the provision of the Police Act (1964) (section 4.1) 'to secure the 
maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the area'. The job 
description for police authority members clearly reflects this aspiration stating 
iat members are appointed to fulfill a dual role; '... to represent the views of 
ie police authority within local communities and the views of local 
ommunities to the authority' (Leicestershire Police Authority, 2007). Gwent 
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Police Authority's definition states that the role of the member is 'To represent 
the interests of all those who live in, work or visit Gwent and to ensure that the 
views of local people are reflected in the nature and style of local policing' 
(Gwent Police Authority, 2007). 
Cindy Butts (Metropolitan Police Authority) explained that it was much 
easier to say whom she did not represent: 'I do not represent a political party 
or a [geographic] constituency of people but the views of ordinary people. I'm 
black, female, a Londoner, I used to be young but not now; I am the youngest 
member of the authority and I bring all these to the table. ' Catherine Crawford 
(Clerk to the Metropolitan Police Authority) explained that 'members 
represented all Londoners but not in the same way an MP represents a 
constituency. For example, MPs vote on issues and pass legislation, a letter 
from an MP to a public body or department must be responded to, MPs have 
a duty to hold weekly surgeries and respond to issues raised by constituents'. 
police authority members operate quite differently. 
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Figure. 6: 12 
Are members doing enough to represent those identified in Fig. 6: 11 ? 
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39 
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Figure. 6: 13 
Is the police authority doing enough to represent its constituents? 
73 
29 
yes no unsure 
On the question of whether police authorities were doing enough to 
represent residents, the police service and the wider community, 73 
responses (Fig. 6: 13) indicated that members thought their police authority 
was doing enough to represent those within its remit and area of 
responsibility. Even though 61 responses (Fig. 6: 12) indicated that members 
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felt that they and other members like themselves were doing enough to 
represent those they had identified in Fig. 6: 11,39 members (Fig. 6: 12) 
indicated that as members they were not doing enough whilst 18 were unsure 
about whether they were doing enough to represent effectively. 
At the heart of the question of whether police authority members are 
doing enough to represent the interests of those who depend on them is the 
question of whether members know how to bring the chief 
constable/commisioner to account and more specifically what questions to 
ask. According to Day & Klein (1987) police authority members lack sufficient 
knowledge and understanding resulting in them being unable to ask the right 
questions. This situation is made worse because members are unaware of 
their legal powers which invariably render them relatively powerless and 
unable to exert real influence or control. Metropolitan Police Authority member 
Rachael Whittaker explained that in her experience, 
in order to know what questions to ask you read a lotl The 
commissioner is at our behest and we know what to ask by doing our 
own research in the same way journalists do. If we attend meetings 
and expect things to be handed to us we are not doing our job'. 
Both David Rogers OBE (Councillor member of Sussex Police 
Authority) and Greg White (Councillor member North Yorkshire Police 
Authority) believed that local knowledge and experience were vital if members 
were to be effective and to know what to ask. 
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Chris Drew (Independent member of Llandudno Police Authority) 
explained that members are appointed not as experts but because they have 
been 'round the block' and the variety of experience that comes to the 
authority particularly from those with public sector experience is considerable. 
This response implies that members are pragmatic and aware that their scope 
of effectively holding the police to account is potentially restricted by the 
resource and time implications that go along with the terms of their 
appointment. 
Consultation and participation 
Figure. 6: 14 
Are people likely to participate if they fee/ represented? 
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Fig. 6: 14 shows that out of 106 responses, 83 indicated that there 
would be a positive impact on active participation if local people felt 
represented. This view is consistent with the thesis of Michael Ignatief in The 
Myth of Citizenship (1995) where he argued that the more a citizen received 
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from the state the more they were obliged and had an increased responsibility 
to it. In the next chapter I will discuss the implications of this and the wider 
opportunities that it provides. 
Figure. 6: 15 
How effective are Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCG) 
Figure. 6: 16 
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Do they attract a representative audience? 
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Given the importance of consultation, 47 members saw the Community 
Police Consultative Group (CPCG) as very or fairly effective and 58 thought 
CPCG's were hardly or not at all effective (Fig. 6: 15). The overwhelming view 
amongst those police authority members who responded to this particular 
question was that where the old consultative arrangements were still in place 
77 (76%) out of 101 responses indicated that the forums did not attract a 
sufficiently representative audience (Fig. 6: 16). Cindy Butts (Metropolitan 
Police Authority) colourfully described CPCG's '... some of them are really shit! 
Some of them are really good... '. 
Richard Barnes (Metropolitan Police Authority) explained that 
isultation is a valued tool but added: 
I am not sure that we know how to do it [Consultation] properly 
because the consultations are not altering the outcome: the crucial 
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thing about consultation is intent; if you just follow statute it becomes 
mechanical but you have to consult and communicate at the same 
time'. 
Bob Jones of West Midlands Police Authority and the Chairman of the 
Association of Police Authorities explained that people wanted to know what 
the police were doing on the ground at the local level and in the West 
Midlands the Neighbourhood Management Forum was a much better 
arrangement than CPCG's for facilitating this level of local accountability. 
Measuring the impact of police authorities 
Figure-6: 17 
Does the police service respond differently as a result of the involvement of 
the police authority? 
80 
22 
4 
Yes no unsure 
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Of the 106 responses to the question on the effect the police authority 
has had on the police service, 80 respondents felt that there was a difference 
in the way the police service responded or reacted as a result of the police 
authority's presence and intervention (Fig. 6: 17). As an example of how the 
police authority had affected the police service, one member cited the impact 
of the MacPherson Report (Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, 1999) on the police 
service and the implementation of recommendation 61 of the MacPherson 
report which called for police officers to record all stops and searches. The 
implementation of recommendation 61 was initially opposed by the police 
service and the Police Federation (see chapter 5) but with the united support 
of police authorities recommendation 61 was implemented in England and 
Wales in April 2003. 
Further evidence of the impact of police authorities on the police 
service was presented by Cindy Butts (independent member of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority) who cited the management of the police budget 
and the regular monthly public meetings which saw the chief officer and other 
senior officers reporting to the police authority. 
Richard Barnes (Magistrate member of the Metropolitan Police 
Authority) noted that where finance was concerned there was clear evidence 
of the impact of the police authority on the police service. He explained that in 
the Metropolitan Police Service there were only 3 or 4 qualified accountants 
managing a E2.4 billion budget and by the time the Metropolitan Police 
Authority was set up in 2000 the police service had only just gone over to 
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double entry book keeping. Mr Barnes was alarmed that in accounting terms 
the police service did not know where the money was coming from or where it 
was going and crucially like Mr Drew (Landudno Police Authority), Mr Barnes 
saw those police authority members with local authority backgrounds as being 
critically important in getting the finance of the police service into a 
'manageable and understandable state'. 
Both Dr Laurie Bush (Independent member and former Vice Chair of 
Sussex Police Authority) and Rachael Whittaker (Magistrate member of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority) agreed that the role of police authorities in 
human resources had and would continue to play an invaluable role in 
impacting and affecting the police service. According to Rachael Whittaker, 
the Human Resources Committee was the enabler for bold decisions that 
were made on remuneration which resulted in the increased ability of the 
police service to attract. top quality ACPO officers. Through the Human 
Resources Committee the police authority was able to secure E30m into the 
budget to address disparities between the pay of civillian staff working for the 
police and those who were employed by the home office on different pay 
scales even though they were doing the same job. 
Agreeing virements to budgets, the introduction of community support 
officers, adapting to new financial systems, being subject to open public 
meetings, all collectively provide some evidence to support the assertion that 
police authorities have been instrumental in increasing the openness and 
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accountability of the police service in England and Wales; but it is by no 
means a definitive or conclusive assertion. 
Enhancing accountability 
Figure. 6: 18 
Can accountability be strengthened by electing police authority chairs and 
members? 
According to Howard (2005), Loveday and Reid (2003) accountability 
could be enhanced and supported by the direct election of officials including 
police authority members and chief constables/commissioners. The results 
from my survey have shown that whilst 52 police authority members believed 
that accountability could and would be strengthened by electing police 
authority chairs and members (Fig. 6: 18), there was no evidence to support 
the assertion that the process of elections would make the work of the police 
authority more accountable or indeed more effective. Michael Ash (Councilor 
member of Cumbria Police Authority) explained that 'electing members would 
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be stupid and electing chief constables would be equally stupidl' Cindy Butts 
(independent member of the Metropolitan Police Authority) also supported 
this position and explained that elections would not make the police authority 
more efficient and that she was certain that the elected route would simply 
maintain the status quo by electing white male professionals. If there was any 
doubt that this would be the case, Cindy Butts advised that one only had to 
look at the House of Commons which through a similar electoral system had 
consistently returned white, predominantly middle class males as Members of 
Parliament. 
Lord Harris the former chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority agreed 
with the prevailing view of interviewees in this research that electing chief 
officers made very little sense; '... the electoral process would not [in my 
opinion] give you professional competence, but different skills. ' He did 
however echo a similar view to that articulated by Loveday and Reid (2003: 
59) that 'electing the chair of police authorities had some virtue because it 
would give clear political accountability' and like Loveday and Reid, Lord 
Harris saw this as a preferable way forward. 
Notwithstanding this, Lord Harris added that the overriding 
consideration that needed to be bourne in mind was the public's limited 
capacity for elections and he saw little value in electing members through free 
standing elections; what was of more importance for him was the breadth of 
experience and diversity brought to the police authority by independent and 
magistrate members who may not otherwise have gained a place on the 
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police authority through an elective process. Dr Bush of Sussex Police 
Authority believed no change was needed and concluded that the balance 
was about correct and whilst a councillor's election to the local council did not 
transfer a mandate from the council directly to the police authority, elected 
councillors still had a clear representative mandate which was valid to all their 
other public appointments including their responsibilities on the police 
authority. 
Figure. 6: 19 
Would electing members be more democratic than appointments? 
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yes 
25 
no 
21 
unsure 
Even though 57 respondents thought that electing police authority 
members would be more democratic than a recruitment process (Fig. 6-. 19), 
the reality is that the merits of appointing through a recruitment process can 
not be assessed against that of an electoral one because both processes are 
attempting to select people using different criteria. Those members that I 
I' 
interviewed generally accepted that whilst an elected system would be more 
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democratic, selecting members through such a process was far less 
desirable. Karim Murji (Metropolitan Police Authority) asked 'why would you 
elect a commissioner of police when you do not elect the head of the fire 
service or the head of any other similar serviceT Loveday and Reid (2003) 
were also of the opinion that if all members were elected, the lack of 
independent non-politically partisan members on police authorities would not 
be good for local communities. 
Figure. 6: 20 
Would elected chief constables improve accountability and give the local 
community a greater say? 
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On the prospect of electing chief constables or commissioners, 92 
members (Fig. 6: 20) did not believe that elections would improve 
accountability or increase the voice of the local community and there was 
consensus that trained professional police were best placed to fill these roles 
as opposed to professional politicians. 
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Policing is a professional responsibility and any suggestion of 
political influence in the appointment of a senior officer would be a 
mistake' (former Home Secretary Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP). 
Councillor member of Sussex Police Authority David Rogers OBE 
added that '... an elected chief is far too American for my liking Thirty 
respondents believed that directly electing chief constables/commissioner 
would result in a reduction in accountability because this accountability would 
be to the electorate and not accountability in terms of stewardship (Pyper, 
1996), rectification (Mulgan, 2003: 30) or 'the ability to impose a cost' 
(Keohane, 2002: 479)3 . Forty seven respondents believed elected chief 
constables would have no impact whatsoever and only 13 respondents 
thought that there would be an increase in accountability (Fig. 6: 21). 
As we saw in Fig. 6: 7,35 members saw the police authority as the most 
subservient member within the tripartite system; however, 43 members saw 
the police authority as playing a different but complementary role. According 
to Marshall (1978: 61-63) the police ought to be accountable - to the police 
authority - in the 'subordinate, explanatory and cooperative' sense. 
See chapter 5 pages 163 and 217 
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Figure. 6: 23 
Do you think the citizen knows about police authorities? 
Even though 84 police authority members saw their primary role as 
representing local people (Fig. 6: 11) 86 members felt that the citizen did not 
know about the police authority (Fig. 6: 23) and 13 members were unsure 
whether or not the citizen knew about them. I will return to this in the next 
chapter to discuss the implications of this. 
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Figure. 6: 24 
Do you think citizens are aware of the distinction between the police 
service and the police authority 
On the question of whether the public was aware of the distinction 
between the police authority and the police service, the overwhelming 
response was that 86 out of 105 members did not believe that the distinction 
was known. However, according to Lord Harris (Metropolitan Police 
Authority), 
people will accept that there is some structure that holds the police 
to account. At the most you may have a high profile police authority 
chair who may impinge on the consciousness of the public and even 
then it is a small number of the public that will notice even that' 
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Policing plans 
Figure. 6: 25 
Do national policing plans contradict local priorities? 
On the question of whether national policing plans were at odds with 
local priorities, 53 members believed that the plans did impact negatively or 
contradict local priorities versus 49 who did not (Fig. 6: 25). One police 
authority member that I interviewed explained that in the larger city areas 
there was no conflict between local and national plans because local plans 
were heavily dictated by the national agenda - which in itself the member 
argued served to demonstrate the dominance of the home office. The 
member went on to explain that in the provincial towns there was a real 
possibility of conflict; for example, if the national concern is with level 2 
criminality4 but the local area is concerned with level 1 criminality. Leigh 
3 
Level I- Local issues - usually crimes and criminals and other problems affecting a Basic Command Unit or small force area. The 
scope of the crimes will be wide ranging from low value thefts to great seriousness such as murder. The handling of volume crime 
will be a particular issue at this level. 
Level 2- Cross Border issues - usually the actions of a criminal or other specific problems affecting more than one basic command 
unit. Problems may affect a group of Basic Command Units, neighbouring forces or a group of forces. Issues OIL be capable of 
resolution by Forces, perhaps with support from the National Crime Squad, HM Customs and Excise, the National Criminal 
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Gothard (independent member for Staffordshire Police Authority) agreed that 
this sort of conflict did indeed occur but added that there was some 
inevitability to this, as some issues such as terrorism must be a national 
priority even though at times its implementation could conflict with local 
concerns. Ultimately, Leigh Gothard felt that with enough pressure at the local 
level members could usually swing the emphasis to reflect local concerns. 
Another interviewee from the Metropolitan Police Authority who wishes 
to remain anonymous explained that the potential for conflict depended on the 
personality of the chief constable/commissioner and explained that chiefs of 
police were at times arrogant and this would have a significant affect on 
priorities. For example, one member explained that the former Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police Service (Sir John Stevens) was more open than the 
then Commissioner Sir Ian Blair who 'locks out the police authority which 
breeds conflict and a lack of understanding'. In another interview a member 
explained that they know of one police authority where the members could not 
visit the police without the chief constable being informed first and agreeing to 
the visit. What Reiner (1991) found, however, was that most chief constables 
made efforts to develop good working relationships with their police 
authorities in order to ensure that policing policy was largely in tune with local 
needs. However, the police authority must be able to exercise its power to call 
the chief to account. Greg White (Councillor Member of North Yorkshire 
Police Authority) provided the most startling assessment explained that the 
Intelligence Service or other national resources. Key Issues will be the Identification of common problems, the exchange of 
appropriate data and the provision of resources for the common good. 
L*v*l 3- Serious and Organised Crime - usually operating on a national and International scale, requiring Identification by 
proactive means and response primarily through targeting operations by dedicated units and a preventative response on a national 
basis (www. dcpa. potice. uk/Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 2007). 
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police authority can enhance its influence and concentrate the mind of the 
chief constable by awarding relatively short fixed term contracts of 
employment of up to three years for relatively young senior officers. 
I authority [which is] the right to call people to account needs to be 
complemented by the notion of power as the ability to call people to 
account' (Day and Klein, 1987: 9). 
In the final chapter I present further conclusions and provide some 
recommendations for policy and practice. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POLICE AUTHORITY DEMYSTIFIED. 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
As I discussed in chapter 4, what led to the creation of today's police 
authority was the 1960 Royal Commission which then led to the Police Act 
1964. The Royal Commission was established to review the constitutional 
position of the police, to clarify the arrangements for its control and 
administration and to consider the functions of police authorities. The need for 
the review also arose as a response to wider public concern about increasing 
crime rates, questions about where responsibility for policing lay and the need 
to ensure that complaints against the police were effectively dealt with. 
E ntwined within this was the growing acknowledgement of the changing 
nature of crime and the police's ability to address it (Jones and Newburn, 
1994; Royal Commission on the Police, 1960). 
Consultation, participation and obligation 
As I discussed in chapter 4, citizenship in ancient Rome did not include 
a responsibility or an obligation on the citizen to participate in political life 
(Low, 2000). The same is true in Britain today, however, even though there is 
no compulsion or obligation on the citizen to participate, it is important that 
when the citizen is asked or expected to participate that there is evidence of 
their input and the possibility of that involvement contributing to change. The 
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conclusion of Hoban (2004) was that decisions had already been made prior 
to the call for wider participation and as a result, the involvement that was 
being requested was simply to validate previously arrived at positions. Whilst 
conducting this research I understood the logic of those police authority 
members who alluded to there being a correlation and a cause and effect 
between being involved in decision making, having visible increases in 
participation (Fig. 6: 14) and enhanced or improved accountability. Lord 
Scarman (1986) however concluded that there was no evidenced relationship 
between increased accountability and participation. I would suggest, that 
further in-depth study may identify that there is a direct relationship between 
increased accountability and increased participation. An interesting question 
however, would be whether there is, or would be a noticeable difference in 
reaction by members of the tripartite system if the citizen coordinated 
themselves through various community or voluntary groups and called for 
increased accountability as opposed to the media being the primary 
instrument through which these calls are made. 
Figure. 7: 1 Is the citizen obliged to participate? 
Those police authority members who indicated in their questionnaire 
that the citizen had an obligation to participate tended to provide explanations 
which included; 
- 'Because they pay council tax, 
- 'The citizen needs to know how the police use their powers 
because they [the citizen] are the first to complain', 
- 'To hold officials to account', 
- 'Policing is only effective with the consent of everyone'. 
Mr. David Dean of Nottingham Police Authority was quite vociferous in 
his response and explained during our in-depth interview that if the citizen did 
not participate they'... cannot complain later if they do not receive the service 
they want. ' 
We ought to be cautious when assigning an obligation to participation, 
because assigning an obligation implies that non-participation justifies or is a 
precursor for a reduction in the citizen's right to demand redress or to raise a 
dissenting voice. Non-participation cannot be used to justify a reduction in the 
rights of the citizen nor can it be used to temper or make the voice of the 
citizen less legitimate because citizenship is not linked to active participation 
but is a right bequeathed on them (Marshall, 1963). In addition to Marshall's 
view of a right being bequeathed on the citizen, policing is a public service 
paid for through taxation and there is no quid pro quo or a commercial or 
consumer relationship, because having security and being free from harm is 
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one of the rights conferred on citizens. Whilst I agree with Locke (1978) that 
the duty to participate is critically important and that abstention is not a neutral 
position, Locke appears to mistakenly conflate the duty to participate with his 
arguement around abstention and tacit consent. As a result of this Locke 
concludes that because abstention is not a neutral position, abstention gives 
tacit consent to the status quo. Cindy Butts (Metropolitan Police Authority 
member) appears to share my thoughts and explained that: 
'... irrespective of the lack of citizen participation it in no way lessens 
the citizen's right to know and one must not forget that usually the 
citizen does not react or participate until they feel that there is 
something to react to - they will opt in as they see appropriate'. 
Rather than giving tacit consent to the status quo, the citizen's lack of 
participation may be a reaction to the fact that the citizen feels that their 
views, thoughts and ideologies are not sufficiently being represented. The 
converse of Locke's (1978) view may in fact be true, because the very act of 
citizen participation could be construed as giving active support to the status 
quo. I therefore conclude that irrespective of the level of the citizen's 
involvement, the remit and the ability of police authorities to discharge their 
responsibilities and to call the chief constable to account is important for the 
effective and efficient administration of policing. Without an exchange of 
ideas, information, openness of processes and the acceptance of 
responsibility, a stalemate may ensue between the state and the citizen. 
When describing consultation and participation Coleman (2005: 1) explained 
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that '... the government believed that the public did not know how to speak 
whilst the public believed that the government did not know how to listen 
resulting in an unending cycle of disengagement, distrust and suspicion. ' 
Citizenship ought to embody a balanced reciprocal relationship 
between the state, institutions and the individual. Within this reciprocal 
relationship there ought to be an acknowledgement of the multiplicity of roles 
individuals inhabit and an understanding of the macro and micro 
responsibilities of the state. If individuals and communities feel that they are 
not afforded fair access, equal treatment or access to resources and they feel 
that there is little parity of outcome to and through the system, it is reasonable 
to conclude that irrespective of the consultative mechanisms that are at the 
disposal of the citizen, the expected reciprocity of active participation will not 
occur. Olson (1956) argued that people participate out of self-interest. 
However, if there are communities which feel excluded and increasingly 
alienated; even though the best opportunities of improving their lives may be 
by engaging with the process, the lack of a sense of belonging (Parekh: 2002) 
due to being excluded and alienated means that it is questionable whether 
society can expect that these communities should have the same degree of 
allegiance or that an obligation can be placed on them to participate. We all 
benefit from the police service, however, the citizen does not equate the 
various services they receive from the police and other public bodies as in any 
way related or linked to their willingness or propensity to engage in civic 
activities. Indeed, as I have discussed in chapter four and five, as far as 
policing is concerned, most people are not aware of the existence of their 
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police authority (Dalgleish et. al, 2003). Given the inherent difficulties of trying 
to conclusively prove that police authorities would perform better if more and 
more people participated, it would be objectionable if citizens were penalised 
as a result of their lack of participation in police authority consultations. I 
would venture to conclude that a lack of participation does not indicate a 
general lack of interest in policing, but reflects the inability of police authorities 
to make themselves and their important functions know. 
During indepth interviews, interviewees reiterated that the police 
authority's specific duty to consult local people and to improve the service on 
behalf of local residents should enable greater awareness and increased 
participation. Olson (1956) argued that those who participate do so to fulfil 
their self-serving desires and he built on the thesis of Downs (1957) who saw 
the individual as a consumer and that it was in the individual's interest to 
support collective action when s/he will benefit. There are obvious limitations 
to applying this utilitarian consumerist approach to policing. Those limitations 
include the fact that policing is a public service, as a service it is free at the 
point of delivery and as such the level of delivery cannot strictly be measured 
in relation to supply and demand. For Jones et al. (1994) the idea of a 
consumer or customer has no meaning in the context of policing because 
interactions between the police and members of the public tend to be bourne 
out of conflict rather than consent. The production of policing plans and the 
performance assessment regime could all be seen from the perspective of the 
consumer, however, meeting the needs of citizens requires much more than 
rneeting the requests of a consumer. 
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Following the Scarman report into inner-city disturbances in the early 
1980s, the subsequent Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) required 
police authorities to consult the public prior to setting local police objectives 
and to publish a local policing plan: this duty was reinforced by the Police and 
Magistrates Court Act 1994 and The Police Act 1996. 
The Police Act (1996) consolidated: 
* The legal requirement for police authorities to obtain the 
views of local people about policing matters 
* The need to seek the co-operation of local people with the 
police in preventing crime and 
* The need to take account of the views of communities in 
setting local police priorities. 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) created Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) under which police forces and local 
authorities were given the duty to co-operate with police authorities and to 
consult the public on a local audit of crime and disorder and in developing a 
strategy for tackling it. 
The Local Government Act (1999) also placed a duty on police 
authorities to achieve Best Value in the provision of services to the public and 
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under this duty, police authorities were required to consult all users of their 
services. Finally, under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) all public 
bodies - including police authorities - have a duty to consult on the likely 
impact of proposed policies on race equality. This drive towards multi-agency 
consultation following the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) and the expansion of 
consultation in the public sector is seen as a positive step by Dalgleish et. al. 
(2003) 
However, this research has found (Fig. 6: 13: 246) that where there is a 
high level of expectation and acceptance of the need for consultation and 
communication, a proportionately significant number of police authority 
members believe that the police authority is not doing enough to represent 
local people. Furthermore, Fig. 6: 12 (246) showed that in total, 40 (39%) police 
authority members questioned their own usefulness and what it was that they 
and the police authority were doing as far as representation was concerned. 
, In view of the importance that police authority members participating in 
this research have placed on increasing participation and their 
acknowledgement that they can play an important role in increasing 
participation, it is clear that unless police authorities and police authority 
members become more proactive in reaching out and engaging with local 
people then not only will they be failing in their legal duty as stated in the 
police Act 1996, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Local Government 
Act 1999 but they will be increasingly meaningless, ineffective and lacking 
validity and legitimacy. 
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'in the modern service delivery state, it can be argued that the way in 
which public services impinge on the lives of citizens may be more 
important, as the embodiment or negation of the democratic ideal, than 
parliament or central government' (Jones, Newburn and Smith 1994: 
1). 
Police authorities need to overhaul their consultative arrangements. 
Elliott and Nicholls (1996) found that police authorities tended to rely heavily 
on traditional police community style meetings but by 2003 Dalgleish (2003) 
found that police authorities had begun to reassess their methods of 
consultation. Raine et. al, (2006) explained that good accountability depended 
on good communication processes and they cited that neighbourhood policing 
was an exciting development which if adequately resourced could deliver 
much. in terms of public reassurance. In 2005, the Association of Police 
Authorities (APA) established twelve 'Accountability Pilots' led by police 
, quthorities and found that Bedfordshire, Merseyside, North Wales, Suffolk and 
Thames Valley each offered valuable opportunities for participation and 
learning by police authority members. The APA concluded that attendance at 
Neighbourhood Action Groups which had been established across Thames 
Valley, the Neighbourhood Panels in Ipswich and Suffolk and the various 
PC; CG/CPCG and Police and Community Together (PACT) meetings would 
enable police authority members to hear at first hand how neighbourhood 
policing was working. The key priority as identified by the APA was to give 
opportunity for dialogue and exchange. It is clear from this research that 
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'failure to provide these opportunities will see police authorities become 
increasingly irrelevant to people's everyday experience of policing. 
One of the challenges for police authorities is to ensure that they are 
not seen as the mouth piece of the police service simply justifying and 
informing the community of what the police are doing (Day & Klein, 1987; 
Marshall, 1978; Reiner, 2000). The other challenge for police authorities is 
thatlocal people do not know - in sufficient number - that police authorities 
exist and therefore do not see themselves as having the opportunity to 
influence local policing through the police authority. This problem is further 
augmented by the fact that police authority members see the police authority 
as having minimal power. 
Participation through consultation is therefore only meaningful if 
people's views can be seen to make a difference and to influence the 
-development of policy. The litmus test of inclusion is therefore not only 
evidenced through participation, but in order to be viable, it must do more than 
simply getting people to talk, 'people must decide and do things' (McHugh & 
parvin, 2005: 22). In addition to a rigorous process, what is needed is a sense 
and expectation that change may ensue from one's participation (Hoban, 
1994; Parekh, 2000; Coleman, 2005). 
In addition to the possibility of change, the question of intent is also 
important in establishing the nature and the relevancy of participation. Those 
being asked to participate will inevitably form a judgment as to whether they 
269 
It 
'think the intention is primarily to enhance the validity of a process without 
there being any real chance of affecting the final decision (Hoban, 2004), or 
whether the intent is to demonstrate that participation is important in affecting 
the decision making process and even the final decision/s. In order for there 
to be any possibility of change, there must be knowledge of police authorities 
and an awareness of the work that they are charged with undertaking. 
Awareness of police authorities 
As demonstrated by the results in chapter six, the majority of police 
authority members believed that local people knew very little about their police 
authority. Staffordshire Police Authority's independent member Leigh Gothard 
explained that whilst the lack of awareness of the police authority could be 
concerning, realistically, even though Staffordshire Police Authority was 
making stringent attempts to inform and consult with local people, it was 
difficult to say with any accuracy what level of knowledge there was of the 
police authority. In a sustained attempt to raise its profile, Staffordshire Police 
Authority produces a6 monthly newspaper called 'Safer Staffordshire' which 
is delivered to every home and provides general information including the 
name of the Neighbourhood Officer, the Police Community Support Officer 
(PCSO), the Inspector and all the telephone numbers residents require in 
order to make contact with a person as opposed to a machine. This 
information is sent out jointly with the local police service. There is also a 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) - in the Trent Valley - 
which involves the three district councils each publishing a monthly newsletter 
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'highlighting what the partnership of police service, fire service, primary care 
trust (PCT), the local business community and the council are doing. Leigh 
Gothard explained that 'even with all this activity only about 30% of people 
really knew about the police authority. The anecdotal evidence from Mr 
Gothard coincides with the research findings of Jones and Newburn (1997), 
Myhill (2003) and Docking (2003) who all found little public awareness about 
police authorities and their roles. 
The importance of police authority members establishing and 
developing local links and having local knowledge and contact is crucial if 
police authorities are to build trust. The Audit Commission (2003a) concluded 
that the notion of trust was based primarily on relationships, familiarity and 
experience and that people trusted individuals far more than organisations. 
The Commission concluded that public trust in the accountability structures of 
public organisations was driven by credible information, the existence of 
external watchdogs, personal contact and the degree of honesty and 
trustworthiness individuals had in these structures. The findings from this 
research leads me to conclude that police authorities need to do more to 
communicate what they are doing in terms of their governance and the 
arrangements for local policing. Secondly, the public needs to demand more 
from their police authority members - who are in fact their ambassadors. If 
police authorities continue to be ambivalent (see figure 6: 12) on the question 
of whether or not they are doing enough to represent local interests it is 
difficult to see how police authorities will ever be truly effective or trusted. Lord 
Harris (Metropolitan Police Authority) speaks to this by asserting that the 
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citizen is happy to know that the police are being brought to account by some 
independent body even if they are not quite sure what that body is. This 
resonates with the findings of Dalgleish et. al. (2003: 3) who found that when 
participants in their research learnt about police authorities the participants 
concluded that police authorities '-were necessary and useful, but only if 
they were effective. ' 
Part of the answer to the lack of wider awareness of police authorities 
rnay lie in the centralisation of policy-making powers. Lustgarten in The 
Govemance of Police (1986) asserted that the centralisation of policy-making 
power, coupled with the increase in influence of central institutions had been 
at the expense of local accountability. Reiner (1992) argued that by the end of 
the 1980s the most important decisions about policing were taken by central 
bodies, in particular the Home Office. This is hardly surprising when one 
considers that many of the powers conferred on the police authority are only 
exercisable with the approval of the home secretary and are subject to 
changes by him/her. 
On the question of whether the public was aware of the distinction 
between the police authority and the police service, 86 out of 105 members 
did not believe that the distinction was known. I agree with Lord Harris of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority that people will accept that there is some 
structure that holds the police to account. I will also accept that the 
consequence of a lack of awareness does not directly affect the police 
authority's ability to discharge its responsibilities because the efficiency and 
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effectiveness with which the police authority discharges these responsibilities 
will be judged in different ways. For example through, agreed performance 
indicators, monitoring systems, through internal and external assessments 
and against the local and national policing plans. 
This research has uncovered that police authority members charged 
with this important responsibility have a low level of trust in their own abilities 
and the rigour with which they are representing the interests of the wider 
community. Police authorities can only be effective if members are confident 
in their own abilities, if they know what it is that they are doing, if they know 
what it is that they are supposed to do, if they have the confidence and 
sufficient tools to bring the chief constable/commisioner to account and if they 
know what questions to ask. I interviewed a Grade 5 civil servant who advised 
me that - with the exceptiion of Sussex Police Authority - police authorities 
and in particular police authority clerks tended to be fearful of their chief 
con stab les/com m issioners and they showed an alarming level of deference to 
them. Surprisingly, the Metropolitan Police Authority was one of those singled 
out as protesting that it was good at bringing its commisioner to account but in 
reality - with the exception of the debacle over the shooting of Jean Charles 
De Menezes in July 2005 - there was very little evidence of a challenging 
relationship. The civil servant went on to explain that where challenges did 
take place they occurred within very narrow and 'almost' agreed boundaries 
which could lead one to conclude that policing by consent was by prior 
arrangement between the police authority and the commissionser and not by 
the public. On the issue of knowing which questions to ask, according to Day 
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& Klein (1987), police authority members lacked sufficient knowledge and 
understanding resulting in them being unable to ask the right questions. This 
situation is made worse because members are unaware of their legal powers 
which invariably renders them relatively powerless and unable to exert real 
influence or control. In response to this, I draw on the answer given by 
Rachael Whittaker (Magistrate Member of the Metropolitan Police Authority) 
who explained that police authority members had to research and like good 
journalists they had to follow and investigate issues. In so doing, police 
authority members would be supporting and enhancing the rigour of the police 
authority and bolstering its ability to bring the police service to account. This 
runs slightly counter to Day and Klein (1987) because they argued that in 
order to be effective, police authorities needed to firstly understand the legal 
parameters of their powers. However, this research has shown that a full 
understanding of the legal parameters of their powers may in fact have very 
I ittle direct impact on the ability of the police authority to bring the police to 
account. What police authority members like Rachael Whittaker have argued 
is that what is needed is an inquisitive mind and the ability to investigate. 
Measuring the impact of police authorities 
In seeking to identify the impact and the degree of change that police 
authorities have had on the police service, it is useful to set the historical 
context. In chapter 4,1 discussed the various difficulties experienced in 
implementing the Police Act 1964 which included that police authorities had 
no powers to instruct chief constables to change any policies set out in their 
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reports to the police authority. Lustgarten (1986) saw this as unsatisfactory 
and argued that the dependence of police authorities on their chief 
constables/commissioners for information was likely to stymie the authority's 
ability to offer effective, objective oversight and criticism. Whilst it cannot be 
denied that police authorities are indeed reliant on the chief constable for 
information, it is important to note that police authorities do have the powers 
to call the police service to account firstly, through the appointed members, 
secondly, through the diligence and effective support of the police authority 
secretariat and finally, through the police authority responding to the concerns 
of local people. Whilst acknowledging that the police authority was dependent 
on the chief constable/commissioner for information, Rachael Whittaker 
(Metropolitan Police Authority Member) explained that this relationship was 
not unique to police authorities and indeed local authorities and all other 
public bodies were just as dependent on their chief executives. As articulated 
-by the senior civil servant that I interviewed, this dependency should not be 
based on a subservient relationship but on a relationship of mutual benefit 
and it should not prevent the police authority from having an impact on the 
work of the police service. 
As I discussed in chapter 6, there are a number of specific areas where 
it can be claimed that the police authority has had an impact on the police 
service including the management of the police budget to the introduction of 
regular monthly public meetings where the chief constable and, other senior 
officers report to the police authority. There is also a greater level of 
accountability which according to Lord Harris of Haringey (former chair of the 
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'Metropolitan Police Authority) has seen the Metropolitan Police Authority 
(MPS) authority become more open, transparent and accepting of the concept 
, of accountability. Lord Harris added that there was much more financial 
discipline along with governance improvements. According to Richard Barnes 
(Greater London Authority Member of the MPA) there is increased financial 
scrutiny and financial oversight. In the area of policing, Lord Harris sees 'a 
turn round in the moral direction ... [and a] ... closer relationship with the 
public... it is no longer an us and them relationship'. He explained that the 
police appreciated the added value of employing individuals who spoke 
second languages, had secondary qualifications and specific areas of 
knowledge that hitherto had been in short supply. Other notable things which 
have impacted on the police service as a result of the police authority have 
been the introduction of police community support officers, the increase in 
ethnic minority officers and the readiness of the police service to confront 
difficult issues like stop and search. 
Whilst the extent of the direct impact of police authorities on the police 
service is debatable, what is clear, is that many of the examples cited above 
have come about as a result of the overall public duty that public bodies must 
adhere to in order to ensure that their provision meets the needs of the whole 
community. Much of these developments are supported, enhanced and 
augmented by statutory tools, such as Acts of Parliament (Race Relations 
Amendment Act 2000, Disability and Discrimination Act 2005) and the duty on 
public bodies to produce local and regional strategies which highlight how 
deprivation, worklessness and crime will be addressed. Even though the 
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direct impact of police authorities on police services is the subject of much 
debate, what we have is an important insight into the pivotal role police 
authorities - as the 'third leg' of the tripartitie system - can play in encouraging 
police services to move forward on a plethora of issues. It cannot be asserted 
however, that these examples in themselves are sufficient tests of the 
robustness of the impact of police authorites on the police service, because at 
most they can only be said to be contributory factors. 
Metropolitan Police Authority member Karim Murji sees the potential 
difference that police authorities are able to make as being embedded within 
the remit of their various committees. He explained that each police authority 
committee has a work programme, a set of objectives and a structure to 
address the issues that arise. For example, the Professional Standards 
Committee (PSC) has a remit to monitor and ensure that the police service is 
performing well and ensuring that complaints are dealt with professionally. 
With the Planning and Performance Committee (PPC), Mr Murji states that 
there is a robust regime to consider and monitor performance against the 
policing plan targets and any performance indicators set locally or by external 
organisations. However, to simply rely on and have faith in the structure and 
its processes as sufficient evidence of the impact of police authorities - as Mr. 
MurJi does - is I think naYve and reflects a blinkered approach to 
understanding the nature of society, human interaction and the interaction 
between individuals and institutions. The structures, procedures and 
processes in which Mr MurJi has confidence are a road map to assist in 
achieving influence, accountability and an effective police service for the area. 
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H aving systems, processes and procedures does not automatically result in 
effective implementation. 
The tripartite system 
Of the 94 respondents answering the question on the relevancy of the 
tripartite system, 81 agreed that it was still relevant (Fig. 6: 6). Karim Murii 
(Independent member of the Metropolitan Police Authority) explained that the 
three legs (of the tripattite system) were unequal and had always been so. He 
added that the relationship had in reality been a bipartite one between chief 
constables and the home office with the home office being the dominant 
player. In chapter 3 and 61 discussed Twine (1994) and I outlined his thesis 
that there where three supportive pillars in any structure with each pillar 
playing a pivotal role in ensuring that there was equilibrium and stability within 
the whole. If the tripartite system operates in a bipartite way, as described by 
Karim Murji or if the role of the police authority is diminished (Jones and 
Newburn, 1994: Loveday, 2005: Reiner, 1992) a structural problem arises 
which potentially challenges the stability of the whole, particularly where the 
third pillar - in this case the police authority - plays a scrutiny role, whilst it has 
an accountability function and legal duties around community cohesion. 
The error that social scientists, policy advisers and civil servants make 
is that they fail to grasp the concept that the tripartite system was never based 
on equality of input, output (policies, procedures, directives) or outcomes 
(implementation results, and the exercise of power) between its members. In 
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fact, the tripartite system is and has always been hierarchical. At its optimum, 
the police authority is a proactive, innovative and dynamic institution, 
supported by knowledgeable members who in turn are supported by a robust 
secretariat. At its minimum police authorities can be seen as functionally 
procedural institutions in so far as they work within the strictures which the 
other two members of the tripartite system permit them to work within. After 
conducting these interviews and securing a 14% response to the 
questionnaires, it is still unclear where police authority members see police 
authorities on the scale ranging from dynamism to functionally procedural. 
Figure. 7: 2 
Is the ability to impose punitive measures important for accountability? 
The predominant feeling amongst the police authority members that 
participated in this research is that the police authority is the least powerful 
body within the tripartite system and when viewed alongside the Her Majesty's 
Treasury HMT), the authority is even less powerful (Fig. 6.3). Whilst 67 out of 
110 questionnaire responses (Fig. 7: 2) affirmed that punitive measures were 
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lan important tool in the armoury of the police authority, the views of those I 
interviewed showed that members believed that even though the police 
authority was the least powerful member of the tripartite system, members 
preferred to achieve change through influence rather than coercion. 
Notwithstanding this reticence to apply sanctions, police authority members 
should not underestimated the usefulness of imposing sanctions because as 
explained by Day and Klein (1987) the ability to use punitive measures is 
crucial if the police authority is to mean anything. During my interview with a 
Grade 5 civil servant, the civil servant rhetorically questioned why it was that 
no police authority had ever dismissed a chief constable. The civil servant 
explained that a chief constable had never been dismissed because whilst 
police authorities are the legal employers of the chief constable, police 
authorities are very much aware that they are at the mercy of the home 
secretary whose permission must be sought before such an action can be 
taken. The real question therefore is whether previous Home Secretaries 
have thwarted the wish of police authorities to dismiss chief constables. If the 
answer is yes, then it not only reinforces but it underscores the argument that 
the police authority can only act in so far as a chief constable and particularly 
the home secretary permits it to. 
I This is therefore not simply about whether or not police authorities 
have the appropriate power or tools at their disposal, but it is about the ability 
and inclination of each police authority to utilise the tools it does have at its 
disposal. I liken the situation of police authorities to placing a Porsche engine 
in the body of a Robin Reliant. You will - in theory - have a very powerful 
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vehicle. However, in reality, the vehicle would be unsafe and unable to 
withstand the thrust and power from the performance Porsche engine, 
rendering it almost unusable. 
,, Having the power and the ability to impose a decision or solicit an 
action in itself is not sufficient to ensure that an institution's services and 
policies are effectively and successfully implemented. The real questions are 
whether the police authority has sufficient power, whether the home secretary 
and, chief constable have too much power, and about the police authority's 
propensity to demand answers and call the police service to account. A 
significant portion of being able and confident enough to do this will depend 
on the police authority members understanding the countervailing forces and 
th e plurality of interests that is brought to bear and affect the issues of the 
day. As history shows, it is possible to have a police service carrying out 
policing functions in the absence of a police authority performing a scrutiny 
function; but it would be impossible to have a police authority without a police 
service. This latter point raises questions about the added value along with 
the importance and relevance of police authorities. Underlining these points 
are also questions about the independence of police authorities and the 
degree to which they are willing to be the critical friend to their respective 
police services. If police authorities are unable or unwilling to make their 
presence felt, they will increasingly be seen as bringing nothing new and 
rnerely espousing and justifying the existing position of their police service. 
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The police authority's role is to scrutinise the police service and to 
ensure that there is an efficient service for its area However, with members 
feeling that the police authority is relatively powerlessness within the tripartite 
system, it is legitimate to ask whether police authorities effectively scrutinise 
their police services. Finally, it is worth considering whether instead of police 
authorities increasing accountability, they may be bringing a greater degree of 
transparency to the work of the police service (Fig. 7: 3). 
Accountability 
Stewart (1984) provided a useful insight into the nature of 
accountability by highlighting a five-fold hierarchy or ladder. At the lowest level 
he suggested that the focus of accountability might have some basic 
considerations such as whether the police budget was being spent as agreed 
or whether activities were lawful: this he termed Probity or Legal 
Accountability. At the next level there was Process Accountability which was 
primarily concerned with whether the systems and processes were adequate 
for the task(s) - whether there was adequate training to ensure that a 
competent service could be provided. Perfonnance Accountability was the 
next level and was concerned with how well tasks were being carried out and 
how well performance compared against targets. The penultimate level is 
Programme Accountability which looks at the extent to which the overall 
intended impacts - in the public domain - are being achieved. The final and 
highest level on Stewart's ladder is Policy Accountability. This level speaks to 
the question of whether the most important and pressing issues are being 
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addressed; for example, whether more attention should be directed at crime 
prevention or crime detection. These two final levels are where I see that 
police authorities can exercise significant power, influence and leverage by 
ensuring that the police service evaluates and directs its resources 
appropriately. Stewart (1984) drew a further distinction between Managerial 
Accountability which he saw as more internally focused and the more 
externally orientated Public Accountability which played an important role in 
Policy Accountability. 
Figure. 7: 3 
Do you see a distinction between accountability and transparency? 
My research has shown that the dependence on the chief constable as 
eferred to by Lustergarten (1986) is by no means absolute. The members 
vho participated in this research believed that the police authority had 
narginally more control over final decision making than the chief constable 
Fig. 6: 2). The reality however is that irrespective of what the respondents 
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believe, police authorities do not even have marginally more control over 
decision making than their chief constable. Magistrate member (Metropolitan 
Police Authority) Rachael Whittaker elaborated on this adding that whilst the 
Metropolitan Police Authority was dependant on the commissioner, the 
dependency had to be placed in context. She asserted that this potential 
dependency could be mitigated by members knowing what questions to ask 
and ensuring that they were well informed and read a lot. 
Being accountable is not solely a matter of presenting reports and 
financially accounting, but it involves power, authority, and ownership. Being 
accountable is also an important tool to help stave off feelings of 
disconnectedness and powerlessness (Day and Klein, 1987; Conger and 
Kanungo, 1988; Mulgan, 2003; Gray et aL 1997). In chapter 5,1 described 
accountability as being more than a procedural construct because the notion 
of accountability held within it a number of important elements including 
having access, the ability to influence decisions, the opportunity for 
, rectification' (Mulgan, 2003: 30) and the allocation and acknowledgement of 
responsibility (Moore: 2000) which incidentally, are all valuable components of 
having and exercising power. Being accountable is therefore much more than 
providing access to information, it is also about those who are being called to 
account being aware that if necessary they can be compelled to give an 
explanation for the actions they have taken (Mulgan, 2003: 30; Keohane, 
2002: 479). 
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Accountability through performance 
Lustgarten (1986) saw the inability of police authorities to instruct chief 
constables to change policies - outlined in their reports - as unsatisfactory and 
as having the potential to impact negatively on the police authority. Whilst 
police authorities could benefit from having increased power, one could 
equally argue that police authorities already have the necessary statutory 
tools, the basic structural framework, resources and relevant powers to 
- enable them to perform their functions to a higher degree of effectiveness 
than they are currently doing. For example, police authorities are able to call 
the police service to account through the Policing Performance Assessment 
Framework (PPAF, the New User Satisfaction Measures, through the 
production of efficiency plans, the local and national policing plan, the Best 
Value performance programme and the very rigorous Activity Based Costing 
(ABC). The police authority is also able to investigate complaints against 
senior police officers, monitor overall complaints procedures and it has the 
mandate to appoint chief police officers. 
Councillor member of Sussex Police Authority David Rogers (OBE) 
explained during our interview that in respect to specific crimes and 
community engagement, the police service was now much more performance 
driven than it had ever been. The former Home Secretary the Rt Hon Charles 
Clarke MP also explained during my interview with him that whilst car crime 
and burgulary could be more easily measured through performance 
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management proceses's he was of the opinion that violent crime and anti- 
social behaviour policing was subject to too much measuring. 
Richard Barnes (Greater London Authority member of the Metropolitan 
Police Authority) proclaimed that; 'Performance measures are rubbishl ... 
They are over complicated, far too extensive and endeavour to define in legal 
terms the undefinable'. Whilst Mr Barnes sees little virtue in peformance 
measures, his overall belief that they are too extensive may in fact be true, but 
his assertion that performance measures endeavour to define the 
undefineable is undermined when subjected to closer scrutiny. For example, 
in chapter 51 discussed and concluded that performance measures were an 
important part of being accountable particularly through the responsibility on 
public bodies to ensure that money was spent as agreed and in accordance 
with laid down procedures (Stewart, 1984). There is also a necessity that the 
administrators and stewards (Pyper, 1996) of resources should be able to 
assess any gain that has been achieved as a result of particular levels of 
activity and be able to measure, justify and quantify the degree to which the 
resources have contributed to achieving the intended results (Flynn, 2002: 
206). Whilst the process of measuring performance may be fraught with 
difficulties, these difficulties do not override the need for performance 
rneasuring, because unless we measure we will have no way of knowing the 
impact or the effect of measures (Millen, 2003: 39). 
Notwithstanding the importance of performance measuring, Jones and 
Newburn (1997: 215) saw the potential for confusion being compounded by 
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constant measurements and they argued '... there are so many performance 
objectives, indicators and measures that the rational consumer ... would most 
likely be overwhelmed by the variety. 
Jones and Newburn go on to assert that with Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the Audit Commission, the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Key Performance Indicators (KPI), local 
Performance Indicators (PI) Public Service Agreements (PSA) there is a 
strong case for rationalising the amount of information produced. 
In addition to the above observations, defining and correctly recording 
what is a crime is problematic. For example, there has been an increase in so 
called hybrid offences where criminal sanctions are attached to breach of 
orders that are initially determined by civil processes (such as Anti Social 
Behaviour Orders). Now, the breach of such an order can attract a penalty of 
up to five years imprisonment (Holder and O'Cinneide, 2007: 135). 
Farmer (1996: 27) wrote that 'defining the scope of criminal law in 
substantive rather than formal or procedural ways is notoriously problematic 
because of the rapidly growing and shifting corpus of criminal law'. As I will 
discuss below, the Metropolitan Police Service's inability to accurately record 
crimes has proved to be a problem which the Metropolitan Police Authority 
appears to be unable to rigorously address. Further research would need to 
be undertaken to explore whether the problem experienced by the 
Metropolitan Police Service in acurately recording crime also applies to other 
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police services and other police authorities in the way they have responded. 
However, what is clear is that with all the tools that the police authority has at 
its disposal, the success or failure of police authorities does not primarily rest 
on the need for new tools or on the need for more statutory instruments but it 
rests on the ability of members being studious enough to be effective 
instruments of accountability (Jones and Newburn, 1997). One interviewee 
remarked; '... the [Metropolitan] police were largely uncontrolled until the 
police authority came into being... [and]... the authority has dragged some of 
the secret processes of the police into the open'. 
Richard Barnes (Metropolitan Police Authority) feared that in the quest 
for increased accountability we were looking at the wrong sort Of 
accountability. Richard Barnes argued that the police authority ought to be 
accountable in terms of answerability and that this answerabifity must go 
down to the ward level because local people know what is going on, whose 
car has been stolen and whose house has been burgled. Being able to 
respond in this way was for Mr Barnes the true measure of answerability and 
by extension a broader level of accountability would follow. Jones and 
Newburn (1997) however, saw a broader restriction on police authorities 
which was that they were restricted because they were tied to explanatory 
modes of accountability rather than being able to call the police service to 
account by imposing actions or sanctions. 
Police authorities do have opportunities to call the police service to 
account. In order to do so effectively, police authorities need to adopt the 
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position of being a 'critical friend' to the police service (Raine et. al, 2006: 28). 
In February 2008 the Metropolitan Police Authority's (MPA) report on 'Crime 
Data Recording' in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was a damning 
indictment on the Metropolitan Police Service. The MPA's two Scrutiny Chairs 
of the Scrutiny Panel, Karim Murji and Richard Sumray wrote in the foreword 
of the report that: 
.... accurate recording is vital to issues of public confidence. At a time 
when overall levels of crime in London are declining, concerns about 
violent crime and the fear of crime persist. If the police are to show real 
evidence of addressing public concern there must be trust that the 
figures recorded are accurate. In addition, accurate recording is an 
important process that can help to drive intelligence, tasking and 
I performance improvements in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). 
Furthermore, accurate data recording is essential to enable the 
Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) to effectively hold the MPS to 
account'(MPA, 2008: 3). 
The report clearly identified evidence of systemic failures in the 
workings of the MPS in its structures of supervision, its policies, processes 
and training and it identified conflicts of interests (MPA, 2008: 15). The report 
finds were as follows; 
Structures and supervision 
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Where structures and supervision were concerned the supervision of 
crime records was judged to be inadequate and there was inappropriate 
supervision. The Crime Recording Oversight Group (CROG) had become an 
executive, rather than an advisory board resulting in a lack of independence 
of CROG. Concern was expressed also that the reductions in external 
auditing could result in a further fall in data quality standards (MPA, 2008: 3). 
Policy and processes 
The report concluded that where policy and processes where concerned 
the MPS needed to prioritise the focus on data quality at a very basic level by 
ensuring that the correct address or house numbers were recorded (MPA, 
2008: 3). This could only be done by Borough Operational Command Units 
(BOCU) and central Senior Management Teams (SMT) demonstrating their 
ongoing commitment to data accuracy and quality - by implication this means 
that there was a lack of commitment to data accuracy and quality in the MPS. 
Which as outlined in the previous page meant that the police authority was 
unable to effectively hold the police service to account (MPA 2008: 3). 
Training and resources 
Concerns were raised that call handling targets focused on time to 
answer calls rather than on the quality of information relayed. The report 
recorded that interviewees felt that the quality and provision of training for 
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officers and staff was inadequate and the report noted that civilian staff 
required more training than officers in legal definitions and legislation. 
System failure and conflicts 
Probably the most disturbing aspect of the report was that it concluded 
that there was pressure being applied to Crime Management Unit (CMU) staff 
to achieve targets which then affected the accuracy of crime recording (MPA, 
2008: 6). The wider implication of this systematic inaccurate recording of 
crime data is that it affected the ability of the police to tackle crime effectively 
and it provided an incomplete picture of what was occurring potentially leading 
to police officers and public safety being compromised. 
As a result of the findings the Metropolitan Police Authority noted that: 
I ... work has already been carried out to address some of 
the crime 
recording and data accuracy problems .... The MPA 
is also pleased to 
note that, following the production of the initial draft report .... the MPS 
has already submitted a preliminary plan of action. This plan addresses 
many of the issues raised in the report ... [but]... should be 
further 
developed to include timetables and resource implications to allow its 
progress to be monitored by the MPA'(MPA, 2008: 4). 
However, the Audit Commission (2007c) found that there was no 
evidence of effective scrutiny of the action plan arising from their audit. The 
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Audit Commission also identified that the MPA needed to develop a more 
proactive approach as there was little evidence of members defining the 
police authority's expectations concerning data quality. 
As far back as 2003 the Audit Commission's report (The Way Forward) 
focused on the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR) which was 
introduced to increase accuracy and consistency around non-crime incident 
recording'. The Commission found that the national average for compliance to 
the incident recording standard was 79% but the MPS had below the average 
compliance at 69%. The MPS also had the highest error rate in the'NSIR sub 
component category' of any police service at 42% whilst nationally the error 
rate was 29% (Audit Commission: 2003). 
The Audit Commission (2007c) also found little evidence of supervisory 
intervention in amending incident closure codes despite supervision 
procedures being in place at both Central Communications Command 
Centres and Integrated Borough Operations (1130). In addition, a large 
proportion of Anti-Social behaviour (ASB) incidents which were passed to 
Safer Neighbourhoods teams were closed with little evidence of mechanisms 
being in place to ensure that incidents were appropriately deployed and 
resolved (MPA, 2008: 13). 
It is quite startling that the above failings of the MPS have not led to an 
internal inquiry led by the Metropolitan Police Authority. Questions also ought 
I NSIR data Informs Statutory Performance Indicators (SPIs), Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and contributes to Assessments of Policing 
and Community Safety (APACS). 
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to be asked about the role, responsibility and the effectiveness of HMIC to 
inspect the police service in England and Wales and to ensure that police 
authorities are effectively fulfilling their statutory duties. 
The budgetary powers of the police authority 
There are a number of obvious reasons why police authority members 
ought to understand their budgetary powers; firstly, the police authority holds 
the budget for policing in its area, secondly, the police authority decides on 
the allocation of funds to the police service, and thirdly, the police authority 
along with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has the power 
to withhold the certificate of efficiency and by extension to withhold funding to 
the police service (Jones and Newburn, 1997). Given the magnitude of errors 
and the potential catastrophic effects that could arise, and have arisen with 
the MPS data recording there is prima facie evidence that the MPA could 
have withhold the certificate of efficiency from the MPS. 
Quite apart from the police authority's power and its legal right to 
withhold a certificate of efficiency, there is another consideration which the 
police authority would need to explore, and it is this. If a police authority 
decides to withhold the certificate of efficiency from a police service, in 
addition to the huge political implications of this action the police authority 
would itself be defaulting on its primary duty to provide an effective police 
service. Secondly, taking this action would present a direct challenge to the 
authority of the chief constable and if the home secretary supported the chief 
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constable the decision would also be a direct challenge to the Home 
Secretary. 
In reality, the power to withhold a certificate of efficiency is effectively 
unenforceable, not only because the police authority would find itself in 
breach of section 4.1 of the Police Act 1964, but it is unenforceable on a 
practical level because although the Police Act 1964 established the tripartite 
system and gave equal powers to each of the three members within it, in 
reality, the Police Act 1964 was weighted against police authorities and in 
favour of chief constables (Reiner, 1993; Loveday, 2005). As a direct result of 
the inconsistencies within the act (see chapter 4) the nature of the tripartite 
system relationship is seen as intentionally confusing and ambiguous (Jones, 
Newburn and Smith, 1994: 27). Notwithstanding these real or perceived 
difficulties it would have been a significant gesture if - in this case - the MPA 
had taken decisive action by refusing to issue the MPS with a certificate of 
efficiency. Unfortunately however, confusion has persisted between the 
members of the tripartite system because there is a lack of clarity around the 
convergence and divergence of the roles and responsibilities of the tripartite 
members and there is also ambiguity around operational and strategic 
policing. Firstly, Perry Nove (former Commissioner City of London Police) saw 
no real distinction between operational and strategic policing because he saw 
all decisions moving from being strategic to operational. During the interview 
he argued that this is not a zero sum game, because strategic planning and 
oversight does not endemically inhibit or run counter to operational 
considerations and operational planning and considerations do not negate the 
294 
value or input of strategic oversight. Decisions are interrelated and 
simultaneously impact on operational and strategic policing. 
In light of the findings of this research, it is reasonable to expect that 
the relationship between the members of the tripartite system can be made 
much clearer. An important step towards realising this would be if the Pattern 
recommendations - in particular recommendation 23 - were applied to 
England and Wales. Recommendations 22 and 23 of the Patten Report called 
for; 
'... the provisions of the Police [Northern Ireland] Act 1998 to be 
simplified so that the respective roles of the Secretary of State (or 
successor), the Policing Board and the Chief constable are clear' 
(Patten Report, 1999: 6.16) 
In addition, recommendation 23 called for the repealing of provisions in 
section 39 of the Police [Northern Ireland] Act 1998 that the Secretary of State 
may issue guidance to the police as to the exercise of their functions. (Report, 
1999: 6.18). 
implications for policy and practice: Social contract and participation 
My research has shown that police authority members acknowledge 
that they ought to do more to represent their varied audiences. I have shown 
that police authority members see the police authority as subservient. 
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Respondents to this research acknowledged and were aware that police 
authorities were only able to act with the permission of the home secretary 
and the chief constable. There was also a feeling that police authorities were 
relatively impotent which was in part evidenced by the reluctance of police 
authorities to dismiss their chief constables. The underlying issues which 
these speak to include the question of what - if any - benefit can be derived by 
encouraging the citizen to engage and what is the added value of wider 
participation and involvement. I concur with Down's (1957) argument that 
there is little evidence of real incentives on offer. Even if there were a glimmer 
of hope that benefits could be accrued by increased participation, the fact that 
police authority members are questioning the benefit of their own work raises 
significant questions about the collective ability of police authorities to be a 
catalyst for change or improvement. 
In relation to the citizen, what does all this mean for the work, the role 
and the responsibility of police authorities? The White Paper: Building 
Communities, Beating Crime (Home Office, 2004) and the initial consultation 
Paper Policing: Building Safer Communities Together (Home Office, 2003) 
signalled the degree of importance that the government (Home Office) placed 
on consultation and community engagement. The plethora of initiatives across 
the public sector around consultation and community engagement reveals two 
things; firstly that there is an understanding that a one-size-fits-all approach to 
engagement does not work and secondly, that these and other initiatives can 
be seen as an attempt at realigning and rejuvenating the social contract 
between the state, its institutions and the individual. In chapter 3,1 first 
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introduced the theme of the social contract through the works of Hobbes 
(1980), Locke (1978) and Rousseau (1987). Hobbes believed that at its core 
the human driving force was fundamentally selfish and geared towards 
acquiring resources that benefited themselves to the exclusion of others. 
Building on from the social contract approach, the evidence from this 
research clearly suggests that there are three things that we the citizen and 
our institutions need. 
Firstly, as individuals, we would collectively benefit from a greater 
understanding of the social contract and the embodiment of that contract 
between ourselves and our institutions. 
Secondly, this relationship will only be effective and productive if there 
is confidence and trust that those institutions will work on our behalf. The 
absence of these two elements will, - as social contract theorists argue - leave 
us in a state of perpetual confusion with our institutions willing us to 
participate by devising new themes, mechanisms and structures for our 
participation whilst the citizen sits and watches the constant flow of initiatives 
without being stirred to increase their overall participation and preferring 
instead to disengage. 
III 
The third thing that is needed is for police authorities to realise that in 
addition to their statutory responsibilities to provide an adequate police 
service for their area, they have the responsibility to effectively reach out to 
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local people, to be accountable to them and to represent them. 
When the citizen is called upon to engage and participate there is also 
an expectation from the citizen that with their involvement will result in change 
(Olson, 1965; Downs, 1957). If however, police authorities are unable to exert 
sufficient influence on the police service and on the members of the tripartite 
system, it is highly questionable whether the citizen can reasonably expect to 
see change as a result of their participation. More significantly, two issues 
arise; firstly, a question hangs over the usefulness and relevance of police 
authorities - in their current form. Secondly, the Association of Police 
Authorities which is the body that represents all police authorities ought to be 
an influential partner: however questions have been asked about the quality 
and the ability of its senior management team about whether they are able to 
speak authoritatively on behalf of police authorities. So far there is little 
evidence to suggest that the APA is playing an effective role. 
Accountability 
Having the ability and the necessary powers to call the police service to 
account is significant tool in the armoury of the police authority. However, the 
lack of evidence of police authorities effectively holding police authorities to 
account raises questions about the continuing legitimacy of their mandate 
(Raine et al, 2006: 9). In order to effectively bring the police service to account 
the police authority's role needs to be unambiguous and the mechanisms 
through which that accountability can be realised should be clearly defined 
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and understood. According to Bob Jones, (Chair of the Association of Police 
Authorities) due to the support police authority members receive from civil 
staff, police authority members are much more effective than they had 
previously been in bringing the police service to account. Anecdotal evidence 
that I have received throughout this research has clearly pointed to the fact 
that the functionality and effectiveness of police authorities is connected to the 
size of their secretariat. I clearly understand that police authorities like Avon 
and Somerset, Humberside and Wiltshire may not necessarily need the same 
number of support staff as larger police authorities such as the West Midlands 
Police Authority or the Metropolitan Police Authority, however, police 
authorities could benefit from agreeing the types of staff and minimum 
numbers of support staff required to enable smaller police authorities to 
function more effectively and consistently. 
The power to demand or call another to account for their actions or 
omissions is central to accountability as it defines the relationship between 
actors and clarifies who owes a duty to whom (Day and Klein, 1987). 
According to Fetterman (1996: 212) accountability provides an explanation for 
decisions, actions, and their consequences whilst transparency is about 
providing information and clarity of processes. It is highly probable that rather 
than increasing the accountability of the police service and the chief 
constable, police authorities are bringing increased transparency to their 
actions. As described by Bob Jones (Chair of the Association of Police 
Authorities) '... the onus is on the police authority to ask rather than the police 
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service to tell. ' As I discuss later in this chapter this emphasis needs to 
change. 
Competing agendas 
The conflict between national and local policing priorities presents a 
conundrum when trying to establish who controls the police, who has greater 
influence over them and who the police see themselves as being answerable 
to. , 
As previously discussed, the perceptible shift of power away from 
police authorities in favour of the home office and chief constables does not 
automatically mean that police authorities are unable to discharge their 
responsibilities. What it does mean however is that police authorities are 
somewhat restricted and constrained due to uncertainty about their remit and 
their position in the tripartite system. As previously discussed, chief 
constables can appeal directly to the home secretary and refuse to amend or 
to- elaborate on a report that they present to their police authority. This 
leverage can directly undermine and inhibit the scrutiny function of the police 
authority. The possibility of chief constables to circumvent their police 
authorities in this way should be limited because the chief constable should 
be responsive to the wishes of his employer - the police authority. 
The citizen, having bequeathed responsibilities and powers to the state 
to aid the smooth and effective exchange of rights, responsibilities and 
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obligations, expects that there is a reciprocal and equitable relationship 
between himself and the institutions of the state. Not only is there an 
obligation on the citizen to live according to the agreed norms and values of 
society but there is also an obligation on the state and its institutions to 
support the conditions conducive to this through the work of the police 
service, the police authority and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC). The police authority members that took part in this research believed 
that citizens would increasingly engage if they felt represented. Like Lord 
Scarman (1986) 1 could find no evidence of there being any correlation 
between increased accountability and participation. However, is as Popper 
(1959) argued, evidence in and of itself can never actually guarantee that a 
theory is right only that the theory is right so far. Popper's theory of 
falsification not only embodies the principle that theories are always open to 
being refuted but also carries with it the idea that theories should be tested in 
circumstances where they are most likely to be refuted. Police authorities 
therefore need to test this by doing more to increase local participation. Police 
authorities should not strive primarily for increased public participation to 
prove that they are relevant, important or indeed as an indication of their 
popular appeal but they should strive to be increasingly rigorous and effective 
in representing local interests to the police; in representing the police to local 
people and in working with the police service to represent all positions to the 
Home Office. 
Elock (1991: 162) describes a multi-directional layer of accountability 
upwards to politicians, outwards to professional colleagues and downwards to 
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the citizen. There may, for example, be disagreements and conflicts between 
the different layers and groupings. In order to ensure harmony, the police 
authority needs to set out clearly the terms and parameters of the 
engagement it is seeking becau se this clarity will ensure that there is 
openness, transparency and maturity around what can be achieved when 
engaging with the public directly or indirectly through voluntary and Third 
Sector organisations. 
Appointed or elected officials 
The former Conservative Party leader Rt Hon Michael Howard MP in 
his speech 'Respect for Others' in Manchester (February: 2005) suggested 
that increased accountability could be achieved by scrapping remote and 
unaccountable police authorities and replacing them with directly elected local 
police commissioners. Mr Howard insisted that elected commissioners would 
improve accountability and give the public a more direct say in the running of 
their local police forces and increase the citizen's influence over the type of 
policing and police priorities in their local areas. This was supported by the 
Conservative Party's manifesto in 2005; 
'Chief constables will be accountable to police commissioners. Working 
together, police commissioners and chief constables will set local 
policing priorities. Local people will be able to hold them to account for 
their performance. London has a directly-elected Mayor and the 
Metropolitan Police Force has a unique national role. We will therefore 
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transfer the powers of the Metropolitan Police Authority to the Mayor. 
But the home secretary will retain the power to appoint the 
commissioner of the Met in consultation with the Mayor' (Conservative 
Party Manifesto, 2005: 5). 
During my interview with - the now Shadow Home Secretary - Chris 
Grayling Mp2 he explained that the Conservative Party's position was now 
more in favour of directly elected chairs of police authorities rather than 
elected police commissioners. 
Given the inability of police authorities to influence, adequately 
represent the citizen, or to challenge the police, it would be easy to conclude 
that police authorities should be dissolved or like Rt Hon Michael Howard MP 
that they should have all their powers transferred to an elected mayor. Neither 
of these options is desirable because, transferring police authority powers to a 
mayor - as opposed to a Mayor chairing a police authority - would see power 
concentrated in too few hands and the legitimacy of a single official deciding 
and implementing policing policy would be questionable. There is also the 
other issue which is that policy would then become even more politically 
partisan as' seen when the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson withdrew his 
support for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service resulting in 
the Commissioner - Sir Ian Blair tendering his resignation. 
2 Interviewed on II th June 2008 
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The apparent ineffectiveness of police authorities does not necessarily 
mean that they are not currently fulfilling an important and valuable role. 
However, in order for police authorities to be more responsive to local issues, 
it would be entirely consistent for the position of police authority chair to be an 
elected one. The tripartite system of chief constable, home secretary and 
police authority - represented by an elected chairman - would appear more 
relevant because the strategic and operational decision making and the 
direction of policing locally would be decided by the police authority, headed 
by the elected chairman and the chief constable in consultation. 
During my interview with Lord Harris (former chairman of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority) he explained that the electorate had a limited 
capacity to participate in elections and that it would be counter productive to 
hold separate elections for the chair of a police authority. I accept the logic of 
his argument and that the elected mayor should also be the chair of the police 
authority. This would ensure that the police authority had an increased profile 
locally and in conjunction with the statutory responsibility that I think ought to 
be placed on the police service - to consult with the police authority - the 
police authority would be an indelible fixture of local accountable policing. 
This is by no means the panacea and there would need to be checks 
and balances in place to prevent unintended consequences becoming 
acceptable norms. For example, in London it would be easy to conclude that if 
the elected mayor was also the chair of the police authority then the 
Metropolitan Police Authority could be subsumed into the Greater London 
304 
Assembly (GLA): this is not desirable and I would not recommend that this 
happens. 
Rebalancing the relationship 
Whilst police authorities have a statutory responsibility to consult with 
the public in order to determine annual local policing priorities, there is no 
similar responsibility placed on the police service to consult with police 
authorities. A statutory responsibility should be placed on the police service 
that it must consult with its police authority. Bob Jones (Chair of the APA) 
explained that police authorities have a statutory right to ask the chief 
constable to report on any issue, however, the onus was on police authorities 
to ask questions rather than the police service to tell; a statutory responsibility 
reversing this and placing the onus on the police service would begin to 
address this imbalance. This is a wish but power inevitably clusters at the top; 
we therefore need strengthen all of our institutions. 
Police authorities can also influence the national policy agenda through 
their representative body the, Association of Police Authorities (APA). In 2006 
the APA's joint report with ACPO on the Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR) provided a positive picture of the APA and ACPO working together and 
calling on the government to acknowledge and address the funding gap which 
arose as a result of the Comprehensive Spending Review. The APA has had 
other notable successes, for example, its response to the Home Affairs 
Committee inquiry into police reform and the subsequent Police Reform Act 
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2002 and the visible role played by the Chairman of the APA (Bob Jones) in 
resisting the proposed police mergers. However according to a number of 
interviewees the secretariat of the APA needs to be more robust, dynamic and 
confident in leading the policy debate on policing and in influencing the 
direction of travel of policy now and into the future. One area that the 
Association of Police Authorities could begin looking at is staffing. For police 
authorities to efficiently discharge their responsibilities there needs to be 
guidance and an acceptance - which is supported by funding - that a 
minimum level of secretariat support is required for all police authorities. The 
onus is therefore on the APA to argue this case on behalf of police authorities. 
Responses to questions and other comments from my in-depth 
interviews have clearly shown that police authority members recognise gaps 
in their training. It therefore appears to be a sensible course of action for the 
APA to lobby for increased funds to support more training. I would also 
suggest that members of the tripartite system ought to revisit the time 
commitment required from members and the remuneration paid. The 
increasing demand on the time of police authority members makes it 
extremely difficult for members to serve the authority whilst undertaking other 
work. This can also serve as a disincentive to those who are able to offer 
much needed expertise on police authorities. 
What is clear is that police authority members are pragmatic and they 
are aware that their scope of effectively holding the police to account is 
potentially restricted by the resource and time implications that go along with 
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the terms of their appointment. Police authorities need to increase their 
effectiveness by attracting people with a wider pool of knowledge. In particular 
there is a deficit of members with professional business and financial 
expertise to augment and broaden the knowledge base of the police authority. 
The question is how fast and how far will police authorities go to ensure that 
irrespective of the wider level of participation that they are effective and 
responsive. At the end of the day active citizenry is not a precondition for an 
effective police service. 
In conclusion, the evidence from my interviews, questionnaires and 
desktop research show that whilst the functions and the responsibilities of 
police authorities are important, the current structure and arrangement has 
resulted in police authorities being seen as not fit for purpose. Any proposed 
changes must ensure that even if they do not directly increase democracy, 
they increase accountability by reconnecting the citizen with policing. 
Finaly, Police authority members are pragmatic and aware that their 
scope of effectively holding the police to account is potentially restricted by 
the resource and time implications that go along with the terms of their 
appointment. Police authorities need to increase their effectiveness by 
attracting people with a wider pool of knowledge. In particular their is a deficit 
of members with professional business and financial expertise to augment 
and broaden the knowledge base of the police authority. The question is how 
fast and how far will police authorities go in ensuring that we have a 
responsive police service irrespective of the wider level of participation. At the 
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end of the day active citizenry is not a precondition for an effective police 
service. 
Implications for policy and practice 
The Impact of police authorities 
As stated earlier, due to the relatively small number of in-depth 
interviews and questionnaires the results from this research can only be said 
to be representative of the views and opinions of the participants. Whilst some 
generalisations can be made generalisations need to be treated with caution. 
This research has identified specific areas where police authorities have 
impacted positively on the police service, for example; 
1. The Metropolitan Police Service has implemented new up to date 
systems, procedures and processes for managing its budgets. As 
far as the Metropolitan Police Authority is concerned financial 
discipline has increased, 
2. The regular attendance and questioning of chief constables, 
commissioners and senior officers at open public police authority 
meetings has improved transparency and the police service 
appears increasing accepting and comfortable with this type of 
accountability. 
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3. The moral direction of some police authorities had noticeably 
changed over time. 
The future of police authorities 
1. Even though most people do not know about police authorities I 
accept that wider knowledge of police authorities is not a 
prerequisite for police authorities being effective. Knowledge, 
however, is an important part of informing and building confidence 
within local areas therefore a lack of local awareness does raise 
questions about the effectiveness of police authorities to engage, to 
reach out and to be relevant to local people. 
2. Police authority members conceded that the training they received 
was poor. Consequently, 39% of the members surveyed were 
unsure about how effective they were and what it was that they 
were really supposed to be doing. A total rethink and restructuring 
of the training programme for police authority members is urgently 
j required. 
3. Evidence from my in-depth interviews suggested that smaller police 
authorities conducted the majority of their business in full authority 
meetings and less in committees. On initial observation this 
appears to be a more open and transparent way of working, 
however, on further investigation these meetings were mainly 
concerned with the police authority's own business as opposed to 
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the important business of bringing the police to account. Indeed as 
Jones and Newburn (1997) asserted, these authorities were 
preoccupied with managerial and organisational issues rather than 
the strategic policy issues governing local policing. Larger police 
authorities seemed much better at bringing the police service to 
account. 
4. Although the question of the number and size of police forces - and 
by extension police authorities - was outside the scope of this 
I'- research. In light of the above observation I would advise that we 
revisit the proposed merger originally presented by Rt Hon Charles 
Clarke MP and reviewed by Rt Hon John Reid MP. Reducing police 
forces from 43 to 12 or even 8 could help to reduce the sheer 
weight of pressure on smaller police authorities and also enable the 
Association of Police Authorities (APA) to focus more clearly on the 
needs of its members. This process however, should only be 
undertaken on the proviso that a clear allocation of resources is 
committed from the outset and that there is sufficient time for 
consultation and wide scale engagement. 
Policing by consent 
1 
5. A police authority Clerk explained that 'we should not lose sight of 
the fact that policing is primarily concerned with enforcing the law'. 
My view on this is that enforcing the law is best achieved by having 
due regard to 'Keeping the Kings Peace' which will ensure that 
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policing continues to be by consent. The emphasis is very important 
and therefore the police authority needs to ensure that policing is 
undertaken with these sentiments in mind. 
6. If police authorities are fulfil their responsibility of bringing greater 
transparency and accountability to the police service. Their role 
needs to be clearly defined and understood. The Patten Review of 
Policing in Northern Ireland holds valuable lessons. 
The Association of Police Authorities (APA) 
7. Whilst there was almost unanimous praise for the Chair of the 
Association of Police Authorities (Clir Bob Jones) a number of 
interviewees felt that the APA's Senior Management Team was not 
effectively representing them. This situation was further 
compounded by the feeling that the APA was being pulled in 43 
different directions. 
8. One of the constraints on police authorities is that chief constables 
can appeal directly to the home secretary and refuse to amend or 
elaborate on reports that they present to the police authority. The 
leverage that this gives to chief constables could be used to 
undermine and potentially inhibit the scrutiny function of the police 
authority. The ability of chief constables to do this should be limited 
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and the chief constable should be responsive to the wishes of his 
employer - the police authority. 
9. Police authority members need to be aware of the distinction 
between engagement, strategic oversight and accountability. For 
example; accountability occurs within a very clear legislative 
framework and even where police authorities have the relevant 
powers this research has identified that they appear unable or 
unwilling to exercise them (see Crime Data recording in the 
Metropolitan Police Service. 
10. Although the findings from this research provides a snapshot of 
opinion and cannot be said to be widely representative, the 
distinction between Strategic and Operational policing appears to 
be overplayed. A former chief constable explained that all decisions 
were strategic before they became operational and the role and 
involvement of the police authority was crucial at all stages. A police 
authority clerk also explained that if their police authority became 
bogged down in the debate they would be forever trying to second 
guess everything they did. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I 
Structured Questionnaire to Police Authority Members 
Please complete the questionnaire below. 
Feel free to add additional comments 
Your confidentiality and anonymity are assured as this questionnaire is not for 
publication only for inclusion in my PhD thesis. 
Who is ultimately responsible for policing in your area? 
13 Home office 
13 Police service 
13 Police authority 
13 Other 
2. Is the tripartite governance structure relevant today? 
11 Yes 
13 No 
11 Unsure 
3. Where does the balance of power reside in this structure? 
0 Home office 
13 Chief Constable 
13 Police authority 
4. Does the nature of the relationship allow the police authority to be 
proactive to events or reactive to them? 
Proactive 
13 Yes 
11 No 
El Unsure 
Reactive 
11 Yes 
11 No 
0 Unsure 
5. The position of the police authority in the tripartite system is; 
0 Equal 
11 Subservient 
0 Different but complementary 
6. Who is responsible for investigating complaints against senior police 
officers? Tick one or more boxes 
1: 1 Police Authority 
11 Police Service 
0 Home Office 
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11 HMIC 
11 IPCC 
7. Is this a reasonable or compatible area of responsibility given the 
police authority's strategic role? 
11 Yes 
0 No 
13 Unsure 
8. Who do members represent? Tick one or more boxes 
11 Themselves 
0 Police Authority 
1: 1 Police Service 
[I Residents in boroughs 
[I Home Office 
11 Other 
9. Are members doing enough to ensure that they are representing the 
views of their constituents? 
11 Yes 
11 No 
Cl Unsure 
IO. Do you think your police authority is doing enough to ensure that it is 
representing the views of its constituents? 
13 Yes 
13 No 
13 Unsure 
1 II. Are people more likely to participate if they feel represented? 
11 Yes 
11 No 
1: 1 Unsure 
0 Makes no Difference 
12. Is there a noticeable change in the way the police service responds, 
reacts or acts as a result of the police authority involvement? 
11 Yes 
13 No 
13 Unsure 
13. Do you think electing police authority chairs and members can be a 
useful part of strengthening the authority's accountability and 
independence? 
11 Yes 
11 No 
1: 1 Unsure 
14. Would elected Chief Constables improve accountability and give the 
public more of a direct say in the running of their local police forces? 
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11 Yes 
13 No 
0 Unsure 
15. Would it increase maintain or have no effect on accountability? 
11 Increase 
0 Maintain 
11 Reduce 
13 No effect 
11 Unsure 
16. Are police authority members too sympathetic to the police? 
13 Yes 
1: 1 No 
11 Unsure 
17. Is the police authority subservient to the police service? 
13 Yes 
1: 1 No 
11 Unsure 
18. Do you benefit from regular training and briefing days? 
11 Yes 
11 No 
11 Unsure 
19. Is this level of training sufficient? 
11 Yes 
13 No 
0 Unsure 
20. Are you happy with the selection process for members? 
11 Yes 
1: 1 No 
11 Unsure 
21. Would the process of electing members more democratic than the 
process of appointing members? 
13 Yes 
11 No 
11 Unsure 
22. In disputes who do you think has the final decision within the tripartite 
system? 
13 Police Authority 
13 Home Secretary 
0 Chief Constable 
23. Do you believe that the citizen has an obligation to participate in the 
consultation of the police authority? 
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0 Yes: Why? 
0 No Why? 
13 Unsure 
24. Do you think the general public knows about police authorities? 
13 Yes 
13 No 
0 Unsure 
25. Do you think the public are aware of the distinction between the police 
service and police authority? 
0 Yes 
13 No 
1-3 Unsure 
26. Does the system of national policing plans and policing priorities 
contradict the sense of localism and ownership 
13 Yes 
11 No 
13 Unsure 
27. How effective are Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCG) as a 
vehicle of consultation? 
0 Very effective 
0 Fairly effective 
0 Hardly effective 
13 Not effective 
28. Do they attract a representative audience? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
0 Unsure 
29. Do you see a distinction between accountability and transparency? 
13 Yes 
11 No 
13 Unsure 
30. Is the ability to invoke punitive measures important for accountability? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
13 Unsure 
31. Is the police authority able to place the police service under effective 
scrutiny as a result of monitoring reviews? 
11 Yes 
13 No 
13 Unsure 
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32. Should the police be told what to 
told what the police are doing? 
11 Told what to do 
11 Told what the police are doing 
1: 1 Mixture of both 
11 Unsure 
do or should the police authority be 
33. Do you feel confident that the police authority is able to bring the police 
to account? 
11 Yes 
13 No 
13 Unsure 
34. Are you confident in your ability as an authority member? 
11 Yes 
13 No 
13 Unsure 
35. What is the role of HMIC? 
13 Audit 
13 Quality 
1: 1 Monitoring 
36. Did 'Closing the Gap' reflect the general view of police authorities? 
11 Yes 
0 No 
11 Unsure 
37. Were the proposed mergers the solution to the problems identified? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
11 Unsure 
38. Is there an identified budget to assist the authority in delivering on the 
plan? 
0 Yes (how much) 
13 No (how much would you require) 
1: 1 Unsure 
Feel free to add any additional thoughts or comments you may have. 
If you are willing to participate in a brief (20 min) interview please 
indicate by leaving your contact details below. 
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Semi-Structured interview schedule 
Describe the tripartite system and how the police authority fits within it? 
Probe about the other two partners 
39. What are the primary responsibilities of the police authority? 
40. Is the tripartite governance structure relevant today? 
41. Where does the balance of power reside in this union? 
42. Is the tripartite relationship ambiguous? 
43. Does the police authority investigate complaints against police officers? 
PROBE if so what types? 
44. Do you see this as a compatible area of responsibility for the police 
authority? Probe is it reasonable! 
45. How are disagreements dealt with? PROMPT; In relation to budgets 
the police authority may have a particular view and the police service 
disagrees, how is this resolved? 
46. What noticeable changes have the police authority brought about since 
its inception? 
47. Who do members represent? 
48. What difference if any does the public representation on police 
authorities make? 
49. Does the police service respond and act differently as a result of the 
citizen's involvement? PROBE What about from ethnic minorities 
50. Is there a noticeable change in the way the police service responds, 
reacts or acts as a result of the police authority involvement? 
51. What is the key element of the police authority that defines its 
independence from the police service? 
52. How else can the independence of the police authority be bolstered? 
53. Would elected police authority members increase the independence of 
police authorities? 
54. Would elect commissioners/Chief Constables improve accountability? 
55. Is the police authority subservient to the police service? 
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56. What regular training and briefing days do members have? PROBE: Is 
this sufficient? Is it good training? 
57. In your view what does the police authority mean to the local citizen? 
PROMPT Does the general public know much about police authorities 
58. How frequently do you consult the citizen? PROMPT, can you do 
more? 
59. What does the police authority do with the citizens' input? 
60. The Police authority represents a cross cultural community: how does 
the members themselves reflect this. PROMPT has it found it 
necessary to react or re-position itself in response to the ethnically 
diverse community? 
61.1-ocally are there any powerful groups that have an interest and 
participate with the police authority. Are there marginal groups that are 
not being heard? 
62. Do you think the public is aware of the distinction between the police 
service and police authority? 
63. How well do citizens respond to attempts to consult them? 
64. Why do police authorities undertake 'Public Consultation'? PROMPT: 
How do they 
65. How effective are CPCG's as a vehicle of public consultation? 
PROMPT are there other forms used apart from CPCG's 
66. Do CPCG's attract a representative audience? 
67. Do you measure citizen involvement? PROMPT How & why 
68. How are the views of the public followed through, analysed or 
actioned? 
69. Is there sufficient public access and influence within the tripartite 
system? 
70. To what extent are the consultation processes of the police service and 
police authority joined? 
71. What impact does the police authority have on the police? 
72. Do you believe the work of the police authority is valued by the home 
office and police service? 
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73. When the Citizen's Charter was instituted in 1991, public services had 
to set out what they were trying to deliver. They had to say what they 
thought the taxpayers were entitled to receive for their money. Can a 
direct correlation be made between cost and delivery? 
74. It was also decided that services should set their own targets, own, 
their charters, rather than have them imposed from outside. Do 
national policing plans conflict with local priorities? 
75. For the police authority is there a distinction between accountability 
and transparency? PROMPT How is the police authority transparent in 
the way it works? PROMPT How is it accountable? 
76. To whom is the police authority accountable? 
77. Do reviews act as an effective method of accountability? PROMPT 
Give me an example of where this has happened? 
78.1s it necessary to consider measuring in this way? PROMPT to 
previous question 
79. Have the police authority ordered the police service to do anything? 
80. To what extent do you rely on the police for data and information? 
8 1. What specific power does the police authority have over the police? 
82. In your view do you think there is a good range of skill sets amongst 
your authority members? 
83. What was the process and type of consultation that you undertook on 
your previous policing plan? 
84. Do the national policing plan and local policing plan complement each 
other? 
85. What is the role of HMIC? 
86. What powers of sanction does HMIC have over the police authority and 
police force? 
The Local Government Act 1999 requires Police Authorities to produce a 
Best Value Performance Plan and undertake Best Value Reviews of its 
functions. 
87. What types of best value reviews have you undertaken? 
88. What did the review identify in terms of the aims and clarity of the 
authority's work? 
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89. Do you have an improvement plan? 
90. Who is leading on it? Possible interview of the person 
91. ls there an identified budget to deliver on the improvement plan 
PROMPT if yes how much if no how much would be required? 
92. How do you distinguish between operational' and 'non-operational 
policing in the context of the independence of chief 
constables/commissioners'? 
93. What's your view of "closing the gap"? 
94. How do the proposed mergers facilitate increased local involvement? 
95. Who is ultimately responsible for policing? 
96. Can I see documentation of the consultation process? 
97. Can I have a copy of your best value reviews 
Appendix 2 
List of Interviewees 
North Yorkshire Police Authority 
Councillor: Potter 23rd October 2007 
Nottingham Police authority: 
David Dean 
Llandudno Police Authority: 
Independent Member Mr. Drew , 23d July 2007 
Sussex Police Authority: 
Councillor Member David Rogers, 23rd July 2007 
Former Home Secretary: 
1 gth Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP, December 2006 
Sussex Police Authority: 
th Independent Member Mr. Laurie Bush, 27 July 2007 
Former Chief Constable City of London Police: 
Perry Nove, 8 th July 2008 
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Cumbria Police Authority: 
Councillor Member Michael Ash, 3rd November 2007 
Staffordshire Police Authority: 
th Independent Member Mr. Gothard 14 December 2006 
Metropolitan Police Authority: 
th Independent Member Cindy Butts 25 January 2007 
Metropolitan Police Authority: 
nd Magistrate Member Rachael Whittaker 22 January 07 
Metropolitan Police Authority: 
Director Catherine Crawford 20th November 2006 
Metropolitan Police Authority: 
th Independent Member Karim Murji, 25 January 2007 
Metropolitan Police Authority: 
Oth Magistrate Member Richard Barnes, 2 February 2006 
Metropolitan Police Authority: 
th Independent Member Lord Harris 26 February 2007 
North Yorkshire Police Authorit 
1 qYh Councillor Member Greg White February 2008 I 
Dorset Police Authority: 
Councillor Member B. G Cooper 1 gth February 2008 
Lancashire Police Authority: 
Councillor Gary Bell I gth February 2008 
Gwent Police Authority: 
Oth Councillor Member Colin Mann, 2 February 2008 
Essex Police Authority: 
1 gth Councillor Member Robert Chambers February 2008 
Senior Civil Servant: Name withheld 
1 gth January 2007 
Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary: 
Chris Grayling Mp 1 Ith June 2008 
Association of Police Authorities 
Policy Officer Cat McIntyre 29th February 2008 
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West Midlands Police Authority: 
nd Councillor Member & Chair of APA Bob Jones, 22 April 2008 
Association of Police Authorities; 
Executive Director Fionnuala Gill 29th February 2008 
Appendix 3 
Chronology of Acts 
Statute of Winchester (1285) 
Authority for local law-enforcement derived primarily from the Statute of 
Winchester (1285), which, although essentially a codification of much earlier 
measures, encompassed instructions on the communities' obligations 
regarding the possession of weapons and maintenance of the king's peace. 
As a precaution against violent assaults, robberies and other unlawful acts, 
there were provisions concerning watch keeping. The statute specifically gave 
the power to constables and watchmen to arrest suspicious strangers, who 
were to be kept under guard until further investigation by the justices or, as 
was the norm by the fourteenth century, at gaol delivery. Two constables in 
each hundred (a subdivision of counties), who were responsible to the county 
keepers of the peace, were entrusted with the inspection of arms and on two 
occasions each year were to check that the watchmen were armed according 
to their competence. They held the titles of capitales constabularii et 
custodes pacis---ý'constable of hundreds and keepers of peace" (Adam and 
Stephens: 2005). 
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Justices of the Peace Act 1361 
The title Justices of the Peace derives from 1361, in the reign of 
Edward Ill. An Act of 1327 had referred to "good and lawful men" to be 
appointed in every county in the land to "guard the Peace". Justices of the 
Peace still retain (and occasionally use) the power conferred or re-conferred 
on them in 1361 to bind over unruly persons "to be of good behaviour'. The 
bind over is not a punishment, but a preventive measure, intended to ensure 
that people thought likely to offend will not do so. 
For the following 600 years, and continuing today, Justices of the 
Peace have undertaken the greater part of the judicial work carried out in 
England and Wales on behalf of the Sovereign. For most of that time - until 
the invention of our modern system of local government in the 19th Century - 
JPs also administered the country at a local level. They fixed wages, built and 
controlled roads and bridges, and undertook to provide and supervise locally 
those services thought by the Monarch and by Parliament to be necessary for 
the welfare of the country (Her Majesty's Court Service: 2005). 
Improvement Act 1762 
This act impacted on law and order by making provision for each town 
to levy a fee for local watching, lighting, paving and street cleaning. Through 
the Improvement Act 1762 more towns employed paid watch. 
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Birmingham Police Act 1839 
The Birmingham Police Act 1839 took control of the police away from 
the council authorising the Home office to establish a force of around 250 
constables with 50 officers to begin policing the streets, and a commissioner 
answerable to the Home office to manage the force. 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 
The act established that the force was under the control of the Home 
Secretary. Metropolitan police officers received regular pay, which was not 
standard practice outside the Metropolitan police area. Also in London all 
former watchmen and constables were dismissed and new people were 
employed, however in other areas the same people were seen as a source of 
cheap labour and kept on. 
Municipal Corporations Act 1835 
Municipal Corporations Act 1835 removed the responsibility of police 
as improvement commissioners under the Improvement Act 1762 and broke 
the link where police were secured under the Lighting and Watching Act 1833. 
This meant that the role of the police was exclusively to keep the peace. The 
act empowered the watch committee to take preventative action to halt 
misuse, or abuse of the system coupled with the responsibility of it to 
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discharge any constable it felt jeopardised the office. It was a tool for 
rearranging the administration and management of councils with the 
requirement to establish a police force being only one aspect of it. The act 
initially only applied to the 178 boroughs in England and Wales that had been 
granted charters of self-government 
County Police Act 1839 
County Police Act 1839 gave justices of the peace the power to appoint 
a chief officer of police who would hold statutory office and only be dismissed 
at Quarter or General Sessions. The act also made all county forces subject 
to the rules concerning government pay, clothing and accoutrements of 
constables. Justices were empowered but not required to establish a force 
and there was no centralisation of police powers. The standing of the county 
chief constable was much greater than that of the borough chief and under 
this arrangement the chief constable was to an even higher degree under the 
authority of the Home office. Once in post the only power the justices had was 
that they could dismiss the chief constable. The chief constable had the power 
to appoint constables, promote, demote, fine, suspend or dismiss constables 
at will. 
County and Borough Police Act 1856 
Boroughs with populations of less than five thousand were not entitled 
to grants but in 1874 in order to adequately cover pay and clothing the 
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exchequer increased the funds to all police forces from a quarter to one half of 
their total requirement. 
The act made it compulsory for all counties to establish a rural police 
force. The act also reinforced the power of the watch committee and the 
justices and introduced a provision for the central inspection of police forces, 
enabling the crown to appoint three inspectors of constabulary to assess the 
efficiency of all forces. The act made a grant available to forces that served a 
population of over five thousand and was seen by many as an incentive for 
smaller areas to merge. The bill also contained clauses which prevented the 
agreement from being broken once entered without the home secretary's 
consent and an order in council to impose an agreement on any reluctant 
council. 
Municipal Corporations Act 1877 
Municipal Corporations Act 1877 imposed the first compulsory check 
on the formation of new police forces by stipulating that a separate police 
force could not be established unless the population exceeded 20,000 
The Local Government Act 1888 
The Local Government Act 1888 established the administrative pattern 
for policing, establishing county councils and under their aegis, standing joint 
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committees consisting of two thirds elected councilors and one third local 
magistrates to be the police authority. 
Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994. 
The act made police authorities independent of local government and 
because combined, joint and single police authority structures were local 
government arrangements the 3 structures became obsolete. The act also 
substantially reduced the size of police authorities and the numbers of elected 
councillors on them and independent members were introduced to police 
authorities. Police authority membership as a result of the act consisted of 9 
IOCal councillors, 5 independent or appointee members and 3 magistrate 
members totalling 17 members. Some larger authorities had slightly more 
members; for example the Metropolitan Police Authority had 23 members 
which enabled it to more adequately represent London's size and make up. 
Magistrates Court Act 1996 
The provisions within the act are as follows 
9 Publish local policing plans (Section 8, Police Act 1996), 
* Monitor performance measures, including collecting and publishing 
performance information 
9 Produce an efficiency plan 
9 Deliver Best Value, 
344 
Consider the Constabulary's finance and resources, plan and decide 
the overall budget 
Investigate complaints against senior police officers and monitor overall 
complaints procedure 
* Oversee the Custody Visitors Scheme and have an input into the 
appointment of authority members. 
9 Appointing Chief Police Officers. 
The Police Act 1964 
The Police Act 1964 replaced the old system of watch committees and 
joint standing committees with a single system of police authorities. Watch 
committees had previously been composed entirely of councilors, whilst half 
of the members of the joint standing committees were magistrates. The new 
authorities consisted of two-thirds councilors and one-third magistrates with 
there being three basic forms of authority; the Single, the combined and the 
Joint police authority. 
the 1964 Police Act set up the Tripartite system giving equal powers to each 
of the three partners 
The 1994 Police and Magistrates Act and the 1996 Police Act 
The 1994 Police and Magistrates Act and the 1996 Police Act cut the 
size of police authorities from 35 members to 17, got rid of direct elections to 
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the authorities and transferred control over police budgets from the police 
authority to chief constables. 
Appendix 4 
Terms and definitions that / have developed 
1. Route to progress refers to the transparent channels and 
opportunities available to individuals and communities to improve their 
positions and attain success. It denotes available routes reflected in the 
structures, policies and conduct of the political, social and economic 
system. 
2. Cross-cultural symbioses; the unavoidable cross fertilisation of 
ideas, terms, experiences, religions, idioms and practices which enter a 
particular dominant culture and become inextricably linked to it and 
overtime being incapable of separation. 
3. Enhanced Cultural Cohesion (ECC). 'Cross-cultural symbioses can 
lead to ECC. Fl + OP + HB = ECC. Enabling a feeling of inclusion (FI) 
an opportunity for participation (OP) + a'greater sense of being heard 
and belonging (1-113) = Enhanced Cultural Cohesion (ECC). 
4. Involuntary principle of participation we participate involuntarily by 
the intrusion of the media and the outside world into our homes and 
private space, 
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5. Functionally procedural institution responsibilities and duties can 
only be performed by them in so far as other parties permit it to 
function. What it then does is provides a functional service which is 
functional. 
Appendix 5 
Crime Data Recording Scrutiny report updsate. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
APA Association of Police Authorities 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 
PACE Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
CPCG Community Police Consultative Group 
PCCG Police Community Consultative Groups 
CDRP Crime Disorder Reduction Partnerships.... 
ICVP Independent Custody Visiting 
LSP Local Strategic Partnership 
RDA Regional Development Agencies 
GO Government Offices, 
LSC Learning and Skills Councils (CDRP) 
BTPA British Transport Police Authority 
DEFRA Department for Environment Food and Rural 
affairs 
LAA Local Area Agreements 
BMA British Medical Association 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
FI Feeling of Inclusion 
OP Opportunity for Participation 
HB Heard and Belonging 
ECC Enhanced Cultural Cohesion 
HMIC Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary 
LGA Government Association 
IPPC Independent Police Complaints Commission 
PPAF Professional Policing Assessment Framework 
ABC Activity Based Costing 
QUANGOS Quasi Non Governmental Organisations 
LVP Lay Visiting Panels 
PPP Public Private partnerships 
PFI Public Finance Initiative 
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